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ABSTRACT 
The primary objective of this study is to examine whether minority shareholder 
expropriation in Malaysian firms occur through related party transactions (RPTs) which 
are likely to result in expropriation and the domestic banking channel as well as whether 
it is influence by independent directors’ tenure.  An analysis is made on whether this 
expropriation is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. Furthermore, an 
assessment is also made whether there is a positive moderating effect of controlling 
shareholders’ ownership on the relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) 
which are likely to result in expropriation, independent directors’ tenure and the number 
of domestic banks that the firm engages with, and firm value in Malaysian firms. 
Further analysis is also made on whether this positive moderating effect (if any) is 
stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. This research utilises panel data 
pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model and the Fixed Effect Least 
Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) model for data analysis. In this research, minority 
shareholder expropriation is found in both family and non-family firms. However, 
minority shareholder expropriation through RPTs is found to be stronger in family firms 
compared to non-family firms. In addition, expropriation due to long tenure of 
independent directors occur only in family firms in exclusive industries and this 
expropriation cannot be proven whether it is stronger in family firms or non-family 
firms. In family firms, corporate reputational effects after the Transmile scandal also 
help reduce expropriation through the positive moderating effects of controlling 
shareholders’ ownership. This moderating effects is stronger in family firms compared 
to non-family firms. Basically, this study shows us that there is a need for the relevant 
authorities in this country i.e. the Securities Commission (SC) to seriously incorporate 
minority shareholder protection in future issuance of Codes of Corporate Governance. 
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                                                                 ABSTRAK 
Objektif utama kajian ini adalah untuk mengkaji sama ada rampasan pemegang saham 
minoriti dalam syarikat Malaysia berlaku melalui urus niaga pihak berkaitan (RPT) dan 
saluran perbankan domestik serta sama ada ia dipengaruhi oleh tempoh pengarah bebas. 
Analisis dibuat sama ada rampasan ini adalah lebih kuat dalam firma keluarga 
berbanding dengan firma bukan keluarga. Tambahan pula, penilaian juga dibuat sama 
ada terdapat kesan pemilikan pemegang saham utama di atas hubungan antara urus 
niaga pihak berkaitan (RPT) yang mungkin menyebabkan rampasan, pengarah bebas 
pemegang saham tempoh dan bilangan bank tempatan bahawa firma itu terlibat dengan 
nilai firma dalam syarikat-syarikat Malaysia. Analisis juga dibuat mengenai sama ada 
kesan positif ini sederhana (jika ada) adalah lebih kuat dalam firma keluarga berbanding 
dengan firma bukan keluarga. Kajian ini menggunakan data panel (OLS) model regresi 
dan Kesan Tetap (LSDV) untuk menganalisis data. Dalam kajian ini, rampasan 
pemegang saham minoriti didapati dalam firma keluarga dan bukan keluarga. Walau 
bagaimanapun, rampasan pemegang saham minoriti melalui RPT didapati lebih kuat 
dalam firma keluarga berbanding dengan firma bukan keluarga. Di samping itu, 
rampasan kerana tempoh lama pengarah bebas berlaku hanya di firma keluarga dalam 
industri eksklusif dan rampasan ini tidak dapat dibuktikan sama ada ia adalah lebih kuat 
dalam firma keluarga atau firma bukan keluarga. Dalam syarikat keluarga, kesan 
reputasi korporat selepas skandal Transmile juga membantu mengurangkan rampasan 
pemegang saham minoriti. Kesan positif pemilikan saham pemegang saham utama 
melalui RPT didapati lebih kuat dalam firma keluarga berbanding dengan firma bukan 
keluarga. Kajian ini menunjukkan bahawa terdapat keperluan bagi pihak berkuasa 
seperti Suruhanjaya Sekuriti (SC) memberi perlindungan kepada pemegang saham 
minoriti dalam penerbitan Kod Tadbir Urus Korporat pada masa hadapan. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
OVERVIEW OF THESIS 
1.1    INTRODUCTION 
Most corporate governance discussions centre on the traditional shareholder-manager 
problems generally referred to as Agency Problem Type I – principal-agent problem 
(De Cesari, 2012) which is prevalent in widely held firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
However, in firms controlled by one or more shareholders with large stakes (controlled 
firms), the interests of the firms‘ controlling shareholders usually are not aligned with 
the firms‘ minority shareholders.  The consequence of this misalignment is that 
corporate insiders possess incentives to pursue private benefits at the expense of outside 
shareholders, which result in minority shareholder expropriation (De Cesari, 2012).  
This is generally referred to as Agency Problem Type II – principal-principal problem.  
In this scenario, the conflict is between principal (majority shareholder) and principal 
(minority shareholder).  The minority shareholder expropriation refers to the transfer of 
resources out of a company to its controlling shareholder at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2000b).  Minority 
shareholder expropriation often occurs in countries with weak corporate governance 
such as those in emerging markets where most firms are controlled by families and 
ownership is highly concentrated (Claessens and Yurtoglu, 2012).   
In these markets, family controlling shareholders assume control of most business 
corporations (Ahlstrom, Chen and Yeh, 2010; Liu, Yang and Zhang, 2010) and they 
possess the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders as well as depriving them 
their right to appropriate returns on their investments (Cueto, 2013).  This makes 
family-controlled firms in emerging markets different from non-family firms due to the 
tendency of family controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders 
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(Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan, 2002; Peng and Jiang, 2010).  Jiang and Peng 
(2011) supported this assertion when they find that family firms tend to use certain 
control structures associated with expropriation activities.  Apart from the literature 
which reasons that family firms in emerging markets are more prone to minority 
shareholder expropriation, there are also studies which argue that within these markets, 
expropriation in family firms can be reduced due to reputational effects. These studies 
include Gomes (2000), Khanna and Palepu (2000) as well as Khanna and Yafeh (2007).  
However, Peng and Jiang (2010) argue that in emerging markets, these effects are 
deemed as a poor substitute for institutional deficiencies such as poor legal protection of 
minority shareholders because even firms with good reputation have exploited minority 
shareholders particularly during periods of financial crisis (Johnson, Boone, Breach and 
Friedman, 2000a).  Nevertheless, this line of reasoning is unconvincing because it does 
not take into account the effect of corporate governance fiascos such as the Transmile
1
 
case in Malaysia, which could have a strong reputational impact on the corporate 
governance of family firms.  For that reason, the argument that reputational effects are a 
poor substitute for institutional deficiencies may not be valid. 
Having considered the various arguments by academic scholars, this research examines 
expropriation in Malaysian public-listed companies with attention given to family firms.  
Malaysia is chosen as the country for analysis due to its high ownership concentration, 
family ownership dominance as well as its weaker corporate governance compared with 
developed economies (Liew, 2007).  Furthermore, it is envisaged that there will be 
negative firm value effects particularly in family firms in Malaysia as the highly 
concentrated ownership structure encourages family controlling shareholders to 
expropriate resources from their firms using related party transactions (RPTs). 
                                                          
1
 In the Transmile case which occurred in early 2007, the firm‘s revenue was inflated in the financial statement (Securities 
Commission, 2011c). This is a dent to the corporate reputation of family firms in this country as Transmile at that time is owned 
by the Kuok family which is one of the large family business groups in Malaysia. 
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An overview of this research is provided by this chapter.  The discussion in this chapter 
is organised as follows. Section 1.2 provides the background of this study. Section 1.3 
discusses the problem statement, which highlight the research gaps in the corporate 
governance literature related to expropriation. Section 1.4 discusses the research 
objectives and research questions. Section 1.5  discusses the research hypotheses. 
Section 1.6 discusses the significance of this research. Section 1.7 explains the 
organisation of this study and Section 1.8 concludes the chapter.  
1.2  BACKGROUND 
Increasingly it appears that there is no ―one-size-fits-all‖ corporate governance model 
which is relevant in all national contexts (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997, 1998; Lubatkin, Lane, Collin  and Very, 2005).  The predominant model 
of corporate governance is a product of developed economies (primarily the United 
States and United Kingdom), where efficient enforcement of arm‘s-length agency 
contracts is prevalent (Peng, 2003).  Also, in developed economies, because ownership 
and control are often separated and legal mechanisms are available to protect owners‘ 
interests; such as the governance conflict that receives the major attention is the 
principal-agent conflict between owners (principals) and managers (agents) (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  On the other hand, in emerging economies, the institutional context 
makes the enforcement of agency contracts more costly and problematic (North, 1990; 
Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson and Peng, 2005).  This results in the prevalence of 
concentrated firm ownership (Dharwadkar, George and Brandes, 2000) especially by 
families (Ahlstrom et.al., 2010; Heugens, Van Essen and Van Oosterhout, 2009; Liu 
et.al., 2010; Peng and Jiang, 2010; Schulze and Gedajlovic, 2010; Zhang and Ma, 
2009). Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000a) finds that the largest ten families in 
emerging markets such as Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand control half of the 
corporate assets. Concentrated ownership coupled with absence of effective external 
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corporate governance mechanisms provide opportunities for controlling shareholders 
especially from family groups to expropriate resources from their firms and indirectly 
disadvantage the minority shareholders (Morck, Wolfenzon and Yeung, 2005).  An 
important consequence of minority shareholder expropriation is the reduction in firm 
value (Barclay and Holderness, 1989; Bebchuk, 1999; Bebchuk, Kraakman and 
Triantis, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang, 1999b; Claessens, Djankov, Fan and 
Lang, 2002; Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell, 2008; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Grossman 
and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988b; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Lins, 2003; 
McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Zingales, 1994).  
This reduction in firm value occurs because firms, which are expropriated by 
controlling shareholders, engage in actions which provide private benefits to controlling 
shareholders rather than enhancing overall shareholder value (Anderson and Reeb, 
2003; Dahya et.al., 2008; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999; Lins, 2003; 
Morck, Stangeland and Yeung, 2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Qian, Pan and Yeung, 
2011).  
 Such actions include appointing unqualified friends or family members as senior 
managers, engaging in self-beneficial trades, advancing family and political agendas 
that hamper corporate performance and appropriating the profits of lower-tier firms in a 
pyramid business group e.g.tunnelling (Chen, Li and Shapiro, 2011).  These actions 
usually occur in family-controlled firms because family owners possess the incentives 
to engage in actions which are in their best interest but not necessarily in the best 
interests of their minority shareholders who may not have any voice in firm governance 
and only limited formal or informal means to protect their interests (Yoshikawa and 
Rasheed, 2010). 
The possibility of controlling shareholders expropriating minority shareholders and the 
resulting reduction in the firm value had attracted the interests of numerous academic 
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scholars. Many studies have examined the indicators of minority shareholder 
expropriation (Faccio, Lang and Young, 2001a; Jiang, Lee and Yue, 2010; 
Krishnamurti, Sevic and Sevic, 2005; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 
2000a; Mitton, 2002; among others) as well as the likelihood of the existence of 
expropriation (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2008; Johnson et.al., 
2000a; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; 2000b; Nenova, 2003; 
among others).  However, there is still limited evidence on the specific transactions 
which controlling shareholders could use for minority shareholder expropriation, the 
impact of independent directors‘ tenure on expropriation, the effect of the number of 
domestic banks that the firm engages with on expropriation, the moderating effects of 
ownership types (i.e. family and non-family ownership) on expropriation and whether 
expropriation as well as the moderating effects of ownership on expropriation is 
stronger in Malaysian family firms compared to non-family firms.  
These studies are significant because the analysis on the specific transactions which 
could be used for minority shareholder expropriation shows the real act of expropriation 
whereas the impact of independent directors‘ tenure on expropriation shows the 
effectiveness of independent directors as the firm‘s internal corporate governance 
mechanism.  In addition, the impact of the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with on expropriation shows how the domestic banking channel could be 
abused for expropriation purposes.  Furthermore, the analysis of the moderating effects 
of controlling shareholder‘s ownership on expropriation shows the effectiveness of 
controlling shareholder‘s ownership as the firm‘s internal corporate governance 
mechanism or as a source of entrenchment.  The comparison of whether expropriation 
as well as the moderating effects of ownership on expropriation is more prevalent in 
Malaysian family firms or non-family firms shows the significance of these issues in 
both types of firms. Therefore, in this study, I examine expropriation in public-listed 
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family firms, within the context of Malaysia.  It is important to examine minority 
shareholder expropriation within the context of the different institutional settings 
(Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera, 2012) as the efficacy of corporate governance in a 
particular country is strongly determined by its institutional context (Doidge, Karolyi 
and Stulz, 2007).  Malaysia provides an interesting emerging market setting to analyse 
minority shareholder expropriation due to its high ownership concentration, dominance 
of family ownership and weaker corporate governance compared with developed 
economies (Liew, 2007) 
1.3       PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In most corporate governance studies, expropriation is indirectly inferred such as the 
firm value effects of the separation of ownership and control rights of the firm‘s 
controlling shareholder (i.e. the effect of its ratio of cash-flow rights over its control 
rights towards firm value) (Claessens et.al., 2002; Krishnamurti et.al., 2005; Mitton, 
2002; among others) as well as by the rate of dividends paid to shareholders (Faccio 
et.al., 2001a; La Porta et.al., 2000a; among others).  Furthermore, economists also 
indirectly infer expropriation through the price paid for corporate control (Zingales, 
1994; Dyck and Zingales; Nenova, 2003; Atanasov, 2005). Some studies even used the 
legal system (in particular investor protection) to examine the likelihood of the 
existence of expropriation in a particular country or region (Djankov et.al., 2008; 
Johnson et.al., 2000a; La Porta et.al., 1998; 2000b; among others).  
While these studies have generally suggested the existence of expropriation, they do not 
identify specific types of transactions that could be used by controlling shareholders to 
expropriate resources from their firms.  Furthermore, the firm value effects of these 
transactions have not been widely examined (Jiang, Lee and Yue, 2010).  This study 
examines a particular type of transaction that could be used for that purpose (i.e. related 
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party transactions (RPTs) which are likely to result in expropriation) and their firm 
value effects.  The extant literature only provides limited evidence with respect to this 
i.e. Cheung, Rau and Stouraitis (2006), Cheung, Jing, Lu, Rau and Stouraitis (2009) and 
Peng, Wei and Yang (2011).  In addition to that, their studies only focussed on the 
market reaction (market valuation) to the announcement of RPTs which are likely to 
result in expropriation (i.e. what they conduct are event studies) (Cheung et.al., 2006; 
Cheung et.al., 2009; Peng et.al., 2011). However, the timeframe that they used to gauge 
the market reaction is within a maximum range of twenty days (i.e. maximum days 
before the announcement and maximum ten days after the announcement).  The 
weaknesses of such studies are that their results do not provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the firm value effects.  Event studies deal with the change around the 
status i.e. usually within a short timeframe surrounding the event that occurred 
(MacKinlay, 1997).  
In the context of expropriation studies, event studies are not entirely suitable as firm 
value effects should not just be measured within a short timeframe (only days)(Cheung 
et.al., 2006; Cheung et.al., 2009; Peng et.al., 2011) but in years as expropriation by 
controlling shareholders can exist for years within their firms as demonstrated by the 
findings of Faccio et.al. (2001a), Krishnamurti et.al. (2005), La Porta et.al. (2000a), 
Mitton (2002), among others.  Hence, a regression of firm value effects that cover 
several years will provide a clearer picture of the relationship between RPTs which are 
likely to result in expropriation and firm value.  Panel regression will provide a clearer 
indication of the existence of controlling shareholders‘ expropriation as it focuses on the 
progress and allows observation of the change of a particular variable over a period of 
time and it can provide a detectable change on that variable as the process involves 
repeated measurements of that same variable over time (Diggle, Liang and Zigger, 
1994; Rajulton, 2001).  This research examines the firm value effects of RPTs which 
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are likely to result in expropriation using an approach which analyse a period of a few 
years (i.e. 3 years) rather than an event study approach.    
In order to reduce the usage of RPTs by controlling shareholders for expropriation, 
board oversight is important.  As such, an independent director is a significant internal 
corporate governance mechanism for monitoring expropriation activities (OECD, 
2009). However, there are certain problems related to the monitoring function of 
independent directors. Their impartiality in executing their duties may be affected by 
their tenure as their independence are very likely to be compromised when their tenure 
increase
2
.  As the tenure of the independent directors increase, controlling shareholders 
particularly those from family firms, possess the incentives to exert influence on the 
independent directors in order to expropriate resources from their firms; hence, reducing 
firm value (Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2004; Lin, Piotroski, Tan and Yang, 2011b; 
Securities Commission, 2011a; Yunos, Smith, Ismail and Ahmad, 2011).  As a result, 
the social cohesion between controlling shareholders and the independent directors will 
increase (Westphal, 1999) which consequently contributes to expropriation by the 
former (Anderson et.al., 2004; Lin et.al., 2011b; Securities Commission, 2011a; Yunos 
et.al., 2011).  
On the other hand, within the context of the corporate governance problems that occur 
in Malaysia; independent directors‘ tenure may also have a positive impact on firm 
value.  This possibility could arise in the post-Transmile period.  During this period, 
reputational considerations come into play as independent directors of family firms 
want to preserve the corporate reputation of their firms (Oh, 2011).  Independent 
directors want good corporate reputation because poor reputation may lower their future 
employment prospects with non-family firms (Othman and Rahman, 2010).  Hence, as 
                                                          
2  In fact, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2012 proposes to limit independent directors‘ tenure to a 
maximum of nine years (Part 3, Para. 3.3). 
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their tenure increases, they may fully utilise their experiences and skills gained to add 
value to their firms in order to maintain the company‘s reputation. 
Despite the possibility of a negative or a positive effect of independent directors‘ tenure 
on firm value, the extant corporate governance literature provides very limited empirical 
evidence on issues related to the effects of board tenure.  Previous research only 
documented evidence with respect to the effects of independent directors‘ tenure on 
CEO compensation (Vafeas, 2003), timeliness of corporate internet reporting 
(Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008) and earnings management (Liu and Sun, 2010).  
Hence, it would be interesting to examine the firm value effects of independent 
directors‘ tenure, as this would contribute to the corporate governance literature.  
Despite the corporate reputational effects on independent directors of family firms, I 
expect independent directors‘ tenure particularly those from family firms to have a 
negative impact on firm value in Malaysia as this is in line with the proposal in the 
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2012 to limit the tenure to a 
maximum nine years.  
Although independent directors can be considered a significant internal corporate 
governance mechanism to reduce expropriation; there are also other potential internal 
corporate governance mechanisms which can be considered. One such mechanism is 
ownership concentration.  However, the corporate governance implication of 
concentrated ownership by different types of owners such as family owners, state 
owners, foreign owners, etc is a relatively unexplored area (Cascino, Pugliese, 
Mussolino and Sansone, 2010; Holderness and Sheehan, 1988; Short, 1994).  The 
existing corporate governance literature only provides limited empirical evidence on the 
moderating effects of ownership types (family vs non-family) on expropriation 
(Iskandar, Bukit and Sanusi, 2012; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010). Iskandar et.al. 
(2012) show the significance of the moderating effects of foreign and managerial 
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ownership on expropriation.  Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2010) demonstrate that bank and 
foreign ownership play a significant role in moderating expropriation.  However, these 
studies did not examine the moderating effects of controlling shareholders‘ ownership 
on the relationship between RPTs, independent directors‘ tenure and the number of 
domestic banks that the firm engages with, against firm value as they only generally 
demonstrate the significance of the different types of ownership in moderating 
expropriation.  
It is important to analyse the moderating effects of controlling shareholders‘ ownership 
because theoretically, there are two possible implications of concentrated ownership.  
Morck et.al. (1988) argue that controlling shareholders respond to two opposing forces 
and that the moderating effect of concentrated ownership depends on which force 
dominates.  The opposing forces work in the following way. Controlling shareholders‘ 
natural tendency is to allocate the firm‘s resources in their own best interests, which 
may conflict  with the interests  of the minority shareholders. This is called the 
entrenchment effect of controlling shareholders.  However, as their ownership increases, 
their interests could also be likely to coincide more closely with those of minority 
shareholders. This is called the incentive alignment effect (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The first of these forces has a negative moderating effect whereas, the second has a 
positive effect (Morck  et.al., 1988).   
However, within the context of the unique institutional setting as well as the corporate 
governance issues in Malaysia, it is argued that the explanations of these moderating 
effects are somewhat different.  Contrary to the assertions by Morck et.al. (1988), it is 
argued that in Malaysian family firms, controlling shareholders‘ ownership may have a 
positive moderating effect when their ownership increases.  This is likely to occur in the 
post-Transmile period as investors confidence on family firms was shattered following 
the Transmile episode (Song, 2010).  When family controlled shareholders‘ ownership 
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increases, they possess higher ownership of their firms‘ equity.  Since, they own more 
of their firms‘ equity; their incentives to preserve corporate reputation and to reduce 
expropriation are higher because poor corporate reputation can affect them as well as 
their family members (Gomez, 1999; Loy, 2010).  As a result, this corporate 
reputational effect helps align the incentives of controlling shareholders to the minority 
shareholders when ownership of controlling shareholders increases (Loy, 2010).  
Therefore, it would be interesting to empirically analyse the positive moderating effects 
of family controlling shareholders‘ ownership on expropriation in Malaysia.  This 
analysis will verify the prediction made as well as contribute to the corporate 
governance literature. 
Apart from the internal corporate governance mechanisms, external corporate 
governance mechanisms such as bank monitoring may also play a role in firm 
governance. Most studies of bank monitoring are associated with syndicated loans, 
focusing more on the information asymmetry between the lead bank with the syndicated 
participants (Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Champagne and 
Kryzanowski, 2007; Sufi, 2007). However, these studies did not test the strength of the 
monitoring role of banks in corporate governance in which the strength is measured by 
the number of banks that the firm engages with (Fan, Wei and Xu, 2011; Hermawan and 
Dina, 2011).  Theoretically, an increase in the number of banks that the firm engages 
with may render the bank monitoring function to become ineffective (Hermawan and 
Dina, 2011).  This is because when a company deals with many banks as its source of 
debt financing, each bank might rely on the other banks to do the monitoring function 
on their borrowers and does not do the monitoring on their own.  This may allow 
controlling shareholders to engage in opportunistic behaviours such as loan 
expropriation (Hermawan and Dina, 2011).  The empirical evidence with regards to this 
is limited. Hermawan and Dina (2011) find that an increase in the number of banks that 
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the firm engages with reduces firm value.  However, their study did not segregate the 
banks into domestic and foreign categories.  The strength of monitoring in domestic 
banks may be different from foreign banks within certain institutional contexts 
(Thillainathan, 1999).  The extant literature provides limited evidence on the strength of 
domestic bank monitoring.  
Only Fok, Chang and Lee (2004) provide some evidence with regards to this by 
analysing the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages 
with and firm value in Taiwan.  Since, the strength of monitoring in domestic banks is 
dependent upon its institutional context (Thillainathan, 1999), it can be argued that the 
institutional setting in Taiwan has a strong effect on the results obtained by Fok et.al. 
(2004).  The generalisability of their results can be debated because the institutional 
setting in Taiwan may not be the same as other countries.  For example, the level of 
investor protection in Taiwan is not the same as common law countries or French-civil-
law countries because German origin laws are used in Taiwan (La Porta et.al., 1998).  
As a result, it can be argued that the findings by Fok et.al. (2004) are contextual by 
nature.  Since, contextual findings are important in expropriation studies (Aguilera and 
Crespi-Cladera, 2012), it is important to analyse these effects in Malaysia.  
Furthermore, another unique institutional feature in Malaysia is the existence of bank-
directed lending in the domestic banking system (Ang, 2009; Ang and Sen, 2011; 
Economic Planning Unit, 1981, 2001, 2006, 2011) which further increases the 
significance of conducting such a study in the Malaysian context.  Due to the existence 
of bank-directed lending within the domestic banking system, controlling shareholders 
particularly those from family firms may expropriate the loans obtained from these 
domestic banks as debt provide incentives for expropriation in emerging markets 
(Faccio, Lang and Young, 2001c).  They can also obtain these loans without proper 
scrutiny (Bhattacharya, 2001; Laeven, 1999; Perera, 2011; Sharma, 2001; Thillainathan, 
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1999).  Moreover, the more domestic banks are engaged by the firm, the more loans the 
firm can obtain via bank-directed lending (IMF, 1998; Kroszner, 1998; Kwack, 2000; 
Oh, 1998; Perera, 2011; Sharma, 2001; Thillainathan, 1999).  Hence, if the firm engages 
more domestic banks for financing purposes, the more loans the controlling shareholder 
may expropriate via bank-directed lending and as a result, firm value may be reduced.  
Therefore, it would be interesting to analyse the firm value effects due to the number of 
domestic banks that Malaysian firms engages with in particular, family firms. 
Despite the previous arguments, the extant literature only provides limited empirical 
evidence as to whether expropriation and the positive moderating effects of controlling 
shareholders‘ ownership on expropriation is more prevalent in family firms or among 
non-family firms in the context of the Malaysian institutional setting.  So far, only 
Munir and Gul (2011) and Munir and Salleh (2010) provide some evidence about this 
assessment.  However, their studies do not assess the relevance of expropriation with 
respect to the impact of expropriation against the independent directors‘ tenure and the 
strength of domestic bank monitoring. The relevance of the positive moderating effect 
of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on expropriation is not assessed as well.  
Besides, it is likely that the potential negative relationships between RPTs (which are 
likely to result in expropriation), independent directors‘ tenure and the number of 
domestic banks that the firm engages with, may result in firm value which is higher 
among family firms compared with non-family firms.  This is because family owners 
possess private objectives which can result in actions which advance their family 
welfare at the expense of minority shareholders (Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino and Bucholtz, 
2001).  Furthermore, it is also likely that the positive moderating effect of controlling 
shareholders‘ ownership on expropriation is stronger in family firms due to the 
corporate reputational effects as predicted previously.  Hence, it is timely to investigate 
empirically the incidence of expropriation and observe whether the relationship between 
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expropriation and firm value is stronger among firms with controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership (family firms) than non-family firms in Malaysia.  
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Considering the limited evidence and research gaps as discussed in the previous section 
as well as the argument that reduction in firm value is an indicator of minority 
shareholder expropriation (Barclay and Holderness, 1989; Bebchuk, 1999; Bebchuk 
et.al., 1999; Claessens et.al., 1999b; Claessens et.al., 2002; Dahya et.al., 2008; 
Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988b; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Lins, 
2003; McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck et.al., 1988; Zingales, 1994);  the research 
questions can be broadly categorised into four parts as discussed below : 
Part I 
Is there a negative relationship between:-  
1) related party transactions (RPTs) (which are likely to result in expropriation) and 
firm value in Malaysian firms? 
2) independent directors‘ tenure and firm value in Malaysian firms?  
3) the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value in 
Malaysian firms ? 
Part II 
If there is a negative relationship between:- 
4) the related party transactions (RPTs) (which are likely to result in expropriation) 
and firm value in Malaysian firms, is this negative relationship stronger in 
family firms compared to non-family firms? 
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5) the independent directors‘ tenure and firm value in Malaysian firms, is this 
negative relationship stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms? 
6) the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value in 
Malaysian firms, is this negative relationship stronger in family firms compared 
to non-family firms? 
Part III 
Is there a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the 
relationship between:- 
7) the related party transactions (RPTs) (which are likely to result in expropriation) 
and firm value in Malaysian firms? 
8) the independent directors‘ tenure and firm value in Malaysian firms? 
9) the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value in 
Malaysian firms? 
Part IV 
If there is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the 
relationship between the related party transactions (RPTs) (which are likely to result in 
expropriation) and firm value, the independent directors‘ tenure and firm value and the 
number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value in Malaysian 
firms; are these positive moderating effects stronger in family firms compared to non-
family firms ? 
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In summary, the research objectives of this study are to find out the following:  
1. Whether there is a negative relationship between related party transactions 
(RPTs) (which are likely to result in expropriation) and independent directors‘ 
tenure, the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with, and firm value 
in Malaysian firms. 
2. If there is a negative relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) (that 
are likely to result in expropriation), and independent directors‘ tenure, the 
number of domestic banks that the firm engages with, and firm value in 
Malaysian firms; is this negative relationship stronger among family firms 
compared to non-family firms. 
3. Whether, there is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership on the relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) (which 
are likely to result in expropriation) and independent directors‘ tenure, the 
number of domestic banks that the firm engages with, and firm value in 
Malaysian firms. 
4. If there is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on 
the relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) (which are likely to 
result in expropriation) and independent directors‘ tenure, the number of 
domestic banks that the firm engages with, and firm value in Malaysian firms; is 
this positive moderating effect stronger among family firms compared to non-
family firms. 
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1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY  
There are several theoretical contributions emanating from this research. First, this 
research provides a new perspective to agency theory by showing that corporate 
reputational effects help mitigate minority shareholder expropriation in Malaysian 
family firms even during the period of the global financial crisis which started in 2008 
through the positive moderating effects of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on 
expropriation via RPTs and through the positive moderating effects of controlling 
shareholders‘ ownership on expropriation due to long tenure of independent directors 
(only in Malaysian family firms in exclusive industries). Hence, the argument by Peng 
and Jiang (2010) that reputational effects is a poor substitute for weak minority 
shareholder protection in emerging markets can be disputed. Second, the significant 
negative relationship between independent directors‘ tenure and firm value in Malaysian 
family firms only in exlusive industries shows that the assumptions of agency theory 
with respect to the positive effects of having independent directors working in firms; do 
not hold within family firms in exclusive industries in emerging markets. Third, this 
research also contributes to the theory of ownership structure by showing that 
controlling shareholders‘ ownership has a significant positive moderating effect on 
expropriation via RPTs in family firms as well as on expropriation due to long tenure of 
independent directors (only in family firms in exclusive industries). The contribution to 
the theory of ownership structure is also shown by the results of the significant negative 
moderating effect of controlling shareholders on the relationship between RPTs which 
are like to result in expropriation and firm value as well as between the number of 
domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value, in non-family firms. 
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1.6 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF 
RESEARCH RESULTS 
Generally, the conclusions derived from the research results in this study consider a 
limitation of this research where the accounting-based performance measures may be 
subject to management manipulation (Chakravarthy, 1986; Lubatkin and Shrieves, 
1986; Purkayastha, 2013) which result in higher sensitivity of market-based 
performance measures towards Agency Problem Type II (principal-principal conflict) as 
well as contradictory significant research results between market-based and accounting-
based performance measures. The contradictory research results in this study will not be 
considered as significant findings because the study that is conducted is conclusive 
research. Therefore, only conclusive evidence which are robust against all the 
performance measures utilised or only restricted to one particular performance measure 
are accepted as significant findings in this type of research (Saunders, Lewis and 
Thornhill, 2009; Singh, 2007). 
With consideration of this limitation, basically, in the Malaysian context, this research 
shows that minority shareholder expropriation do exist in family and non-family firms. 
In family firms, minority shareholder expropriation occurs through RPTs as well as due 
to long tenure of independent directors. In non-family firms, expropriation occurs as a 
result of the negative moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the 
firm value effects of RPTs as well as on the firm value effects of the number of 
domestic banks that the firm engages with.  Likewise, it is found that minority 
shareholder expropriation through RPTs is stronger in family firms compared to non-
family firms.  Furthermore, in family firms in exclusive industries, minority shareholder 
expropriation occurs due to the long tenure of independent directors but it cannot be 
proven whether this expropriation is stronger in family firms or non-family firms. On 
the other hand, in family firms, corporate reputational effects after the Transmile 
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scandal help reduce minority shareholder expropriation through RPTs as well as 
expropriation due to long tenure of independent directors through the moderating effects 
of controlling shareholders‘ ownership. Basically, this study shows us that there is a 
need for the relevant authorities in this country i.e. the Securities Commission (SC) to 
seriously incorporate minority shareholder protection in future issuance of Codes of 
Corporate Governance as the current Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
(MCCG) 2012 does not incorporate this protection in its code. Furthermore, the current 
MCCG 2012 which sets the limit of the tenure of independent directors to 9 years ought 
to be continued in future codes issuance as it is shown in this research, that long tenure 
of independent directors are detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders. 
1.7 ORGANISATION OF THIS STUDY 
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one provides an overview of the 
thesis by introducing the research topic, background of study, problem statement, 
research questions, research objectives, hypotheses used and the significance of its 
contribution. Chapter two discusses the literature related to agency problems, ownership 
structure and control, legal protection of minority shareholders, corporate governance 
mechanism and the Malaysian institutional setting. Chapter three discusses the 
expropriation in family firms, RPTs in family firms, independent directors in family 
firms, the banking relationship of family firms and the moderating role of controlling 
shareholders‘ ownership. Chapter four discusses philosophical paradigm, theoretical 
framework and hypotheses development. Chapter five discusses the research model, 
variable measurements, sampling design and the data analysis techniques used in this 
research. Whilst in Chapter six, the discussion is focussed on the descriptive statistics, 
research results, conclusions, endogeneity issues, multicollinearity issues and robustness 
checks. Finally, Chapter seven discusses the summary of the findings by hypotheses, 
20 
 
implications of these findings, theoretical contributions,  policy implications, limitations 
in this research as well as suggestions for future research. 
1.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has introduced the thesis by outlining the topic of this research, the 
background of study, the problem statement, the research questions and the objectives, 
the hypotheses examined, the research significance and a brief summary of the research 
results and its implications. The next chapter discusses the relevant literature related to 
this research which provide the background and foundation for issues related to 
expropriation.  In addition, the institutional setting in Malaysia is discussed as well. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE MALAYSIAN INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT,  
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND MINORITY SHAREHOLDER 
EXPROPRIATION 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
The main aim of this chapter is to explain the Malaysian institutional environment as 
well as explain issues of ownership structure and how it relates to minority shareholder 
expropriation.  
The rest of the discussions in this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 discusses 
the definition of corporate governance. Section 2.3 discusses the literature on agency 
problems, ownership structure & control and legal protection of minority shareholders. 
Section 2.4 discusses the corporate governance mechanisms available to mitigate 
agency problems. Section 2.5 discusses the Malaysian institutional setting.  
2.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
Corporate governance is very significant for a firm to succeed and for gaining trust from 
investors and the public generally.  Besides that, effective corporate governance can 
boost market confidence and sustain both economic and social stability (Ibrahim, 2009).  
McKinsey (2000) conducted a survey and finds that ASEAN investors show 
appreciation for those companies which ensure protection of minority shareholder rights 
and they are willing to pay a valuable premium to purchase shares in well governed 
firms.  As a result, an efficient corporate governance system is required for the firm‘s 
success and overall market stability (OECD, 2004, 2011). 
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2.2.1 Definitions of Corporate Governance 
The definition of corporate governance is very subjective.  There are various definitions 
of corporate governance, each in line with the field of research in which they are 
committed. Blair (1995) argues that corporate governance should be defined in a 
broader context, which takes into consideration the business environment, social culture 
and political framework.  Therefore, he defines corporate governance as: 
 ―The whole set of legal, cultural and institutional arrangements that determines 
what publicly traded corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is 
exercised, and how the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are 
allocated‖ 
              (Blair, 1995, p.3) 
In the United Kingdom (UK), corporate governance is defined as the system to direct 
and control a company as described by the Cadbury Committee on the financial aspects 
of corporate governance (MacMillan and Downing, 1999).  In sequence, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles of 
Corporate Governance (1999) improves the view of corporate governance with a sound 
set of relationships between the firm‘s board, shareholders and stakeholders: 
 ―Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are 
directed and controlled.  The corporate governance structure specifies the 
distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the 
corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders, 
and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs.  
By doing this, it also provides the structure through which the company 
objectives are set, the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance.‖ 
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                   (OECD, 1999) 
Basically, the OECD principles concentrate on five items which are the rights of 
shareholders, fair treatment to shareholders, role of stakeholders, transparency and 
responsibility of the board members.  As such, the shareholders look forward to a well 
maintained management since they place their trust in firms to use their invested funds 
in an appropriate manner (OECD, 1999). 
On the other hand, The Malaysian High Level Finance Committee on Corporate 
Governance defines corporate governance as: 
 ―The process and structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of 
the company towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate 
accountability with the ultimate objective of realising long term shareholder 
value, whilst taking into account the interests of other stakeholders‖. 
            (Finance Committee of Corporate Governance, 1999, p.52) 
This definition indicates that corporate governance is concerned about both internal and 
external controls.  The board‘s structure and the relationship with both shareholders and 
stakeholders are also taken into account in well organised governance.  Furthermore, 
internal and external governance mechanisms are also taken into consideration.  The 
internal mechanism of main interest are the Board of Directors and the ownership 
structure of the companies, while the main external mechanisms are the external market 
for corporate control like the takeover market and the legal system (Cremers and Nair, 
2004). Well monitored governance mechanisms can enhance the corporate governance 
stability, thus increase a firm‘s productivity as well as the overall economy. 
Furthermore, from the finance perspective, corporate governance is defined as the ways 
in which suppliers of funds to firms assure themselves of obtaining a return on their 
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investment (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  An entrepreneur or a manager raises funds 
from investors either to productively use them or to cash out his holdings in the firm.  
The financiers need the managers‘ expertise to generate returns on their investments.  
The manager needs the financiers‘ investments, since he either does not possess 
sufficient capital of his own to invest or else wants to cash out his holdings.  One 
interesting and significant question that arises is, how can financiers be assured that 
they obtain returns on their investments?  The agency problem in this context refers to 
the difficulties financiers have in assuring that their investments are not expropriated or 
wasted on unproductive projects (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
To resolve this problem, the financiers and the manager sign a contract which specifies 
what the manager does with the funds, and how the returns are divided between him and 
the financiers.  Ideally, they would sign a complete contract, which specifies exactly 
what the manager does in all states of the world and how the profits are distributed.  The 
difficulty in this process is that most future contingencies are hard to describe and 
predict, and as a result, complete contracts are technically infeasible (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997).  Due to the problem of incomplete contracts, the manager and the 
financier have to allocate the residual control rights which are the rights to make 
decisions in situations not fully foreseen by the contract (Grossman and Hart, 1986; 
Hart and Moore, 1990). In principle, the financiers could invest in the firm if only they 
retain all the residual control rights.  Anytime something unexpected occurs, they get to 
decide what to do.  However, this approach is too idealistic, for the simple reason that 
the financiers are not qualified or sufficiently informed to decide what to do as this is 
the very reason they hired the manager in the first place.  As a result, the manager ends 
up with substantial residual control rights and therefore, discretion to allocate funds as 
he chooses.  There may be limits on this discretion specified in the contract and much of 
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corporate governance deals with these limits but the fact is that managers do possess 
most of the residual rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
In reality, the situation is more complicated.  First, the contracts that the managers and 
investors sign cannot require too much interpretation if they are to be enforced by 
outside courts.  In the United States (USA), the role of the courts is more extensive than 
anywhere else in the world, but even the so-called business judgment rule keeps the 
courts out of the affairs of companies.  In much of the rest of the world, courts only get 
involved in massive violations by investors‘ rights such as erasing shareholders‘ names 
from the register, etc.  Second, in the cases where financing requires collection of funds 
from many investors, these investors themselves are often small and too poorly 
informed to exercise even the control rights that they actually possess.  Furthermore, the 
free rider problem encountered by individual investors makes it uninteresting for them 
to learn about the firms they have financed, or even to participate in the governance.  As 
a result, the effective control rights of the managers and hence, the room they have for 
discretionary allocation of funds end up being excessive than they would have been if 
courts or investors became actively involved in detailed contract enforcement (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997).  
The outcome of this is that managers end up with significant control rights 
(discretionary rights) over how to allocate investors‘ funds.  They can expropriate these 
funds and in many pyramid schemes, for example, the organisers  abscond with the 
money. Managerial expropriation of funds can also take more complicated forms than 
just taking the cash out, such as transfer pricing.  As a consequence of the opportunistic 
behaviours of managers due to the possession of significant control rights, agency 
problems arise.  The agency problem that arises here is between the principal (investor) 
and the agents (managers).  This problem is called the Principal-Agent Problem or 
generally referred to as Agency Problem Type I (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
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2.3 AGENCY PROBLEMS, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE & CONTROL AND 
LEGAL PROTECTION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 
2.3.1 Agency Problem: The Principal-Agent Conflict (Agency Problem Type I) 
Traditionally, agency problems involve the relationship between the principal and the 
agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  Jensen and Meckling (1976) define this agency 
relationship as a contract in which one party (the principal) provides another party (the 
agent) the decision-making authority to perform some service on its behalf.  In the 
classical principal-agent problem, professional managers assume the role of the agent 
who acts on behalf of the company‘s shareholders (the principal).  The basic agency 
problem arises when the interests of the professional managers and the company‘s 
shareholders are not aligned. This misalignment of interests occurs as a result of the 
separation between decision-making, which is carried out by professional managers, and 
the bearing of residual risk by shareholders (Clacher, Hillier and McColgan, 2010).  
This separation of ownership and control provide managers with the power to control 
the firm.  Due to their controlling power, managers possess the incentives to realise 
private benefits of control that are unavailable to the firm‘s shareholders. When 
managers derive private benefits from the firm, they are not acting in the best interest of 
the shareholders.  The latter want to see their investment returns maximised and not 
their firm investments being expropriated by managers (Clacher et.al., 2010).  Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) argue that this inefficiency is reduced with the increase of 
managerial incentives to make value-maximising decisions so that the interests of 
professional managers are more aligned with those of shareholders.  Clacher et.al. 
(2010) further argue that agency costs arise because providing managers with the 
appropriate incentives to act in the best interest of company shareholders imposes costs 
on the principals. This cost can be seen as the value loss to shareholders arising from the 
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cost of minimising divergence of interest between company shareholders and corporate 
managers (Clacher et.al., 2010). 
In developed economies such as United States (USA), this principal-agent problem or 
Agency Problem Type I receive major attention because in these economies, often there 
is separation of ownership and control as well as legal mechanisms exist to protect 
owners‘ interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton and 
Jiang, 2008).  However, this is not the norm for most countries across the world outside 
USA, where family groups own and control many firms (Clacher et.al., 2010).  There is 
also no effective and predictable rule of law that protect investors (Dharwadkar et.al., 
2000; Mitton, 2002).  The difference is further elaborated next. 
2.3.2 Ownersip Structure & Control And Legal Protection Of Minority 
Shareholders: International Evidence 
2.3.2.1 Ownership Structure & Control outside United States (USA) 
One of the major differences between developed economies such as USA and the rest of 
the world lies in terms of ownership structure and control.  Traditionally, the literature 
on the role and function of modern firm is based on the assumption of the prevalence of 
widely dispersed ownership (Claessens et.al., 1999b).  In widely dispersed firms, the 
control over companies is being transferred to professional managers (Claessens et.al., 
1999b).  This assumption is applicable to countries like USA as the corporate 
governance literature concluded that almost half of large American firms are widely 
held (Claessens et.al., 1999b).  This assumption has also been propagated by Baumol 
(1959), Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Grossman and Hart (1980), among others. 
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However, a subsequent line of the empirical literature finds results, which go against 
this traditional assumption (Claessens et.al., 1999b).  La Porta et.al. (1999) finds a huge 
concentration of ownership in countries outside USA.  La Porta et.al. (1999) is one of 
the pioneering studies which investigates the significant issue of ultimate control i.e. 
they trace the chain of ownership to find who has the most voting rights.  Their findings 
suggest that ownership is largely concentrated in the hands of families and the state 
particularly in emerging markets.  The study by La Porta et.al. (1999) presented a 
different picture of the ownership structure of a modern corporation than that suggested 
by Berle and Means and which is widely accepted in the finance literature.  The Berle 
and Means widely held firms is only common for large firms in the richest common law 
countries such as USA.  Outside USA, particularly in countries with poor shareholder 
protection, even the largest firms tend to possess controlling shareholders.  Sometimes, 
the controlling shareholder is the State but more often, it is a family, usually the founder 
of the firm or his descendants (La Porta et.al., 1999). 
La Porta et.al. (1999) further find that the controlling shareholders in countries outside 
USA typically have high control over firms in excess of their cash-flow rights 
(ownership rights).  This is so because they often control large firms through pyramidal 
structures and in part because they manage the firms they control.  As a result, large 
firms particularly in emerging markets have a problem of separation of ownership and 
control.  These firms are run not by professional managers without equity stakes who 
are unaccountable to shareholders, but by controlling shareholders.  These controlling 
shareholders are ideally placed to monitor the management, and in fact, the top 
management is usually part of the controlling family.  As a result, they possess the 
power to expropriate minority shareholders.  Generally, the findings by La Porta et.al. 
(1999) reflects the negative impact of huge control by controlling shareholders 
particularly in emerging markets. 
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Claessens et.al. (1999b) further investigates ultimate control patterns in 2,980 publicly 
traded firms in nine East Asian countries (i.e. Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, South 
Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand).  They find large family 
control within more than half of East Asian firms (Claessens et.al., 1999b).  They also 
find that smaller firms in East Asia are more likely to be family-controlled, as are older 
firms.  In many East Asian countries, control is enhanced through pyramid structures, 
deviations from one-share-one-vote rules, and voting rights exceeding cash-flow rights 
(Claessens et.al., 1999b).  Separation of management from ownership control is rare and 
management of two-third of firms, which are not widely held, is related to the family of 
the controlling shareholder (Claessens et.al., 1999b).  Since, the 1996 statistics by 
Claessens et.al. (2000a), there has been relatively little change to the ownership 
structure and control in East Asia.  Carney and Child (in press) finds that for the year 
2008, family control remains the most dominant form of ownership across East Asia, 
though widely held firms dominate in Japan and Taiwan and is substantial in both South 
Korea and Thailand.  The Philippines has witnessed the largest increase in family-
controlled firms, while Taiwan has undergone the largest decline.  
Basically, the separation of ownership and control has undergone little change from 
1996 to 2008 for the East Asian region as a whole and remains highest among family-
controlled firms (Carney and Child, in press).  Furthermore, it shows among firms with 
a dominant family owner, the average number of firms belonging to a single family or 
the top families has also remained relatively stable over time when looking at East Asia 
in the aggregate, although changes have occurred for individual countries.  For example, 
family control has increased substantially in South Korea from an average of 1.61 firms 
per family in 1996 to 3.22 in 2008.  Hong Kong and the Philippines, by contrast, have 
shown the largest declines, from 1.92 for Hong Kong in 1996 to 1.33 in 2008, and 2.42 
for the Philippines in 1996 to 1.69 in 2008 (Carney and Child, in press).  On average, 
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the number of family firms from 1996 to 2008 has reduced as well, from an average of 
179 to 144 (Carney and Child, in press).  Table 2.1 below shows the concentration of 
family control for both 1996 and 2008. One of these East Asian countries which 
demonstrate high ownership concentration as well as large family ownership and 
control is Malaysia (1.49 firms per family for 2008 as shown in Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1: Concentration of Family Control for 1996 and 2008 
Percentage of Sample Firms That Families Control 
Country Average 
Number of 
Firms per 
Family 
Top One 
Family 
Top Five 
Families 
Top 10 
Families 
Number of 
Firms 
1996 
Hong Kong 1.92 8.0 30.0 39.0 200 
Indonesia 1.55 4.5 18.0 29.2 178 
Japan 1.00 0.5 2.5 5.0 200 
South Korea 1.61 5.0 16.0 23.5 200 
Malaysia 1.75 10.5 29.0 37.0 200 
Philippines 2.42 6.7 25.0 39.2 120 
Singapore 1.23 3.0 10.0 14.5 200 
Taiwan 1.08 3.5 7.8 11.3 141 
Thailand 1.67 7.8 24.0 33.5 167 
East Asia nine 1.58 5.49 18.02 25.8  
2008 
Hong Kong 1.33 3.2 11.4 17.7 158 
Indonesia 1.49 4.5 18.9 26.5 132 
Japan 1.07 1.5 4.4 8.1 136 
South Korea 3.22 10.1 37.5 42.8 159 
Malaysia 1.49 5.2 16.4 23.4 154 
Philippines 1.69 5.3 16.9 36.0 114 
Singapore 1.16 3.8 12.2 16.0 131 
Taiwan 1.24 1.2 5.5 8.6 163 
Thailand 1.53 4.7 13.4 19.5 149 
East Asia nine 1.58 4.38 15.18 22.05  
Change 
Hong Kong -0.59 -4.84 -18.61 -21.28  
Indonesia -0.06 0.05 0.96 -2.70  
Japan 0.07 0.97 1.91 3.09  
South Korea 1.61 5.06 21.50 19.27  
Malaysia -0.26 -5.31 -12.65 -13.62  
Philippines -0.74 -1.40 -8.12 -3.20  
Singapore -0.06 0.82 2.21 1.53  
Taiwan 0.15 -2.32 -2.28 -2.76  
Thailand -0.14 -3.09 -10.53 -14.07  
East Asia nine 0.00 -1.12 -2.84 -3.75  
Source: Carney and Child (in press) 
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2.3.2.2 Ownership Structure & Control in Malaysia 
Malaysia is an emerging market which possesses very different ownership structure and 
controls compared to developed economies. Yunos, Smith and Ismail (2010) found that 
between 2001-2007, 96.8% of Malaysian public-firms are closely held by a controlling 
shareholder.  They also found that 30.8% of public-listed firms are controlled by 
management whereby the manager is supplied by the controlling shareholder (Yunos 
et.al., 2010).  Moreover, family shareholders form the predominant controlling 
shareholders and 67.2% of the total firms in the stock exchange are family owned 
(Claessens et.al., 2000a; Ibrahim and Samad, 2010).  This figure is the highest among 
East Asian countries i.e. Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan and Thailand for 1996 (Claessens et.al., 2000a; Ibrahim and Samad, 2010).  In 
fact, for the year 2004, the average shareholding of family controlling shareholders in 
Malaysian public-listed firms amounts to 27.3% (Munir and Salleh, 2010).  
Aside from ownership structure, Malaysian public-listed firms also demonstrate very 
high concentration of control.  The percentage of concentration of control among 
Malaysian public-listed family firms amounts to 76.2% of its Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP), which is the second highest after Hong Kong for the year 1996 among all the 
East Asian countries (Claessens et.al., 2000a; Lee and Li, 2009).  Concentration of 
control is also reflected by the ratio of cash-flow rights to control rights.  This ratio 
explains how much of the firm a controlling shareholder own (cash-flow rights) 
compared to how much he could control the firm (control rights).  A low ratio signifies 
a high concentration of control as control rights exceed cash-flow rights (Claessens 
et.al., 2000a).  In Malaysia, for the year 2008, public-listed firms demonstrate a 
relatively low cash-flow-to-control rights ratio i.e. 0.81 (Carney and Child, in press).  
This ratio is the second lowest in East Asia after South Korea, from nine East Asian 
countries analysed (Carney and Child, in press).  Whereas, for family firms its cash-
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flow-to-control rights ratio i.e. 0.743 (Carney and Child, in press).  This ratio is the 
lowest in East Asia, from nine East Asian countries analysed (Carney and Child, in 
press).  As Malaysia is ranked second lowest for public-listed firms and lowest for 
family firms, respectively, in East Asia, it can be inferred that the concentration of 
control in Malaysian public-listed firms, particularly, family firms, is very high for this 
region
3
.  The high concentration of ownership and control in Malaysia as well as in 
other emerging markets provide opportunities to controlling shareholders to expropriate 
minority shareholders due to the lack of investor protection in these markets compared 
to developed economies (Claessens et.al., 2000a; Young et.al., 2008).  Hence, the 
following section provides a further explanation of the protection of minority 
shareholders in these economies. 
2.3.2.3 Legal Protection of Minority Shareholders outside United States (USA) 
The extant literature on corporate governance systems and models, which are widely 
practiced in developed economies such as USA, are based upon the assumption of 
strong legal protection for minority shareholders‘ rights (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  In 
USA, both small and large shareholders are protected through an extensive system of 
rules that protect minority shareholders‘ rights allows easy transfer of shares, keeps 
election of directors relatively uninhibited by managers and gives shareholders 
extensive powers to sue directors for violations of fiduciary duty, including through 
class-action suits (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  However, in the rest of the world 
particularly emerging markets, legal protection of investors is less substantial, due to 
laws are not good or because courts do not enforce these laws (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997).  As a result, firms remain family-controlled and, some of these firms have 
difficulties raising external funds, therefore, have to finance their investments internally 
                                                          
3
  For public-listed firms in general, the low range of cash-flow rights-to-voting rights is between 0.79 to 0.855 and the high range 
between 0.855 to 0.92. For family firms, the low range of cash-flow rights-to-voting rights is between 0.743 to 0.817 and the high 
range between 0.817 to 0.891 (Carney and Child, in press). 
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(Mayer, 1990).  In fact, the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) and 
Credit Lyonnaise Securities Asia (CLSA) jointly conducted an investor protection and 
corporate governance assessment on eleven Asian countries in 2012
4
. Table 2.2 shows 
the investor protection and corporate governance scores for these countries. 
Table 2.2: Investor Protection & Corporate Governance (CG) Scores for Eleven Asian Countries 
 
No. Country Total 
(Average 
Score) 
CG Rules 
& 
Practices 
Legal Enforcement Political & 
Regulatory 
Accounting & 
Auditing 
Standards 
CG 
Culture 
1 Singapore 69 68 64 73 87 54 
2 Hong Kong 66 62 68 71 75 53 
3 Thailand 58 62 44 54 80 50 
4 Japan 55 45 57 52 70 53 
5 Malaysia 55 52 39 63 80 38 
6 Taiwan 53 50 35 56 77 46 
7 India 51 49 42 56 63 43 
8 South 
Korea 
49 43 39 56 75 34 
9 China 45 43 39 56 63 43 
10 Philippines 41 35 25 44 73 29 
11 Indonesia 37 35 22 33 62 33 
Source: ACGA (2012b) 
From Table 2.2, it can be observed that Asian emerging markets such as Thailand, 
Malaysia, India, China, Philippines and Indonesia only demonstrate overall decent and 
below average scores in this assessment (total average scores range between 37 to 58 
out of 100).  Hence, it can be concluded that investor protection in Asian emerging 
markets is basically poor or mediocre.  The lack of legal protection of minority 
shareholders and the prevalence of high ownership concentration in emerging markets 
give rise to the principal-principal conflict which is generally known as Agency 
Problem Type II (Morck et.al., 2005; Young et.al., 2008).  This is explained in the next 
section. 
 
                                                          
4
  Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) and Credit Lyonnaise Securities Asia (CLSA) are non-profit organisation and 
independent financial services provider respectively, which assess corporate governance and investor protection in Asia (ACGA, 
2012a; Krishnamurti et.al., 2005). 
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2.3.3 Agency Problem: The Principal-Principal Conflict (Agency Problem Type   
             II) 
2.3.3.1 Corporate Governance in Emerging Markets and the Nature of the Principal-
Principal Conflict 
Emerging economies are low-income, rapid growth countries which use economic 
liberalisation as their primary growth engine (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau and Wright, 2000).  
In these economies, formal institutions often do not exist to promote mutually beneficial 
arms‘ length transactions between economic actors (North, 1990; 1994).  Consequently, 
firms in emerging markets are guided by informal institutions, to a huge extent. (Peng 
and Heath, 1996).  In the case of corporate governance, emerging economies typically 
do not possess effective and predictable rule of law which in turn, creates a weak 
governance environment (Dharwadkar et.al., 2000; Mitton, 2002).  This is not to say 
that emerging economies have no laws dealing with corporate governance.  
In most situations, emerging economies have attempted to practise legal frameworks of 
developed economies, in particular those of Anglo-American system, either as a result 
of internally driven reforms such as in Malaysia or as a response to international 
demands such as in South Korea and Thailand.  However, formal institutions such as 
laws and regulations with regards to accounting requirements, information disclosure, 
securities trading and their enforcement are either absent, inefficient or do not operate as 
expected.  Consequently, standard corporate governance mechanisms possess relatively 
little institutional support in emerging markets (Peng, 2004; Peng, Buck and 
Filatotchev, 2003).  This results in informal institutions such as relational ties, business 
groups, family connections and government contacts, all playing a stronger role in 
influencing corporate governance (Peng and Heath, 1996; Yeung, 2006).  
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For threshold firms
5
, the transition to professional management is always difficult 
(Daily and Dalton, 1992).  It is even more difficult in emerging markets due to the weak 
institutional environment and it is common for even the largest firms to still be under 
the control of the founding family.  Basically, these companies attempt to appear as 
having crossed the threshold from founder control to professional management.  
However, the founding family often retains control through other informal means (Liu, 
Ahlstrom and Yeh, 2006; Young, Ahlstrom and Bruton, 2004).  In addition, public-
listed firms in emerging markets possess shareholders, board of directors and 
professional managers, which reflect the characteristics of firms with modern corporate 
governance (Monks and Minnow, 1995).  Even the largest public listed firms in an 
emerging economy may have adopted the appearance of corporate governance 
mechanisms from developed economies but these mechanisms rarely function like their 
counterparts in developed countries (Young et.al., 2008). 
Generally, the corporate governance structures in emerging markets often resemble 
those of developed economies in form but their implementation is poor (Backman, 
2001; Peng, 2004).  Consequently, concentrated ownership and other informal 
mechanisms emerge to fill the corporate governance gap. While these ad hoc 
mechanisms may resolve some problems such as the principal-agent conflict, they 
create other agency problems in the process such as the principal-principal conflict or 
generally known as Agency Problem Type II (Young et.al., 2008). 
The principal-principal conflict or Agency Problem Type II has been identified as a 
major corporate governance problem in emerging markets (Young et.al., 2008).  This 
conflict is between two groups of principals: controlling shareholders and minority 
shareholders (Jiang and Peng, 2011). Young et.al. (2008) argue that the principal-
                                                          
5
  Threshold firms are firms which are undergoing a transition from the emergence to the professional management stage (Zahra 
and Filatotchev, 2004). 
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principal conflict is likely to be severe when the firm is owned and controlled by one 
large shareholder or a single family owner.  The principal-principal conflict in emerging 
markets differs from the principal-agent problem that is prevalent in developed 
economies.  This difference is explained by Figure 2.1. 
 
                                                   
                                                 (a) Principal-Agent Conflict 
                                                             
                                                 (c) Principal-Principal Conflict 
                                                     
                                                                      (b) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Principal-Principal Conflict vs. Principal-Agent Conflict 
  Source: Young et.al. (2008) 
In the top panel of Figure 2.1, arrow (a) depicts the traditional principal-agent conflict 
that occurs between dispersed shareholders and professional managers.  In the bottom 
panel of Figure 2.1, the slanting arrow (b) depicts the relationship between the 
controlling shareholders and their affiliated managers.  These affiliated managers may 
be family members or associates who reports directly to the controlling shareholders 
(Young et.al., 2008).  The straight line (c) depicting the conflict is drawn between the 
affiliated managers – who represent the controlling shareholders - and the minority 
shareholders. Hence, the conflict actually is between the controlling shareholders on one 
hand and dispersed minority shareholders on the other hand (Young et.al., 2008).  This 
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principal-principal conflict has certain costs associated with it, which is missing from 
agency theory (Dalziel, White and Arthurs, 2011). 
2.3.3.2 Extension of Agency Theory 
Largely missing from agency theory is the discussion of the potential costs which could 
arise from principal-principal conflict.  In order to fully understand the costs associated 
with such conflicts, I briefly review the costs and benefits associated with mitigating 
principal-agent conflict (see Figure 2.2) and then extend this agency theory foundation 
by specifying the costs and benefits associated with mitigating principal-principal 
conflict (see Figure 2.3). 
        $ 
                                                                                               
                                                                                         A (Marginal Control Costs) 
 
 
 
 
$benefit 
                                                                                        L 
                        G                                     X 
                                                                                                                  B1(Marginal                          
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                                      C0                            Cx                                                            Control 
Figure 2.2: The costs of principal-agent conflict 
       Source: Dalziel et.al. (2011) 
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In Figure 2.2, curve A represents marginal control costs.  Marginal control costs are the 
additional costs incurred from incremental control.  Marginal reductions in residual 
losses, depicted by curve B1 are the reduction in residual losses expected from 
additional control.   Thus, curve A represents incremental costs, while curve B1 
represents incremental benefits. Curves A and B1 intersect at point X.  When control 
reaches Cx, the marginal benefit of control equals or breaks even with the marginal cost 
of control. 
To illustrate, consider the arbitrary point C0 shown in Figure 2.2, which is to the left of 
level of control Cx.  At this level, the benefit of an additional unit of control (shown in 
the figure as $benefit) is larger than the cost ($cost) associated with that same additional 
unit of control, so overall the principals are benefiting from control.  At this level, there 
are also additional benefits which can be derived if more control is exerted, but it is 
important to note that the marginal costs associated with achieving these marginal 
benefits are higher.  In other words, when control is very low, a principal who increases 
control (e.g. through additional monitoring) will be able to substantially reduce the risk 
of huge losses associated with opportunistic agent behaviour.  However, further increase 
in control ultimately yields smaller and smaller returns as remaining opportunism 
becomes increasingly trivial or difficult to obviate.  Accordingly, the marginal benefits 
of control (i.e. the marginal reduction in residual losses depicted as curve B1) dwindle at 
the same time as the marginal costs of control (curve A) increase.  From an agency 
perspective, the goal is to ensure that the benefits of control surpass the costs, yielding 
net gains to principals.  Shaded area G represents these gains to principals as control 
reduces more costly residual losses. 
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If the principals exert too much control, the firm enters the area to the right of point Cx, 
where the marginal costs of control are higher than the marginal benefits and the firm 
begins to experience losses.  Exerting too much control or ‗over-governance‘ can occur 
in a variety of ways.  For example, rigid checks and balances, excessive reporting 
requirements (Manzi, 2007), over-monitoring of executive compensation (Tosi and 
Gomez-Mejia, 1994), and too many layers of supervision can constrain managerial 
behaviour in undesirable ways and impose costs on the organisation which are far above 
the benefits to be obtained (Shapiro, 2005).  Additionally, principals who typically 
possess less knowledge of the internal workings of the firm than agents – must 
frequently monitor using gross proxies of performance such as financial measures rather 
than strategic criteria or first-hand operational insights.  As a consequence, when these 
principals ―try to closely monitor managerial actions, they may inadvertently cause 
managers to pursue non-wealth-maximising strategies‖ (Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin, 
1998, p. 560).  Finally, over-governance can shift risk to managers in ways which are 
ultimately detrimental to firm performance (Hoskisson, Castleton and Withers, 2009).  
Shaded area L depicts the losses firms suffer to the right of Cx when control is 
exceptionally high. 
2.3.3.3 The Costs of Principal-Principal Conflict 
In addition to examining the costs associated with principal-agent conflict, it is also 
important to analyse the potential costs of principal-principal conflict (Dalziel et.al., 
2011).  Figure 2.3 depicts what happens as principals exert ―biased control‖. 
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Figure 2.3: The costs of principal-principal conflict 
    Source: Dalziel et.al. (2011) 
When a given principal uses its influence to bend the governance of the firm to its own 
benefit rather than focusing on the shared interests of all the firm‘s principals, it 
redirects the governance devices towards tasks that suit its own ends but which will be 
less useful in reducing residual losses.  This is indicated by the lower marginal residual 
loss reduction curve (B2) shown in Figure 2.3.  This result in a new equilibrium level of 
control indicated as CY. 
By lowering the residual loss reduction curve, principal-principal conflict deprives the 
firm of some of the benefits of control.  In effect, the gain area G is divided into two 
sections, such that G = RG + FG. The (actual or realised) gains, which are represented 
by area RG, are substantially smaller than G because worthwhile tasks are being 
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neglected as powerful principals use governance mechanisms to pursue their own 
agendas.  Potential gains which the firm could have enjoyed are forfeited as governance 
mechanisms are diverted away from their intended purpose.  The region FG shows the 
size of these forfeited gains and is a measure of unrealised governance potential.  This 
region depicts the cost of principal-principal conflict or principal costs. 
Dalziel et.al. (2011) define principal costs as the forfeited gains which result from 
principal-principal conflict and the associated neglect of important governance tasks.  
Principal costs have the effect of reducing the value of the firm below what it otherwise 
would have been.    
Basically, the differences between principal-agent conflict and principal conflict are 
outlined in the following table : 
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Table 2.3: Principal-Agent Conflict versus Principal-Principal Conflict 
 Principal-Agent conflict as depicted in Anglo-
American variety of agency theory 
Principal-Principal conflict that commonly occur in 
emerging economies 
Goal incongruence Between fragmented, dispersed shareholders and 
professional managers. 
Between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. 
Manifestation Strategies that benefit managers at the expense of 
shareholders in general (e.g. shirking, pet projects, 
excessive compensation and empire building). 
Strategies that benefit controlling shareholders at the 
expense of minority shareholders (e.g. minority shareholder 
expropriation, nepotism and cronyism). 
Institutional protection of 
minority shareholders  
Formal constraints (e.g. judicial reviews and courts) 
set an upper bound on potential expropriation by 
majority shareholders. Informal norms generally 
adhere to shareholder wealth maximization. 
Formal institutional protection is often lacking, corrupt or 
un-enforced. Informal norms typically favour the interests of 
controlling shareholders over minority shareholders. 
Market for corporate control. Active as a governance mechanism ―of last resort‖. Inactive even in principle. Concentrated ownership thwarts 
notions of takeover. 
Ownership pattern. Dispersed – holding 5-20% equity is considered 
―concentrated ownership‖. A shareholder with 5% 
equity stake is regarded as a ―block holder‖. 
Concentrated – often more than 50% of equity is held by 
controlling shareholder. Often structured as a ―pyramid 
where control rights are greater than ownership rights. 
Board of directors Legitimate legal and social institutions with 
fiduciary duty to safeguard shareholders‘ interests. 
Research focuses on factors that affect day-to-day 
operations such as insiders vs. outsiders, 
background of directors, committee structures, etc. 
In emerging economies, boards often have yet to establish 
institutional legitimacy and thus are ineffective. Research 
indicates they are often the ―rubber stamp‖ of controlling 
shareholders. 
Top management team Professional managers who often have made their 
way up through the ranks or are hired from outside 
after extensive search and scrutiny of qualifications. 
Monitored internally by boards of directors and 
externally by managerial labour market. 
Typically, family members or associates. Monitored mainly 
through family consensus or self-regulation adhering to 
―gentlemen‘s agreements‖. 
Source: Young et.al. (2008) 
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The reduction in firm value as a result of principal-principal conflict (minority 
shareholder expropriation) will be further discussed in the next section on minority 
shareholder expropriation. 
2.3.3.4 Minority Shareholder Expropriation 
Since principal-principal conflict incurs costs, it is important to discuss a significant 
manifestation of this conflict.  One significant manifestation of principal-principal 
conflict is minority shareholder expropriation (Le Breton-Miller and Miller, 2009; 
Young et.al., 2008).    Minority shareholder expropriation is defined as the transfer of 
resources out of a company to its controlling shareholder at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Johnson, Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 2000b).  It is also called 
tunnelling and often, the term expropriation and tunnelling is used interchangeably 
(Johnson et.al., 2000b).  Expropriation by controlling shareholders occurs due to 
conflict of interest between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders as the 
interests of both these shareholders are diverged and the former do not act in the best 
interest of the latter.  
When expropriation by controlling shareholders occurs, there is a transfer of value from 
minority shareholders to controlling shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  This 
value transfer emphasises the point that expropriation is indeed a key characteristic of 
Agency Problem Type II, because it is used to fulfil controlling shareholders‘ interests 
which are in direct conflict with, as well as, at the expense of minority shareholders‘ 
interests (Claessens et al., 2000a; Faccio et al., 2001a; Johnson et al., 2000b; Mitton, 
2002; Young et.al., 2008).  The reason for this is that controlling shareholders have the 
incentives to expropriate resources from the firm due to their power in controlling the 
corporation (Dharwadkar et.al., 2000; San Martin-Reyna and Duran-Encalada, 2012; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Young et.al., 2008).  Such expropriation generally reduces 
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the observed market value of the firm (Dahya et.al., 2008).  This reduction in firm value 
occurs due to the cost of the principal-principal conflict (forfeited gains) as discussed 
previously which basically refers to the unrealised governance potential of the firm.  
Instead of governing their firms properly, controlling shareholders direct their activities 
and actions to benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003; Dahya et.al., 2008; La Porta et.al., 1999; Lins, 2003; Morck et.al., 
1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Qian et.al., 2011).   
Such activities or actions can take many forms – some legal, some illegal and some in 
grey areas (La Porta et.al., 2000a,b). These include putting less-than-qualified family 
members, friends, and cronies in key positions (Chen et.al., 2011; Faccio et.al., 2001a); 
engaging in advantageous transfer pricing transactions (Chang and Hong, 2000; Chen 
et.al., 2011; Khanna and Rivkin, 2001); engaging in strategies which advance personal, 
family or political agendas at the expense of firm value such as excessive corporate 
diversification (Backman, 1990; Chen et.al., 2011); tunnelling profits from companies 
at the bottom of the corporate pyramidal structure to the holding firm or to other 
subsidiaries or associated companies (Chen et.al., 2011); excessive executive 
compensation (Wiwattanakantang, 2001); self-beneficial trades (Atanasov, Boone and 
Haushalter, 2010; Hand and Skantz, 1999; Nanda, 1991; Powers, 2003); loan guarantees 
(Johnson et.al., 2000b); outright theft or fraud (Johnson et.al., 2000b) as well as dilutive 
share issues (Johnson et.al., 2000b).  Djankov et.al. (2008) argue that self-dealing 
transactions such as advantageous transfer pricing, excessive executive compensation, 
loan guarantees and outright theft enable controlling shareholders to utilise RPTs to 
expropriate resources from their firms for their own private benefits.  
As minority shareholder expropriation reduces firm value, it is also significant to know 
the factors which encourage minority shareholder expropriation as outlined in the next 
section.                         
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2.3.4 Factors Which Encourage Minority Shareholder Expropriation 
Several factors could encourage minority shareholder expropriation. These include: 
(i) private benefits of control and expropriation;  
(ii) capital market development and moral hazard banking;  
(iii) agency cost of debt;  
(iv) lack of informed trading in equity markets;  
(v) lack of market for corporate control;  
(vi) inadequate and costly legal protection of minority shareholders;  
(vii) restrictive licensing practices; and  
(viii) rent seeking practices.  
2.3.4.1 Private Benefits of Control and Expropriation 
Private benefits of control is defined as the benefits which accrue to managers or 
shareholders who possess control of the corporation, but not to minority shareholders 
(Benos and Weisbach, 2004). They can be non-pecuniary, such as the ability to direct a 
company‘s resources to a cause one agrees with (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985), a 
preference for glamorous projects (Jensen, 1993), or the use of a position for the 
enhancement of one‘s human capital (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). 
Private benefits of control can have an enormous direct financial effect on minority 
shareholders through transactions which divert corporate resources to other companies 
owned by the controlling shareholder or their families (Benos and Weisbach, 2004). 
Hence, measuring the extent of private benefits accruing to controlling shareholders is 
therefore a central question in corporate finance because the nature of these benefits are 
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interesting and important in their own right because they are detrimental to the interests 
of minority shareholders (Benos and Weisbach, 2004). 
One significant method to measure private benefits of control was originally proposed 
by Barclay and Holderness (1989) and relies on ownership changes of controlling 
blocks of shares. Barclay and Holderness (1989) argue that the difference between the 
price per share paid by the acquiring party and the price per share prevailing on the 
market after the acquisition has taken place, reflect private benefits associated with the 
control of the company. This difference is a plausible measure of private benefits since 
the price per share paid by the acquiring party reflects not only the expected future cash 
flows but also the value of control, whereas the market price of the shares reflects only 
the cash flow benefits (Benos and Weisbach, 2004).  
Extending the Barclay/Holderness approach to an international context, Dyck and 
Zingales (2004) calculate the control (or block) premium in 393 control-transactions 
spanning 39 countries for the years 1990-2000. These authors define block premium as 
the difference between the price per share paid for the control block in firms and the 
price on the Stock Exchange two days after the announcement of the control transaction, 
divided by the price on the Exchange after the announcement and multiplied by the 
proportion of cash-flow rights represented in the controlling block (Dyck and Zingales, 
2004).  In Malaysia, the average private benefits of control are just 7% (Dyck and 
Zingales, 2004). This low figure signals some interesting postulations about the state of 
corporate governance in this country. 
First, if controlling shareholders do purchase their controlling blocks and subsequently 
enjoy on average low private benefits of control, they definitely have more incentives to 
engage in expropriation activities in order to increase their private benefits (assuming 
they are utility maximisers).  Secondly, the 7% of private benefits are actually only 
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representing the private benefits derived from the acquisition of control blocks
6
.  It does 
not represent other types of private benefits of control such as private benefits enjoyed 
by the controlling shareholder since the firm started, without any change of hands in the 
controlling block.  This type of private benefits could be huge if we consider the 
opportunities for expropriation in emerging markets where investor protection is lower. 
As a conclusion, these 7% of private benefits only indicate that either the potential for 
expropriation by controlling shareholders is high or it is not definitive of the entire 
private benefits of control enjoyed by them.  Aside from private benefits of control, the 
lack of capital market development also plays a part in encouraging minority 
shareholder expropriation. 
2.3.4.2 Capital Market Development, Moral Hazard Banking and Expropriation 
The bond market in Malaysia is relatively underdeveloped (Sharma, 2001) which 
increases the expropriation incentives of controlling shareholders.  The poor 
development of the bond market can be explained by the ‗supply side‘ and ‗demand 
side‘ constraints.  For the former, the heavy reliance on bank financing creates a strong 
hindrance for the utilisation of bonds to obtain capital.  In fact, between 2001 to 2006, 
corporate loans comprise the largest category of loans for commercial banks, finance 
companies and merchant banks in Malaysia (Zulkhibri, 2013). 
The weak Malaysian bond market is also related to the links between business and 
politics.   In this country, the ethnic dimension increases the intricacies with the 
adoption of ―Bumiputra‖ policy7  leading to the ownership of many companies and 
banks being reserved for Malay citizens.  As a result, the major connections in Malaysia 
tend to be between political parties and powerful families within specific ethnic groups 
                                                          
6
  Based upon the average, the range of the percentage of private benefits considered low is between -4% to 34.5% and considered 
high is between 34.5% to 65% (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). 
7  Bumiputra policy means policy for the natives. 
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controlling companies (Sharma, 2001). A common institutional characteristic is that 
there is a close and often interlocking relationship between members of government and 
the owners of banks and conglomerates (Sharma, 2001).  These links explain the heavy 
reliance on bank financing by business groups.  Consequently, relationship banking 
works well for both, businesses as well as banks (Bliss and Gul, 2012). 
Adding to this ‗relationship banking‘ is the rationale provided by government support.  
The Government promises bail-out in the case of bank failures.  This gave the private as 
well as state banks the confidence to lend without much prudence and rigorous credit 
criteria, hence, creating a moral hazard in the banking industry.  It also gave businesses 
the security to undertake long-term strategic investments by the availability of long-
term loans.  Consequently, firms rarely encounter the need to diversify their sources of 
debt financing and issue medium-term instruments (Sharma, 2001).  This not only 
retards  bond market development but also encourages expropriation by controlling 
shareholders.  Moral hazard bank lending gives rise to the utilisation of bank loans for 
the private benefits of controlling shareholders such as engaging in unprofitable 
investments (empire building) and increases the risk of bank failures (Faccio et.al., 
2001c; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2008). 
Aside from the ‗supply side‘ constraints, there are also the ‗demand side‘ constraints.  
Given the predominance of bank financing; there has been little perceived need to 
develop the governance infrastructure related to arms‘-length mechanisms of finance, 
i.e. the legal rights of creditors and minority shareholders and corporate transparency 
(Sharma, 2001).  Though, creditors‘ rights have been well defined in Malaysia, the 
enforcement is problematic
8
 due to corruption, political interference and the fact that 
                                                          
8  The joint assessment by Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) and Credit Lyonnaise Securities Asia (CLSA) only 
provides  a score of 35 out of 100 for legal enforcement in Malaysia (ACGA, 2012b). 
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courts still do not possess the expertise and practical knowledge for handling 
proceedings like critical bankruptcy cases (Sharma, 2001).  
Failure to develop a proper governance infrastructure for arms-length debt (bond) 
financing retards the development of the bond market because it discourages investors 
to lend their funds as they will never know whether they will obtain their principal back 
when the bond matures or when the firm becomes insolvent.  If investors are 
discouraged to lend to firms then the controlling shareholders will have more incentive 
to expropriate through continued reliance on long-term bank loans.  
In essence, the bond market is a market-based debt system where ratings agency such as 
Ratings Agency Malaysia (RAM) regularly rates the bonds of corporations based upon 
the quality of the firm‘s financials and bond characteristics such as amount and duration 
borrowed.  If firms with poor quality financials borrow excessively from the market on 
a long-term basis, its rating will drop due to the increased risk of bond default.  This 
will deter future investors from lending to these firms; thus, reducing the incentives for 
controlling shareholders to engage in debt expropriation.  On the other hand, bank 
financing particularly in Malaysia is very much a relationship-based system influenced 
by moral hazard, which ultimately, creates strong incentives for expropriation. 
Unless the supply and demand side constraints of bond market development are  
addressed  seriously in Malaysia, it is unlikely that the bond market will grow.  The lack 
of bond market development means the retardation of a market-based system, which can 
help constrain expropriation by controlling shareholders through the disciplinary effects 
of bond ratings.  As a result, businesses will depend more on bank financing for 
financing needs through a relationship-based system, which is influenced by moral 
hazard and provide the incentives for expropriation.  Besides capital market 
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development and moral hazard banking, the lower agency cost of debt also plays a role 
in encouraging expropriation. 
2.3.4.3 Agency Cost of Debt and Expropriation 
Agency cost of debt is lower when firms are highly concentrated in shareholding.  As a 
result, highly concentrated firms obtain loans more easily  from banks as well as find it 
easier to secure capital from bond investors.  This increases the incentives for debt 
being used as an expropriation tool (Kim and Sorensen, 1986).  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that in emerging markets such Malaysia, in which bank financing is dominant 
and shareholding concentration is high; access to debt financing becomes easier such 
that the share of domestic debt of the banking system increased from 62% in 1986 to 
75% in 1997 (Thillainathan, 1999).  With the increase in debt usage by firms, the 
amount and the likelihood of debt being used as an expropriation tool by controlling 
shareholders will increase indefinitely.  Although, debt can be expropriated by 
controlling shareholders, the characteristic of the equity market also play a role in 
encouraging minority shareholder expropriation. 
2.3.4.4 Lack of Informed Trading In Equity Markets and Expropriation 
Morck, Yeung and Wu (2000) conducted a cross-country study on developed and 
emerging markets (total 40 countries) to examine the stock returns synchronicity in both 
markets.    Stock returns synchronicity is measured as the average R-squared values of 
firm-level regressions of bi-weekly stock returns (dependent variable) on local and US 
market indexes (independent variables) in each country.  Malaysia is ranked third 
highest behind Poland and China in terms of stock returns synchronicity with an R-
squared value of 42.9%.  This means 42.9% of the variation in bi-weekly stock returns 
in Malaysia is explained by the variation in the domestic market index and the US 
market returns.  The higher R-squared values, it indicates that stock prices frequently 
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move together and this measurement is consistent with Roll (1988) and French and Roll 
(1986) measurement.  
Both these papers argue that low levels of synchronicity in some country‘s stock prices 
reflect the incorporation of more firm-specific information into the stock prices in their 
markets.  They further argue that if less firm-specific information is capitalised into 
stock prices, investors would carry out less risk-arbitrage activities (informed trading).  
When less risk-arbitrage activities are being carried out, noise trading instead of 
informed trading of stocks occur, which is not based upon stock fundamentals but by 
market trends.  
In finance theory, it is argued that risk arbitrageurs utilise resources to uncover 
proprietary information about stocks and earn an acceptable return by using that 
information to trade against less informed investors (Morck et.al., 2000).  Hence, 
indirectly, they are actually acting as firm monitors.  Morck et.al. (2000) further argues 
that this activity might not be attractive in countries with poor minority shareholder 
rights protection because risk arbitrageurs fear they may not be allowed to keep their 
earnings in these countries, especially if they are not politically connected.  
Since, Malaysia is ranked the third highest in stock returns synchronicity (Morck et.al., 
2000), it can be argued that risk arbitrageurs are not interested in trading in this 
country‘s stock market due to lack of minority shareholder rights protection.  With lack 
of informed trading, there is less monitoring by risk arbitrageurs in the capital markets 
(Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Morck et.al., 2005).  This further provide incentives for 
controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders through stock market 
manipulation such as share repurchases, share price dilution, etc.  This opportunistic 
behaviour is also encouraged by the lack of market for corporate control. 
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2.3.4.5 Lack of Market for Corporate Control and Expropriation 
Due to the prevalence of high ownership concentration in Malaysia, there is a lack of 
market for corporate control (Abdullah, 2006; Thillainathan, 1999). Ownership 
concentration reduces the incentives for takeovers and acquisitions because of the 
higher price the acquirer has to pay to become the new controlling shareholder of the 
acquired firm (due to the higher volume of shares needed to be purchased) compared to 
the price they have to pay to acquire a stake in widely held corporations.  As a result, 
the disciplinary effects of the market for corporate control are greatly reduced.  This 
encourages expropriation because controlling shareholders know that the likelihood that 
they will be replaced is low due to their ownership concentration (Thillainathan, 1999).  
The argument by Thillainathan (1999) is consistent with the argument by Stulz (1988) 
who argues that an increase in the fraction of voting rights of controlling shareholders 
decreases the probability of a successful tender offer to acquire the firm and increases 
the premium offered if a tender offer is made.  The lack of disciplinary effects of the 
market for corporate control can also be attributed to the strategic under pricing of 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) shares by controlling shareholders in order to elicit 
oversubscription of these shares and allow lotteries to ration the shares.  This prevents 
large subscribers from purchasing large-block shares and weakening the control of the 
controlling shareholders, hence, the under pricing helps maintain the control power of 
controlling shareholders.  This is detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders as 
the market for corporate control is weakened by the IPO under pricing (Lin and Chuang, 
2011). 
Apart from a low likelihood of being replaced, the inadequate and costly legal 
protection of minority shareholders also encourages controlling shareholders to 
expropriate. 
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2.3.4.6 Inadequate and Costly Legal Protection of Minority Shareholders 
The adequacy of investor protection for minority shareholders in Malaysia can be 
analysed with regards to their rights as shareholders, the protection they enjoy against 
expropriation as well as the quality of law enforcement (Thillainathan, 1999; World 
Bank, 2005).  Equity ownership in firms provides a shareholder several basic rights, 
which include the following: 
a) The right to a secure method of ownership registration 
b) The right to convey or transfer shares 
c) The right to obtain relevant information on the corporation on a regular basis 
d) The right to participate and vote at general shareholders meetings on key 
corporate matters 
e) The right to elect members of the board  
f) The right to share in the residual interest in the profits of the corporation 
The principal rights that minority shareholders possess is the right to vote on the 
election of directors, on amendments to the corporate charter as well as on key 
corporate matters such as asset sales, mergers and acquisitions, and liquidation; thus 
restricting the discretion of corporate insiders on these key issues (Thillainathan, 1999; 
World Bank, 2005). 
In assessing how well Malaysia performs with regard to these principal shareholder 
rights; an assessment of the voting rights attached to shares as well as the rights that 
support the voting mechanism against intervention by corporate insiders (also known as 
anti-director rights) was conducted by La Porta et.al.(1998) (as cited in Thillainathan, 
1999). 
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La Porta et.al. (1998) find that Malaysia is one of  only eleven countries out of a total of 
forty nine, which adopts a genuine one-share-one-vote rule.  They also find that 
Malaysia scored four out of six in anti-director rights whereby proxy mail and 
cumulative voting are not allowed.  This provides incentives for controlling 
shareholders to take advantage of this weakness by engaging in expropriation activities. 
In Malaysia, as in many other common law countries, shareholder-voting rights are 
supplemented by an affirmative duty of loyalty of managers to shareholders.  Managers 
have a duty to act in shareholders‘ interests.  The most commonly accepted element of 
the duty of loyalty are the legal restrictions on managerial self-dealing, such as outright 
theft from the firm, excessive compensation or issues of issuing additional securities 
(such as equity) to the management and its relatives.  Malaysian courts would intervene 
in cases of management theft and asset diversion, and they would definitely intervene if 
managers dilute existing shareholders through equity issuance to themselves 
(Thillainathan, 1999; World Bank, 2005).  
However, the courts are less likely to intervene in cases of excessive compensation and 
in line with the business judgment rule (that keeps the courts out of corporate 
decisions), they are also very unlikely to second guess managers‘ business decisions, 
including those decisions that could hurt minority shareholders (Thillainatan, 1999; 
Pascoe and Rachagan, 2005; Salim, 2009).  This is a window of opportunity for 
controlling shareholders to engage in expropriation activities. 
The minority shareholders in this country, as in the United States, have the right to sue 
firms using class action suits that bypass the free rider problems, if they believe that 
corporate insiders have violated their duty of loyalty to them.  However, Malaysian civil 
procedures are less accommodative to class action suits and contingent fees are 
prohibitive (Chan, 2007; Thillainathan, 1999).  This hinders legal action by minority 
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shareholders and increases the incentives for expropriation by controlling shareholders. 
Although, overall, there is an avenue for minority shareholders to take legal action on 
behalf of the firm‘s name,  the practical realities  discourage such actions.  This is 
because the legal costs of initiating legal action as well as the substantive and 
procedural requirements to carry out such actions are generally burdensome (Chan, 
2007; Thillainathan, 1999).  This further provides incentives for minority shareholder 
expropriation. 
Apart from property rights and the quality of investor protection, the quality of legal 
enforcement is also significant for good corporate governance (Berglof and Claessens, 
2006; Thillainathan, 1999).  As shown in the investor protection scores from the Asian 
Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) and Credit Lyonnaise Securities Asia 
(CLSA), Malaysia only obtained a score of 39 out of 100 for legal enforcement (ACGA, 
2012).  Consequently, it is very clear that emerging markets such as Malaysia need to 
improve upon its legal enforcement.  
In addition, there is a growing public perception that the judiciary standards have 
declined in this country (Thillainathan, 1999; Wain, 2009).  For example, it is perceived 
that the independence, impartiality and integrity of the judiciary have been 
compromised, whereby judges are perceived to be not ‗truly‘ independent in their 
judgments.   Declining standards of the judiciary system will definitely serve as a 
catalyst for expropriation by controlling shareholders, as they are confident that the 
likelihood of receiving a favourable outcome from court cases is high.  Although, legal 
weaknesses and cost of legal protection is an important factor in encouraging 
expropriation, economic practices too play a role in encouraging this behaviour. 
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2.3.4.7 Restrictive Licensing Practices and Expropriation 
In Malaysia, one significant issue which encourages expropriation is the presence of 
restrictive licensing practices (exclusive economic practices), which benefit certain 
controlling shareholders of large business groups.  These practices result in monopolies 
in certain industries and hence, concentrated shareholding (Nambiar, 2011; 
Thillainathan, 1999).  These practices need to be reduced or eliminated which is crucial 
for encouraging more dispersed shareholding and risk diversification at the level of 
individual or family wealth holders which will result in less expropriation by controlling 
shareholders.  However, the practice of restrictive licensing is likely to continue as long 
as firms have the tendency to be rent-seekers. 
2.3.4.8 Rent Seeking and Expropriation 
Generally, the theory of the firm presumes that in a perfect market, all firms compete 
for resources and market share on an even level.  In a pure, competitive market with low 
ownership concentration and limited economic distortions, a highly efficient firm sells 
its product at market prices and earns a normal profit.  This firm employs a reasonable 
number of workers at market rate wages and using optimum capital structure, is able to 
pay normal dividends and provide a reasonable return on equity to shareholders.  This 
was basically the idea of traditional business corporations in the early twentieth century 
as postulated by Coase (1937).  He argues that firms control the transformation of inputs 
into outputs and earn a resulting profit.  As a result of this, the theory by Coase (1937) 
predicts that the whole economy could operate efficiently as one great system of 
markets, in which autonomous agents enter into very elaborate contracts with each other 
without any transaction and agency costs incurred. 
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However, due to market imperfections such as transaction costs, barriers to entry, the 
existence of monopolies, oligopolies and monopsonies, market illiquidity, etc; firms 
strive to maximise profits by engaging in rent-seeking activities (Ariffin, 2009).   Morck 
et.al. (2001) define rent seeking as business practices which extract uncompensated 
value from others without taking actions to improve productivity or create a mutual 
beneficial transaction.  Although, rent seeking is unethical in nature, given the urgency 
of the firm in maximising shareholder wealth along with various economic constraints, 
rent seeking may be the only business solution to the firm (Krueger, 1974). 
In the model by Krueger (1974), it is shown that firms which seek rent try to create a 
barrier of entry into the market and monopolise the production line in which the rent is 
created.  This distortion creates an artificial market price for a product that, in turn, 
creates a higher profit margin for the firms.  
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993) find that rent-seeking activities show increasing 
returns for firms which practise them.  Since the returns from rent-seeking activities are 
attractive, this makes rent-seeking more attractive relative to productive activities.  
Basically, this is costly to the firm‘s growth because resources are channelled to rent-
seeking instead of production.  This expropriates minority shareholders.  Murphy et.al. 
(1993) further explain that firms which choose to maximise their rent-seeking activities 
instead of production, had most of their resources diverted to unproductive activities.  
Hence, minority shareholders are expropriated.  For example, instead of channelling 
investment funds into research and development (R&D), the funds are used to finance 
the lobbying of a specific government agency.  If the lobbying is successful, it will help 
the participating firms maintain their rent seeking activities.  In the long run, the 
economy will suffer because no product development occurs but corruption, minority 
shareholder expropriation and other unhealthy business practices prevail. 
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Having known the factors which encourage minority shareholder expropriation, it is 
also important to know that the risk of minority shareholder expropriation occurring is 
the highest during times of financial crisis (Johnson et.al., 2000a).  This is explained 
further next. 
2.3.5 Minority Shareholder Expropriation during Financial Crisis 
Young et.al. (2008) argue that the principal-principal conflict may increase during 
periods of economic crisis.  This can occur because during these periods where 
controlling shareholders possess stronger incentives to expropriate minority 
shareholders due to the financial losses that they have suffered.  This occurs because 
controlling shareholders become more desperate to extract firm resources in an attempt 
to protect their own wealth (Young et.al., 2008; Jiang and Peng, 2011).  
In addition to that, Johnson et.al. (2000a) argue that minority shareholders expropriation 
becomes more severe during periods of financial crisis because controlling shareholders 
are led to expropriate more as the expected returns on investment falls.  During the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, even firms with a good reputation exploited their minority 
shareholders (Johnson et.al., 2000a).  Johnson et.al. (2000a) used a simple model to 
show that agency problems can make countries with weak legal systems vulnerable to 
the effects of a sudden loss of investor confidence.  They show that corporate 
governance variables particularly those related to minority shareholder protection such 
as contracts enforceability and shareholder rights explain more of the variation in 
exchange rates and stock market performance during the Asian financial crisis 
compared to macroeconomic variables.  The evidence provided by Johnson et.al. 
(2000a) suggest that corporate governance particularly minority shareholders protection 
is a first-order significance in determining the extent of macroeconomic problems in 
crisis situations. 
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The model used by Johnson et.al. (2000a) show that minority shareholder protection 
matters more in explaining the changes in the exchange rate and stock market 
performance during the Asian financial crisis is as following: 
As in Jensen and Meckling (1976), the conflict of interest is between insiders (managers) 
and outsiders (shareholders in our simple model).  The manager owns a fraction α of the 
firm‘s equity and shareholders own equity of (1-α) fraction. Retained earnings are 
represented by I.  The manager steals S≥ 0 of retained earnings and receives utility of S 
from them.  Johnson et.al. (2000a) utilise ―stealing‖ as shorthand for more general 
forms of managerial expropriation. Stealing is costly and the manager expects to lose 
C(S)=(S
2
/2k) when he steals because, for example, other people need to be compensated 
and there is some probability that the manager will be caught and punished.  A higher 
value of k - representing, in this case, weaker corporate governance rules or a weaker 
legal system or both - means that it is cheaper to steal. Thus, the value of stealing, S - 
C(S), is concave in S.  The marginal value of stealing is reduced as the amount stolen 
increases because it becomes harder to steal as the absolute amount of theft increases; 
the stealing becomes more obvious and easier for a court to stop
9
.  
The manager invests what he does not steal in a project that earns a gross rate of return 
R, which is greater than one, and from which he receives the share α of profits. The 
manager's optimisation problem is given by MaxS U(S; R, k, a) = Max[αR(I - S) + S - 
(S
2
/2k)], and the optimal amount of theft, S*, is found by solving δU/δS = 1 - (S*/k) – 
αR = 0, which yields S*(R, k, a) = k(1 - αR).  Johnson et.al. (2000a) assumes that the 
parameter values are such that the manager will not attempt to steal more than the total 
amount of retained earnings, or S*(R, k, a) ≤  I.  This simplifies the analysis by avoiding 
a corner solution, without changing the main insights. 
                                                          
9 A referee has pointed out that Johnson et.al. (2000a) could cast the model in terms of general agency problems for managers (e.g., 
shirking). Their results apply directly to any managerial agency problems that become worse in an economic downturn. Note that 
many forms of stealing are actually legal in countries with weak legal environments (Johnson et al., 2000b). 
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The manager equates the marginal cost and marginal benefit of stealing.  Because the 
manager owns α of the firm, he possess an incentive to invest at least some of the firm's 
cash rather than to steal it all.  As k rises, the equilibrium amount of stealing falls.  As k 
rises, the amount of stealing in equilibrium rises. If α > 1/R, the manager's stealing is 
―negative‖, meaning the manager puts in some of his own money into the firm, perhaps 
to ensure firm survival and enjoy positive stealing in the future (Friedman and Johnson, 
1999).  For their own objectives, Johnson et.al. (2000a) assume that α is low enough 
that the manager decides to steal.  Alternatively, they assume that the manager is credit 
constrained.  In this static model, assuming that the manager never steals less than zero 
does not substantially change the analysis. 
Differentiating the optimal stealing equation with respect to R gives 
(δS*/δR) = - αk. 
An increase in the rate of return on the invested resources lowers the amount of stealing 
because it increases the marginal opportunity cost of the stolen resources.  
A higher α means δS*/δR  is more negative.  If the manager owns more of the firm, then 
a given increase in the return on investment convinces him to put more resources into 
the investment project and, therefore, to steal less.  Conversely, if the manager owns 
more but the return on investment declines, then he steals more.  
A higher value of k means that δS*/δR is more negative.  A lower cost of stealing 
(higher k) both raises the equilibrium value of stealing and makes stealing more 
responsive to variation in the rate of return on investment.  This is because larger k both 
shifts up the stealing function and makes it less concave (i.e., the returns to stealing do 
not decrease so strongly). 
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The shareholder receives share (1 - α) of the returns from the funds that are actually 
invested in the firm.  The expected value of the firm‘s shares is therefore 
Π = R(I - k(1 - αR)), 
where P is the share value of the firm.  This is the value of all the shares owned by both 
shareholders and managers, which equals the total value of the firm minus the value of 
stealing. 
Differentiating with respect to R gives the ―absolute responsiveness,‖ 
ρa = δΠ/δR = I – k + 2Rkα,  
which is the sensitivity of firm value to variations in R.  This is always positive because 
Johnson et.al. (2000a) have assumed that the optimal level of stealing is less than I.  The 
maximum value of stealing, given by the first-order condition when αR is zero, is k.  
Johnson et.al. (2000a) assumed that there cannot be negative stealing, so k ≤ I, and thus 
is adequate to ensure that ρa > 0.  
There are two effects of a higher R.  The first, direct effect is to increase the expected 
payoff and thus increase the amount that the investor is willing to invest in the firm.  
Holding the level of stealing constant, the direct effect shows that the value of the firm 
increases.  The second, indirect effect works because higher investment returns decrease 
the optimal level of stealing, so δS*/δR < 0. Reduced stealing also increases the 
expected payoff for shareholders and increases the firm value
10
.  
What is the effect on δΠ/δR of altering the penalty for managerial theft, k ?  The effect 
on the absolute responsiveness is 
δρa/δk = 2Rα - 1. 
                                                          
10  In order to make the point, Johnson et.al. (2000a) presented a simplified model that ignores general equilibrium effects. 
Assuming α is exogenous, the expected return for a shareholder varies between countries that have a different value of k. In 
equilibrium this would not occur because shareholders would want to invest more in the country with a higher return. A 
complete model would include these general equilibrium effects. 
62 
 
For low values of αR, such that Rα < 1/2, a larger value of k (a lower penalty) implies a 
reduction in δΠ/δR.  For large values of αR, however, a larger value of k implies an 
increase in δΠ/δR.  The intuition for this result is that when αR is low, the manager is 
already stealing a huge amount, so Π is already low in absolute terms and thus further 
variations in R do not induce much additional stealing
11
.  
However, Johnson et.al. (2000a) receive an unambiguous prediction for the relative 
responsiveness, ρr = (δΠ/δR)/Π = (I - k(1 - αR) + Rkα)/R(I - k(1 - αR)), which is the 
sensitivity of firm value in percentage terms. The differentiation of this variation with 
respect to k is 
δρr/δk = Iα/(I – k + Rkα)
2
 > 0. 
This impact is positive regardless of the α value. Note that the relation between absolute 
and relative responsiveness is 
δ(ρa )/δk = δ(Πρr)/δk = Π[δρr/δk] + [δΠ/δk](ρr). 
The first term is positive.  The second term contains δΠ/δk, which is negative.  A higher 
value of k (i.e., a weaker legal environment) implies that (δΠ /δR)/Π increases, so that 
the value of the firm, P, becomes more sensitive in percentage terms to a variation in the 
rate of return, R.  The same result holds if they allow firms to borrow debt as well as 
issue equity.  However, the presence of debt implies a range of values for R within 
which a lower value of R actually means reduced stealing because the manager steals 
less (or even transfers funds into the firm if that is possible) in order to enable the firm 
to service its debt and therefore preserve the possibility of future stealing.  If R falls 
sufficiently low, however, then the manager will choose to loot the firm and it will go 
                                                          
11  Differentiating absolute responsiveness with respect to k gives: 
 δρa /δk = δ
2Π/δRδk  =  ( - δS/δk) + [ - R(δ2S/δRδk)]. 
 
 The first term is always negative: a larger value of k increases the absolute level of stealing. But the second term is positive - 
when k is larger, a given variation in R induces a smaller change in the level of stealing (due to the convex stealing costs). When 
the second term is relatively high in absolute terms, i.e., when R is large, then δ2Π/δRδk will be positive. 
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out of existence. Therefore, in the data, Johnson et.al. (2000a) look at the percentage 
variation in firm values. 
Besides the model by Johnson et.al. (2000a), Mitton (2002) further finds that firms 
which have poorer minority shareholder protection have a negative impact on firm 
performance during the East Asian financial crisis.  His study complements the study by 
Johnson et.al. (2000a) that corporate governance particularly minority shareholder 
protection is a significant determinant of firm performance during periods of financial 
crisis.  
Jiang and Peng (2011) find that during the Asian financial crisis, family firms tend to 
select certain control structures associated with principal-principal conflict.  These 
control structures are corporate pyramidal structures which provide family controlling 
shareholders excess control rights as well as the appointment of an owner Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO). 
Based upon the empirical evidence by Johnson et.al. (2000a), Mitton (2002) and Jiang 
and Peng (2011), minority shareholder protection is indeed a significant issue during 
periods of financial crisis as the likelihood of principal-principal conflict occurring is 
the highest. Since minority shareholder expropriation is a significant corporate 
governance problem in emerging markets particularly during times of financial crisis, 
corporate governance mechanisms can possibly be used to mitigate this problem. 
2.4 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
Traditionally, corporate governance mechanisms are designed to mitigate the principal-
agent conflict which is prevalent in developed economies (Young et.al., 2008).  These 
include internal corporate governance mechanisms such as board of directors, 
ownership concentration, executive compensation packages and external corporate 
governance mechanisms such as product market competition, managerial labour market 
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and the market for corporate control (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Fama and Jensen, 
1983b).  Figure 2.4 illustrate these mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Corporate Governance Mechanisms Designed to Mitigate the 
                             Principal-Agent Conflict 
         Source: Demsetz and Lehn (1985),  Fama and Jensen (1983b) 
Figure 2.4 depicts a bundle of corporate governance mechanisms designed to mitigate 
the principal-agent problem.  It comes in a bundle as the effectiveness of a particular 
corporate governance mechanism depends on the effectiveness of other mechanisms 
(Davis and Useem, 2002; Rediker and Seth, 1995).  In other words, one mechanism 
may act as a substitute for or complement another mechanism.  If one or more 
mechanisms are less effective, then others will be relied on more heavily (Rediker and 
Seth, 1995; Suhomliva, 2006). 
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However, in emerging markets, since the major corporate governance problem is the 
principal-principal conflict instead of principal-agent conflict; a different bundle of 
corporate governance mechanisms are needed rather than those depicted in Figure 2.4 
(Young et.al., 2008).  This is because the institutional setting in emerging markets 
where the principal-principal conflict is dominant and different from the institutional 
setting in developed economies such as USA where the principal-agent conflict is more 
prevalent.  Such bundle may include bank monitoring, more effective independent 
directors, etc and this bundle differs across different countries as each bundle is 
dependent upon the institutional setting in each country (Guillen, 2000, 2001; La Porta 
et.al., 1997, 1998, 2002; Suhomliva, 2006). 
2.5 INSTITUTIONAL SETTING IN MALAYSIA 
One of the emerging markets, which possess different institutional setting from 
developed economies such as USA is Malaysia. Institutional setting in Malaysia is 
unique in certain ways.  This uniqueness is possibly one of the factors which may 
contribute to the prevalence of principal-principal conflict in Malaysia.  The 
institutional setting in Malaysia constitutes three major parts, its political economy, 
corporate governance reforms and regulatory framework. 
2.5.1 Malaysia’s Political Economy 
In Malaysia, the principal-principal conflict to a certain extent can be influenced by its 
political economy.  The main landscape for Malaysia‘s political economy from 1970 
onwards was shaped by the New Economic Policy (NEP).  The primary objective of the 
NEP, formed in 1970, was to achieve national unity by eliminating poverty, regardless 
of race and by ‗restructuring society‘ to achieve inter-ethnic economic equality between 
the predominantly Malay bumiputras and the predominantly Chinese non-bumiputras 
(Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Searle, 1999).  The New Economic Policy (NEP) was 
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implemented during the last thirty-two years with the aim of promoting national unity 
through the eradication of poverty among all Malaysians and the restructuring of society 
to eliminate the identification of race with economic function.  The NEP and later the 
National Development Policy (NDP)
12
 basically, involves restructuring of corporate 
stock ownership, employment and education (with the latter two often considered 
together).  
Although, the NEP has been successful to a certain extent, this restructuring has 
generated a group of elite minorities who usually possess huge shareholding stakes in 
large public-listed firms.  This group of elite minorities are also very well politically 
connected.  In other words, the NEP had encouraged ownership concentration by an 
elite group of minorities who are also politically connected (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; 
Liew, 2007; Searle, 1999).  This political connection enables large business groups to 
practice political patronage and one of the major benefits is that these conglomerates 
could obtain bank loans effortlessly from domestic banks via bank-directed lending as 
the government has a huge influence on the loans provided (Ang, 2009; Ang and Sen, 
2011; Gomez and Jomo, 1997).  
This widespread practice of political patronage by business corporations, particularly 
large business groups, in this country (Gomez and Jomo, 1997; Liew, 2007; Searle, 
1999), can possibly motivate firms‘ controlling shareholders particularly those from 
family firms, to expropriate minority shareholders by devoting some of the firms‘ 
resources obtained through political patronage and connections, for their own private 
benefits or for the purpose of empire building by engaging in unprofitable business 
ventures and excessive unrelated business diversification.  In short, the NEP encourages 
a rent-seeking culture among business corporations in this country (Gomez and Jomo, 
1997; Liew, 2007; Searle, 1999) and hence, can possibly encourage minority 
                                                          
12  The NDP is an extension of the NEP with the same original objectives promulgated by the ruling government in 1990. 
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shareholder expropriation by controlling shareholders.  Furthermore, the easy access to 
the banking sector for funding needs due to bank-directed lending, encourages debt 
expropriation by controlling shareholders as debt provides incentives for expropriation 
in emerging markets (Faccio et.al., 2001c).   
Since, the political economy could possibly encourage minority shareholder 
expropriation in Malaysia; it is not surprising that the 1997 financial crisis revealed the 
corporate governance flaws in this country which was previously unknown to investors 
(Boubakri, Guedhami and Mishra, 2010).  As the crisis alerted investors to Malaysia‘s 
poor corporate governance, the government had undertaken major reforms to improve 
the level of governance within the corporate sector (Boubakri et.al., 2010).  
2.5.2 Corporate Governance Reforms in Malaysia 
Since the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the Malaysian government had implemented 
major corporate governance reforms to improve corporate governance.  This is shown in 
Figure 2.5: 
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Figure 2.5: Major Corporate Governance Reforms in Malaysia 
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One of the major post-1997 corporate governance reforms in this country is the 
establishment of the High Level Finance Committee on March 24, 1998 in response to 
the urgent need to raise standards of corporate governance by setting up a sound 
corporate governance and best practices framework in Malaysia (Shim, 2006).  The 
Finance Committee on Corporate Governance chaired by the Secretary General of 
Treasury, Ministry of Finance, was a smart partnership between the government and the 
private sector.  Its twelve member committee was represented by almost all sectors of 
the business and regulatory communities including the Securities Commission, the 
Financial Reporting Foundation, the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB), 
the Registrar of Companies (ROC), the KLSE (later called Bursa Malaysia), the Central 
Bank, Federation of Public-Listed Companies and the Association of Banks. Extensive 
consultations with government ministries, private sector, independent consultants and 
professional bodies were conducted during the term of office of the committee (Shim, 
2006). 
The terms of reference of the Finance Committee (Shim, 2006) are:  
(i) to develop an acceptable definition of corporate governance for Malaysian 
companies  
(ii) to identify and clarify the role and responsibilities of key participants in the 
corporate sector  
(iii) to raise standards of corporate governance  
(iv) to promote training and education for directors and  
(v) to ensure effective enforcement mechanisms  
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The Committee started on the premise that corporate governance standards in Malaysia 
were lacking and that there was a need to increase these standards.  It submitted its final 
report (after consultation with the various professional and administrative bodies) to the 
Minister of Finance in February, 1999.  The 275 page Report (commonly known as the 
Green Book) has eight chapters.  It broadly covers three areas namely: the establishment 
of the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG), the reform of laws, 
regulations and rules relating to corporate governance and training and education for 
directors.  It has made seventy recommendations.  Many of them have been 
implemented and some of them were even updated or implemented before the release of 
the report, a move which was highly praised by those involved in the capital market 
(Shim, 2006).  Central to the report on corporate governance is the recommendation for 
the establishment of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG). 
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) was established in 2000. The 
recommendations set out in the MCCG are prescriptive in nature and fall under four 
main parts:  
Part  (1)  Principles;  
Part (2)  Best Practices;  
Part (3)  Exhortations to Other Participants; and  
Part (4) Explanatory Notes (Wahab, How and Verhoeven, 2007).  
In part (1) on Principles it addresses four main issues: board of directors, directors‘ 
remuneration, shareholders, and accountability and audit.  A narrative statement in the 
annual report of how the relevant principles have been applied is perceived adequate 
disclosure for investors to assess the firms. In part (2) on the area of best practices; it 
provides a set of guidelines or practices relating to the board of directors and 
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accountability and audit to assist firms in designing their approach to corporate 
governance. Compliance is voluntary but firms are required to state in their annual 
reports the extent of their compliance, with an explanation for any deviations.  Part (3) 
advice other participants addresses primarily institutional investors and auditors and the 
enhancement of their role in corporate governance. In part (4) explanatory notes provide 
further explanation of the three parts mentioned above.  However, unlike part (2) Best 
Practices, part (4) Guidelines on Explanatory Notes does not require firms to justify 
deviations from best practices (Wahab et.al., 2007).  
Despite significant improvements, the code was revised in 2007 (Securities 
Commission, 2007).  The MCCG 2007 emphasised  strengthening the Board of 
Directors and Audit Committees and ensuring that the Board of Directors and Audit 
Committees discharge their roles and responsibilities effectively (Securities 
Commission, 2007).  To increase reforms, the Securities Commission (SC) further 
established the Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011 in 2011 (Securities Commission, 
2011b).  This blueprint consists of recommendations focusing on shareholder rights, 
role of institutional investors, board‘s role in governance, improving disclosure and 
transparency, role of gatekeepers and influencers and public as well as private 
enforcement (Asian Corporate Governance Association, 2012).  In order to implement 
the Corporate Governance Blueprint 2011, the Securities Commission further revised 
the MCCG 2007 in 2012 (Securities Commission, 2012).  The MCCG 2012, which 
supersedes the 2007 code, sets out principles on structures and processes for companies‘ 
board so that the board could incorporate good corporate governance into their firms‘ 
business dealings and corporate culture (Securities Commission, 2012).  
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Despite the issuance of the MCCG in 2000, 2007 and 2012, these codes of corporate 
governance are possibly ineffective in improving corporate governance (i.e. reducing 
minority shareholder expropriation) due to the voluntary nature of the adoption of its 
principles.  Controlling shareholders in Malaysia possibly view the adoption of these 
principles as not mandatory, and this provides them incentives to expropriate minority 
shareholders, even though, they are still required to state in their annual reports the 
extent of their compliance, with an explanation for any departure (Securities 
Commission, 2007, 2012; Wahab et.al., 2007).  
Subsequent to the establishment of MCCG in 2000, another significant corporate 
governance reform in this country is the issuance of the revamped listing requirements 
in January, 2001 by Bursa Malaysia (Shim, 2006).  This was a move widely seen as a 
major effort to strengthen the capital market and the securities industry in Malaysia.  
The new listing requirements are perceived to be highly effective in the area of financial 
reporting, disclosure of corporate governance matters and continuing listing obligations.  
The revamped listing requirements of 2001 have devoted an entire chapter (chapter 15) 
to corporate governance.  It requires the listed issuer and its directors to conform with 
the requirements of Chapter 15 which deals with board composition (at least one third 
of the total board must be independent directors), restrictions on the number of 
directorships which may be held by a person to not more than 25 directorships), 
prescribing an audit committee of no less than three members with a majority being 
independent directors, provisions as to external auditors including their role, 
appointment and removal, adaptation of MCCG with a comply or explain approach, 
.responsibility statements‘ by the directors and the training of directors (Shim, 2006). 
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In 2008, the listing requirements were further revamped to further strengthen the capital 
market and the securities industry in this country.  The Bursa Malaysia listing 
requirements is argued to be a more effective tool in promoting good corporate 
governance among Malaysian public-listed firms because it is mandatory unlike the 
MCCG which is voluntary.  Bursa Malaysia has the power to reprimand, fine or 
suspend a listed firm and/or its defaulting dealer‘s representative.  It also has the power 
to issue a caution letter, private or public reprimand, impose a fine, suspend trading, or 
delist an issuer from the official list of the exchange, with public reprimand and fines 
being the most common disciplinary actions (Shim, 2006).  However, the powers 
exercisable by Bursa Malaysia, being an inferior tribunal are not absolute.  They are 
always subject to the usual remedy of judicial review with the usual test of good faith 
and legality.  Hence, although Bursa Malaysia listing requirements can be argued to be a 
more effective tool in promoting good corporate governance, it is not an entirely 
effective one due to the possibility of judicial review of its decisions (Shim, 2006).  
Hence, this may provide opportunities for controlling shareholders to expropriate 
minority shareholders as they view that the disciplinary actions taken by Bursa 
Malaysia can be subjected to judicial review.  In the same year Bursa Malaysia issued 
its revamped listing requirements in 2001, The Malaysian Capital Market Master Plan 
(CMP) was also established. 
The Capital Market Steering Committee was formed in 2001 under the auspices of the 
Securities Commission with a vision of having an internationally competitive capital 
market in all core areas (Shim, 2006).  The committee has the following terms of 
reference (Shim, 2006):  
(i) formulate a comprehensive vision and programme for the development of 
the Malaysian Capital Market going forward;  
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(ii) formulate a framework for the orderly and effective sequencing of further 
deregulation and liberalisation; and  
(iii) identify and map the direction for the strategic positioning of the Malaysian 
capital market both domestically and externally. 
The works of the Committee were largely undertaken by the Securities Commission.  
The seven men Committee chaired by the Chairman of the Securities Commission 
undertook extensive consultations with experts in the industry at home and 
internationally, professional bodies, government ministries as well as members of the 
public.  Its 291 page report is most comprehensive and prolifically written.  It has six 
key objectives, 24 strategic initiatives and 152 specific recommendations, 10 of which 
relating to corporate governance and 15 relating to regulatory framework.  In so far as 
corporate governance is concerned, the Steering Committee recommended as follows: 
Table 2.4: Corporate Governance Recommendations in Capital Market Masterplan (2001) 
 
No. Recommendation 
1 The recommendations contained in the report on corporate governance will be effected 
in a timely and comprehensive manner. 
2 The Securities Commission (SC) will further facilitate efforts towards enhancing 
shareholder rights, especially those of minority shareholders and broadening avenues 
for private enforcement of these rights. 
3 Minority shareholders‘ rights in respect of related transactions will be further 
strengthened. 
4 Public-listed firms will be required to provide appropriate shareholder value 
disclosures for securities issuance, restructuring, takeovers and merger exercises. 
5 A set of principles best practices and standards will be developed to encourage 
institutional investor activism in corporate governance and the promotion of 
shareholder value recognition.  The SC will strongly support the efforts of Minority 
Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) in promoting shareholder activism in 
Malaysia. 
6 The SC will work with relevant industry bodies in enhancing the quality and 
independence of auditors of public-listed firms. 
7 The SC will encourage the improvement of channels of communication between firms 
and their shareholders. 
8 The SC and Bursa Malaysia will initiate further measures to promote timely, 
comprehensive and regular dissemination of material and relevant company 
information to shareholders. 
9 Efforts to further enhance disclosures in annual reports by public-listed firms will be 
examined. 
Source: Shim (2006) 
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The futuristic CMP can be characterised into three distinct phases premised on the 
vision, objectives and strategic initiatives and simultaneously taking into account the 
practical issues involved in their implementation (Shim, 2006):  
(1) Phase 1 (2001-2003):  Strengthen domestic capacity and develop strategic and 
nascent sectors,  
(2) Phase 2 (2004-2005): Further strengthen key sectors and gradually liberalise market 
access,  
(3) Phase 3 (2006-2010): Further expansion and strengthening of marker processes and 
infrastructure towards becoming a fully-developed capital 
market and enhancing international positioning in areas of 
competitive advantage. 
An implementation task force through the Capital Market Advisory Council was 
appointed by the SC to advise the Commission on issues relating to the implementation 
of the CMP.  As part of the CMP implemented initiatives, a tripartite High Level 
Enforcement Committee on corporate governance was established with the involvement 
of the SC, Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) and the Royal Malaysian Police 
Force (PDRM) as members to implement strong and proactive market surveillance and 
enforcement mechanisms to promote good corporate governance. The tripartite 
Committee reports directly to the Prime Minister (Shim, 2006).  So far, there is no 
direct evidence of the committee in making arrests, charges or convictions against white 
collar criminals.  Hence, the effectiveness of CMP i.e. through the tripartite High Level 
Enforcement Committee in proactively enforcing good corporate governance among 
Malaysian public-listed firms is questionable.  This provides an opportunity for 
controlling shareholders to take advantage of this ineffectiveness to expropriate 
minority shareholders. 
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Aside from Bursa Malaysia‘s revamped listing requirements and the CMP, another 
important corporate governance reform in Malaysia is with respect to RPTs disclosure.  
In Malaysia, all RPTs have to be disclosed (Rachagan, 2006).  In 2006, the International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) 24 on related party disclosures has been adopted as an 
accounting standard in Malaysia and it is called Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) 
124 (Rachagan, 2006).  The objective of this standard is to ensure that a firm‘s financial 
statements contain the necessary disclosures to draw attention to the possibility that its 
financial position may have been affected by the existence of RPTs (Financial 
Reporting Standard 124, 2010).  Some examples of RPTs which need to be disclosed 
include those transactions which are analysed in this study.   These are RPTs which are 
likely to result in expropriation such as asset acquisitions, asset sales, equity sales, 
trading relationships and cash payments to a related party (Financial Reporting Standard 
124, 2010).  Since the purpose of FRS 124 is to disclose RPTs to investors, it is logical 
to argue that this disclosure requirement can possibly help increase the awareness of 
investors on RPT activities.  As a consequence of this increased awareness, it is also 
rational to assert that investors may increase their shareholder activism to counter 
minority shareholder expropriation through RPTs.  
However, despite the implementation of FRS 124 since 2006, it is found that there is a 
possibility of insufficient information on RPTs being disclosed by companies‘ 
controlling shareholders (CFA, 2009).  With insufficient RPTs disclosure, minority 
shareholders tend to lose out because those undisclosed RPTs could be detrimental to 
their interests.  Moreover, relevant material information on RPTs is not always easily 
identifiable and this information may not easily be tracked by the company‘s internal 
controls.  All these make it difficult for all relevant information on RPTs to be properly 
disclosed (CFA, 2009).  Therefore, the implementation of FRS124 can be considered to 
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be not entirely effective in raising the awareness and increasing shareholder activism on 
expropriation through RPTs due to the possibility of incomplete disclosure. 
Another important corporate governance development in Malaysia is the creation of 
external corporate governance mechanisms to ensure fair treatment and protection of 
minority shareholder rights (Wahab et.al., 2011).  Given the fact that ownership 
structure in Malaysian companies is highly concentrated, minority shareholder 
protection becomes more significant.  Therefore, to monitor and protect the rights of 
minority shareholders and to promote shareholder activism, the High Level Finance 
Committee recommended the establishment of the Minority Shareholder Watchdog 
Group (MSWG) in February, 1999 (Wahab et.al., 2011).  In 2001, MSWG was formally 
established and funded by five local institutional investors, namely; Employees 
Provident Fund (EPF), The National Equities Corporation (PNB), The Armed Forces 
Fund Board (LTAT), Pilgrims Fund Board (Lembaga Urusan Tabung Haji) and the 
Social Security Organisation (SOCSO).  
The main roles of MSWG are to act as a platform in initiating collective shareholder 
activism on unethical or disputable practices by management of public-listed firms; 
monitoring of breaches and non-compliance in corporate governance practices by 
public-listed companies; to disclose current corporate governance practices to 
stakeholders and provide training, education and awareness programmes to promote 
shareholder activism and the benefits of good corporate governance practices (Wahab 
et.al., 2011).  With the formation of MSWG, it is expected that the conflict of interest 
between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders can be reduced as this is 
one avenue of market discipline to encourage good corporate governance amongst 
public listed companies with the objective of raising shareholder value over time 
(MSWG, 2012).  However, the effectiveness of MSWG in reducing minority 
shareholder expropriation is disputable because unlike the Securities Commission (SC), 
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it does not possess the legal authority to bring cases of minority shareholder 
expropriation to the courts.  Its main role is only to promote shareholder activism to 
protect the rights of minority shareholders by acting as external monitors of corporate 
governance practices in public-listed firms.  Therefore, the role of MSWG in reducing 
the problem of minority shareholder expropriation is deemed to be not entirely 
effective.  In fact, Azizan and Ameer (2012) investigate the effect of shareholder 
activism led by MSWG on the level of RPTs in Malaysian family-controlled firms and 
find that it had not much impact on the level of these transactions within these firms.  
This provides an additional support to the argument that shareholder activism promoted 
by MSWG is not entirely effective in reducing the problem of minority shareholder 
expropriation particularly through RPTs in family-controlled firms. 
Although corporate governance reforms can be considered to play a central role in 
assisting the improvement of corporate governance in Malaysia, the existing regulatory 
framework is also crucial as corporate governance activities such as RPTs are regulated 
by it.  Two significant regulatory frameworks which regulate RPTs are the Companies 
Act (1965) Sections 131-133 and the Listing Requirements (World Bank, 2005). 
2.5.3 Regulatory Framework on Related Party Transactions (RPTs) in Malaysia 
In Malaysia, the Companies Act (1965) plays a significant role in regulating RPTs. For 
this purpose, the relevant sections in the Companies Act (1965) are Section 131, 131A, 
132C, 132E, 133 and 133A (Thillainathan, 1999).  However, these sections contain 
loopholes, which could be taken advantage of by controlling shareholders.  A closer 
review of these Sections reveals several weaknesses, which could be manipulated by 
controlling shareholders particularly from family firms to expropriate through RPTs 
(Thillainathan, 1999): 
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a) Section 132E of the Companies Act (1965) only embraces transactions with 
directors or persons connected with directors.  It does not embrace transactions 
between a company and a substantial shareholder.  Section 132G recognises the 
concept of a substantial shareholder in RPTs.  Therefore, the ambit of Section 
132E should be extended to cover substantial shareholders and persons 
connected to substantial shareholders. 
b) Section 132E of the Companies Act (1965) only requires that RPTs be disclosed 
and approved by shareholders but it does not prohibit the related party from 
exercising its voting rights on such transactions (World Bank, 2005).  
Amendments should be considered to require the related parties (and in 
particular when the ambit of the section is expanded to cover substantial 
shareholders) to abstain from voting on interested party transactions (World 
Bank, 2005). 
c) There are also weaknesses in existing legal provisions with respect to a 
substantial acquisition or disposal, which requires shareholders approval.  Koh 
(1997) argued that Section 132C of the Company‘s Act (1965) is ambiguous 
with respect to the scope of the meaning of ―undertaking‖, ―property‖ and 
―substantial values‖; leading to doubts as to whether in any one transaction, 
approval of a general meeting is needful.  Furthermore, it can be disputed that 
only acquisition or disposal, which materially and adversely affects the 
performance or financial position of the company, would require general 
meeting approval.  It can also be debated in anyone case whether the transaction 
is adverse to the performance of the company or its financial position. 
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These regulatory loopholes indicate a weak legal system in the governance of RPTs, 
which could be taken advantage by family controlling shareholders.  Coupled with low 
cash-flow-to-control rights ratio (Claessens et.al., 2000a) and poor legal enforcement 
(Thillainathan, 1999; World Bank, 2005), minority shareholder expropriation is indeed 
a significant corporate governance problem in Malaysia particularly in family-
controlled firms.  Hence, the following section provides a detailed explanation of family 
firms and how its existence impedes the minority shareholders through expropriation 
activities. 
2.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explain the various issues related to the Malaysian institutional 
environment and ownership structure and how they relate to minority shareholder 
expropriation. Basically, this chapter discuss the differences between the traditional 
principal-agent conflict and principal-principal conflicts as outlined in Table 2.3. The 
next chapter will explain issues related to family firms and minority shareholder 
expropriation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
FAMILY FIRMS AND MINORITY SHAREHOLDER EXPROPRIATION 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss issues related to family firms and minority shareholder 
expropriation. Section 3.2 will discuss issues related to family firms. Section 3.3 will 
discuss issues related to minority shareholder expropriation in family firms. Section 3.4 
will discuss about RPTs. Section 3.5 will discuss about the tenure of independent 
directors. Section 3.6 will discuss the issues related to the domestic banking channel 
used by firms. Section 3.7 will discuss the moderating effects of controlling 
shareholders‘ ownership. Section 3.8 concludes. 
3.2 FAMILY FIRMS  
3.2.1 Definition of Family Firms 
Family firms have always been significant to free-market economies.  They have been 
defined in various ways by theorists in accordance with the research being conducted at 
that time.  First, family firms is defined based on the degree of ownership and/or 
management by family members, e.g. Alcorn (1982), Barnes and Hershon (1976), Barry 
(2004), Dyer (1986), Lansberg, Perrow and Rogolsky (1988).  Second, others use the 
degree of family involvement to define family firms (Beckhard and Dyer, 1983; Davis, 
1983).  Third, some theorists define family firms as a potential for generation transfer 
(Churchill and Hattern, 1987; Ward, 1987). 
Furthermore, according to empirical studies e.g. McConaughy, Walker, Henderson and 
Mishra (1998), Mishra and McConaughy (1999) and Sraer and Thesmar (2007); they 
view family controlled firms as firms whose CEOs are either the founder or a 
descendant of the founder.  Furthermore, others define firms as family firms when 
81 
 
families hold shares in the firms according to a certain level of equity stake, and also 
whether family members appear on the board (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Yammeesri 
and Lodh, 2004; Yeh, Lee and Woidtke, 2001).  In fact, in the case of a public family 
business, the term ownership brings a similar meaning for control (Churchill and 
Hatten, 1987).  
This study utilises the definition of family firms as suggested by Barnes and Hershon 
(1976) whereby a firm is classified as a family firm if an individual or members of a 
single family is the controlling shareholder; that is a person (rather than a state, 
corporation, management trust or mutual fund) can obtain enough shares to assure at 
least  20% of the voting rights and the highest percentage of voting rights in comparison 
to other shareholders (Bjuggren, Johansson and Sjogren, 2011; Chakrabarty, 2009; De 
Vries and Manfred, 1993; La Porta et.al. 1999).  The definition by Barnes and Hershon 
(1976) as well as the 20% threshold is used in this study as the majority (i.e. 76%)
13
 of 
family firms‘ controlling shareholders in the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia holds at 
least 20% shareholding.  
Moreover, in order to be classified as a family firm, there must be family involvement 
in the management of the firm and this requires at least one member of the controlling 
family hold a managerial position (i.e. board member, CEO or chairman, chairman of 
the syndicate pact) (Cascino et.al. 2010).  Hence, the definition of family firms used in 
this study is based upon a threshold of 20% family shareholding as well as family 
involvement in the management of the firm.  This definition is stricter than those used 
by Ibrahim (2009) and Munir and Gul (2011), where these authors also studied 
Malaysian family firms. Ibrahim (2009) define family firms as firms which have the 
presence of a family member on the board or the family members must hold at least 
                                                          
13
  As found from the sample data in this study. 
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20% equity stake in the firm. Munir and Gul (2011) define family firms as firms where 
the family holds at least 10% equity stake in the firm. 
Apart from the definition of family firms, there are also certain characteristics and 
problems within these types of firms. 
3.2.2 Family Firm Formation  
Social scientists have discussed various reasons which can explain the existence of 
family firms (Bhaumik and Gregoriou, 2010).  Economists argue that the existence of 
family firms is a consequence of imperfections in the market for managerial talent or a 
market for corporate control (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003).  In the absence of a 
market for managerial talent, for example, firms may need to depend on successive 
generations of the founding families to provide managerial personnel.  Similarly, if 
there is no market for takeovers, such that it is difficult to credibly threaten the 
management of poorly performing firms with the prospect of a takeover, the 
convergence of management and ownership could be a (second best) response aimed at 
mitigating Agency Problem Type I.  The latter argument has been extended to argue 
that family ownership of firms is an optimal outcome in situations where the cost of 
contract enforcement is high, such that informal agreements or social norms backed by 
the threat of social sanctions are used to facilitate transaction of resources and output, 
thereby explaining the ubiquity of family firms (Redding, 1990; Peng and Heath, 1996).  
Furthermore, the concentrated ownership structure found in family firms is a rational 
response to the institutional environment confronting these firms.  The lower investor 
protection and lack of legal development in emerging markets such as those in East 
Asia increase the cost of enforcing arm‘s-length contracts.  As a result, concentrated 
ownership arise within family firms as family owners possess the incentives to increase 
their control of the firm in order to extract private benefits and outside investors do not 
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have the incentives to invest in these firms due to the lower minority shareholder rights 
protection offered by the institutional structures in these markets (Redding, 1990; 
Yeung, 2006).  
On the other hand, the market imperfections argument suggests that family firms might 
be an outcome of factors such as altruism, externalities associated with social capital 
and high cost of contract enforceability.  It is now well established in the labour 
economics literature that even in firms which are not characterised by familial 
relationship among sections of the management and employees, individual effort is 
determined by reciprocal altruistic gestures the genesis of which lie in norms (Akerlof, 
1982).  The collaboration that results from such reciprocal gestures can lead to better 
firm performance (Rizov and Croucher, 2009).  
Similarly, reciprocal altruism among family members could reduce their reservation 
price for key resources, thereby allowing them to outbid (or undercut) non-family firms 
in the product market (Eaton, Yuan and Wu, 2002).  Similarly, while a firm can prosper 
with addition to its social capital, it may not acquire this social capital from a widely 
dispersed group of individuals because the private benefits of these individuals would 
be much less than the aggregate social capital of the firm.  If the firm is owned by a 
family, it can however acquire the social capital of the family, an institution which 
heavily invests in social capital (Arregle, Hitt, Sirmon and Very, 2007).  
Basically, when family firms are formed, they have certain characteristics which 
differentiate them from non-family firms. 
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3.2.3 Family Firm Characteristics 
Family firms differ from non-family firms in that family firms are governed and/or 
managed by members of the same family or a small number of families with a vision of 
continuing the business across generations (Chua, Chrisman and Sharma, 1999).  Daily 
and Dollinger (1992) argue that family businesses reflect different structural, process 
and strategic differences as compared with professionally managed non-family firms.  
They also suggest that family owners behave differently from professional managers 
and that firms managed by families are generally characterised by centralised decision-
making processes.  In addition to that, the type of strategic and operational planning 
undertaken by these two groups differs because family owners have distinct goals from 
professional managers.  Ward (1988) further argues that strategic planning for family 
firms differs from professionally managed non-family firms because family owners 
must incorporate family issues into their strategies and planning processes.  He finds 
that family firms are reluctant to utilise strategic planning and strategy formulation as 
well as implementation due to a lack of formal training, insufficient knowledge of 
management techniques (Dyer, 1989), fear of losing control (Hutchinson, 1995; Storey, 
1994) and beliefs that professionalisation is unnecessary.  Family firms also have their 
own business goals and objectives which are different from professionally non-family 
managed firms.  Furthermore, File, Prince and Rankin (1984) and Dunn (1995) argue 
that family firms possess complex, multiple goals and varying priorities compared to 
non-family firms.  
In terms of financing decisions, Croci, Doukas and Gonenc (2011) find that family-
controlled firms raise less equity capital and more debt capital compared to non-family 
firms.  The financing policies of the former are influenced by control motives.  While 
information asymmetry in family firms favour debt financing, control considerations 
exert a larger influence on debt over equity financing. Moreover, Croci et.al. (2011) find 
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that family-controlled firms are more likely to issue long-term than short-term debt, 
indicating that they are viewed by credit markets as non-risk-seeking firms. The non-
risk-seeking behaviour of family firms is confirmed by the nature of their investment 
decisions.  Barth, Gulbrandsen and Schone (2005) and Croci et.al. (2011) find that 
family-controlled firms commit less capital resources in R&D expenditures and high-
risk investments compared to non-family firms; and thus, family firms could miss 
profitable investment opportunities.  Feng and Li (2009) further point out that family 
firms tend to pay fewer cash dividends compared to non-family firms.  
Gama and Galvao (2012) argue that there are particular attributes of family firms.  
Some of these attributes include long CEO tenures (typically more than 15 years) and 
concern for subsequent family generations.  Family firms are also more likely to take a 
long-term orientation in making strategic investments (Lee, 2006).  These type of firms 
also have to deal with additional issues, namely family ones (Schulze et.al., 2001), 
which might be resource-consuming.  Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana and Makri (2003) 
argue that family firms are less innovative compared to non-family firms.  Dalton and 
Daily (1992) further argue that family firms are more efficient forms of organisation 
than non-family firms due to less separation between ownership and control.  
Fan, Wong and Zhang (2005) argue that family firms tend to control their listed firms 
through pyramidal structures
14
 due to difficulties in obtaining external financing. This is 
consistent with the studies by Williamson (1985) and Stein (1997) who believe that the 
internal capital market based upon the pyramidal structure can relieve a family-
controlled firm from funding difficulties.  
 
                                                          
14  Pyramidal structures will be discussed in more detail in Sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 of this research. 
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Aside from the differences between family firms and non-family firms, these types of 
firms are also mostly found in most parts of the world outside USA and UK.  La Porta 
et.al. (1999) document that most large firms in most other countries besides USA and 
UK are family-owned.  Fukuyama (1996) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) find that East 
Asian firms are highly concentrated and usually owned by families.  In most East Asian 
countries, wealth is very much concentrated in the hands of a few families and links 
between government and business are extensive (Claessens et.al., 1999b).  Another 
significant characteristic of family firms is the family business group structure. 
3.2.4 Family Business Groups 
Another common feature of corporations in emerging markets is family business groups 
(Ghemawat and Khanna, 1998; Peng and Delios, 2006).  A business group is a 
collection of legally independent firms that are bound by economic (such as ownership, 
financial and commercial) and social (such as family, kinship and friendship) ties (Yiu, 
Bruton and Lu, 2005).  Each member firm in a business group may be a distinct legal 
entity that publishes its own financial statements, possess its own board of directors, and 
is responsible to its own shareholders.  This is different from conglomerates in 
developed markets where individual lines of business typically do possess any of these 
properties (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001).  Large family businesses in emerging economies 
often are organised around business groups with different affiliated companies being 
run by various family members or branches (Biggart and Hamilton, 1992; Wilkinson, 
1996).  Business group networks, together with family structure are some of the key 
institutional features characterising emerging economies (Hamilton and Biggart, 1988).  
In family business groups, informal ties such as cross-holdings, board interlocks and 
coordinated actions are strong (Chung, 2006; Dieleman and Sachs, 2006). 
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Family business groups can be further divided into those that emphasise vertical 
strategies versus those that emphasise horizontal strategies.  Vertical strategies are 
primarily used to overcome product market and labour market failures, while horizontal 
strategies are more useful in overcoming capital market failures (Li, Ramaswamy and 
Petit, 2006).  In general, family business groups especially those with high levels of 
horizontal product diversification may provide advantage in emerging economies 
(Chakrabarti, Singh and Mahmood, 2007; Khanna and Palepu, 2000, Wan, 2005).  This 
is primarily because they can substitute capital for weak institutional environments 
(Guillen, 2000; Li et.al., 2006; Wan, 2005).  For example, they could facilitate 
technology transfer or inter-group capital allocation which otherwise might not be 
possible because of insufficient infrastructure (Zheng, Anand and Mitchell, 2005). 
While there are benefits of family business groups, they have particular disadvantages.  
They tend to be large cumbersome organisations which carry coordination and 
administration costs (Bae, Kang and Kim, 2002; Claessens et.al., 2002; Ferris, Kim and 
Kitsabunnarat, 2003; Joh, 2003).  Poor performance of family business groups are in 
part due to problems in coordinating and allocating resources between the affiliated 
members (Isobe, Makino and Goerzen, 2006; Mursitama, 2006).  The low transparency 
of family business groups makes it difficult for minority shareholders to determine 
where control is located.  Thus, this makes it hard to identify and challenge unfair intra-
group transactions (Chang, 2003) since family business networks provide significant 
collusion opportunities or unethical transactions (Hoskisson et.al., 2000; Woodruff, 
1999).  Therefore, business group affiliation provides a means by which controlling 
shareholders can expand control and thus increase the likelihood of minority 
shareholder expropriation (Khanna and Rivkin, 2001). 
One of the Asian countries which possess a large number of family business groups is 
Malaysia (Ibrahim and Samad, 2010). 
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3.2.5 Family Businesses in Malaysia 
Family businesses form an essential part of the Malaysian economy.  It is estimated that 
family firms contribute more than half of Malaysia‘s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(Ngui, 2002).  Family firms do not embrace openness in the firm‘s practices and they 
still practice a similar business culture to the founders (Ow-Yong and Cheah, 2000).  A 
survey by Jasani (2002) finds that the majority of Malaysian family firms are small-
scale; the founders manage the firm with assistance from their children and relatives; 
and the founders do not force the children to join the firms, unless the children 
themselves are willing to work with their families.  Gomez (2004) argues that family 
firms emerged in Malaysia due to the difficulties migrants encountered in securing start-
up capital and recruiting labour.  Chinese family businesses in Malaysia possess a 
history of intra-ethnic business partnership.  This business tradition exists among 
migrants in the colonial period with some firms failed and some still operating until 
today (Gomez, 2004).  In Malaysia, most public-listed firms are owned or controlled by 
families and they are inherited from their own ancestors (Rahman, 2006).  Such firms 
include Genting Group, Kuok Group, Lion Group, YTL Group, Mah Sing Group, etc.  
The number of Malaysian firms is increasing yearly due to the positive economic 
growth (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 1998; Claessens and Fan, 2002; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2002; Soederberg, 2003).  Although, some of the established Malaysian family business 
groups such as Sapura, Melewar, Kuok, Genting, YTL, Tan Chong, IOI, Oriental and 
Berjaya Group have ventured into diverse economic sectors; there are also smaller firms 
such as Habib and Kamdar which maintain their business within their respective sectors.  
The established family business groups also contribute to the number of richest people 
in Malaysia (Forbes, 2012).  According to the top 40 list of Malaysia‘s richest people, 
Tan Sri Robert Kuok dominates the chart.  His outstanding wealth accounted for 
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approximately RM 38 billion or 19.24 percent of the wealth of the 40 richest.  The top 
ten wealthiest, account for 72.64 percent of the top 40‘s wealth (Forbes, 2012). 
Tan Sri Robert Kuok, also known as the ―Sugar King‖, conquered the fundamentally 
typical economy assets such as consumer edibles, property and shipping, which 
combined to provide him a RM 7.6625 billion disparity with his closest rival, 
telecommunications tycoon T. Ananda Krishnan (Forbes, 2012).  Singh (2008) states 
that Kuok acquired the remaining 55.5 percent stake in his media group of SCMP 
Group Ltd with a cash offer of HKD 2.37 billion or HKD 2.75 per share.  Previously, he 
was also successful in taking over the Singapore based Pacific Carriers and had a huge 
investment with the flagship of PPB Group Bhd.  The PPB Group, which is involved in 
the government project of ―Iskandar Malaysia‖, is one of the biggest property 
development projects in Malaysia. 
Despite the enormous wealth that some of the family owners garner, the overall 
concentration of control among Malaysian public-listed family firms is still high as 
discussed earlier and presented in Table 2.1 (Carney and Child, in press).  Due to the 
high concentration of control, Morck and Yeung (2003) and Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2007) argue that in emerging markets such as Malaysia, family controlled firms may 
give rise to serious corporate governance problems such as the principal-principal 
conflict.  The next section discusses the reasons why principal-principal conflict or 
minority shareholder expropriation is more prevalent in family firms. 
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3.3    MINORITY SHAREHOLDER EXPROPRIATION IN FAMILY FIRMS 
There are several reasons why principal-principal conflict is more prevalent in family 
firms particularly in emerging markets.  One of these reasons is the relatively high 
separation of ownership rights to control rights. 
3.3.1 Separation of Cash-flow Rights (Ownership Rights) to Control Rights 
(Voting Rights) 
 
Edwards and Weichenrieder (2004) defines cash-flow rights (or ownership rights) of a 
controlling shareholder as the fraction of the firm‘s profits to which he is entitled 
whereas his control rights (or voting rights) refers to his ability to influence the way the 
company is run.  The control rights of ownership of firms can be separated from the 
cash-flow rights in two main ways.  Firstly, firms can issue classes of shares that differ 
in terms of their relative proportion of voting rights and dividend entitlement.  
Secondly, even if all shares have the same voting rights, but engages in pyramiding, i.e. 
ownership via a chain of firms provides another method of separating control and cash-
flow rights (Edwards and Weichenrieder, 2004).  The process of how pyramiding can 
separate cash-flow rights and control rights will be shown in the next section.   Edwards 
and Weichenrieder (2004) further argue that the distinction between the control rights 
and cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholder has been central to the analysis of 
conflict of interest.  A low cash-flow-to-control rights ratio of the controlling 
shareholder indicates his higher ability to influence how the firm is run with lower 
ownership stakes.  This increases his ability to obtain private benefits of control at the 
expense of minority shareholders.  Vice versa, a high cash-flow-to-control rights ratio 
signifies that his incentives are closer aligned with those of minority shareholders.  
Thus, the incentives of the controlling shareholder to expropriate minority shareholders 
will be lower (Edwards and Weichenrieder, 2004).  Table 3.1 shows that overall, the 
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cash-flow rights –to-control rights ratio of family firms in East Asia is relatively lower 
compared to non-family firms for 1996 and 2008 (Carney and Child, in press).  These 
statistics shows that East Asian family firms particularly those from emerging markets 
are more prone to minority shareholder expropriation compared to non-family firms due 
to their lower cash-flow-to-control rights ratio. 
Table 3.1: Cash-flow-to-Control Rights Ratio across Different Types of Firms 
Country Family State Widely Held 
Financial 
Widely Held 
Corporation 
1996     
Hong Kong 0.860 1.000 0.884 0.981 
Indonesia 0.666 0.9555 1.000 0.984 
Japan 0.974 1.000 0.531 1.000 
South Korea 0.861 0.981 0.873 0.949 
Malaysia 0.791 0.973 1.000 0.954 
Philippines 0.821 0.948 0.938 0.961 
Singapore 0.712 0.690 0.923 0.935 
Taiwan 0.755 1.000 0.901 0.885 
Thailand 0.923 0.990 1.000 1.000 
East Asia 0.818 0.948 0.894 0.961 
2008     
Hong Kong 0.891 0.879 0.859 1.000 
Indonesia 0.836 0.962 0.719 0.859 
Japan 0.879 0.836 1.000 0.976 
South Korea 0.757 0.917 0.905 0.818 
Malaysia 0.743 0.911 1.000 0.784 
Philippines 0.836 0.961 0.601 0.980 
Singapore 0.809 0.871 0.770 1.000 
Taiwan 0.870 0.902 0.822 0.944 
Thailand 0.829 0.817 1.000 0.941 
East Asia 0.827 0.895 0.853 0.922 
Change     
Hong Kong 0.031 -0.121 -0.025 0.019 
Indonesia 0.170 0.007 -0.281 -0.125 
Japan -0.095 -0.164 0.469 -0.024 
South Korea -0.104 -0.064 0.032 -0.131 
Malaysia -0.048 -0.062 0.000 -0.170 
Philippines 0.015 0.013 -0.337 0.019 
Singapore 0.097 0.181 -0.153 0.065 
Taiwan 0.115 -0.098 -0.079 0.059 
Thailand -0.094 -0.173 0.000 -0.059 
East Asia 0.01 -0.053 -0.042 -0.039 
Source: Carney and Child (in press) 
The cash-flow rights and control rights in family firms can be separated using corporate 
pyramidal structures. 
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3.3.2 Corporate Pyramidal Structures 
Pyramidal ownership structure is defined as an entity whose ownership structure 
displays a top-down chain of control (La Porta et.al., 1999). In such structures, the 
controlling shareholders which are usually family owners are located at the apex and 
what follows below are successive levels of firm subsidiaries.  With a pyramid structure, 
a family controls multiple firms, each becoming a member of an informal business 
group (Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006).  Guillen (2000) argue that the proponents of the 
resource-based view emphasises controlling shareholders‘ contributions, which suggest 
that corporate pyramidal structures may be beneficial to a firm‘s performance.  
Essentially, business groups form an internal capital market where resource allocation is 
made within groups.  Other group members in the pyramid may provide useful 
information, access to finances and technologies, and significant social interactions 
(Carney, Gedajlovic, Huegens, Van Essen and Van Oosterhout, 2011; Khanna and 
Yafeh, 2007).  If the holding company fails to perform financially, other member firms 
may come to rescue it by injecting assets such as funds and talents (Estrin, Poukliakova 
and Shapiro, 2009; Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 2002; Hoskisson, Cannella, Tihanyi and 
Faraci, 2003; Li et.al., 2006).  As a result, pyramid firms may outperform independent 
firms without such pyramid/business group affiliations (Bruton, Ahlstrom and Wan, 
2003; Peng, 2003).  However, it is argued that this is unlikely to occur because the cost 
of corporate pyramidal structures outweigh its benefits as the internal capital market in 
the pyramidal structures is very likely to be abused by controlling shareholders in 
countries with weak investor protection such as those in emerging markets. 
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This abuse occurs as a result of the separation of actual ownership and control in firms 
located at the lower part of the pyramid structure (Claessens et.al., 2000a).  Ownership 
and control is separated because the pyramid structure enables the controlling 
shareholders particularly from family firms to garner control disproportionately to the 
amount of ownership he has in every one of the successive levels of firm subsidiaries.  
With such structures, the family controlling shareholder‘s actual ownership becomes 
smaller and relative to his control farther down the pyramid and this evidently creates 
some negative consequences (Ariffin, 2009).  These negative implications refer to the 
opportunity for family owners to expropriate minority shareholders through tunnelling 
funds from firms at the lower level of the pyramidal structure to the holding company or 
to other subsidiaries or associated companies; due to the discrepancy between the 
controlling shareholders‘ ownership and control rights which gets larger farther down 
the pyramid (Morck and Yeung, 2003; Jiang and Peng, 2011).  This explains why 
principal-principal conflict is more prevalent in emerging markets as corporate 
pyramidal structures is very common in these regions particularly among large family 
business groups (La Porta et.al., 1999; Morck and Yeung, 2003).  Figure 3.1 explains 
how family owners can expropriate via corporate pyramidal structures: 
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Figure 3.1: Example of a Corporate Pyramidal Structure  in a Family Group 
      Source: Morck and Yeung (2003) 
 
Expropriation by controlling shareholders particularly from family firms can actually be 
proven as shown by the above diagram.  Assuming the business owner controls 51% of 
its subsidiary firm, A which in turns control 51% of firm B.  This means the owner 
controls 51% x 51% ≈ 26% of firm B.  Therefore, the control stake of the business 
group on the firm at the lowest level of the corporate pyramidal structure if each firm 
controls 51% of its subsidiary will be ƒ(a)= 0.51n, where - 
a: control stake in subsidiary; and 
n: number of subsidiaries controlled by the business group. 
In the example given, the family business group owns approximately 26% of firm B.  
Since, firm B is controlled by firm A (51% majority stake) and firm A is controlled by 
the family business group holding company (51% majority stake); the family business 
group holding company can actually direct policies and management activities in firm B 
with only a net approximate 26% shareholding.  This means the holding company only 
bear 26% of the cost of any losses by firm B while being able to direct its policies and 
Family Firm  
(Holding Company) 
Firm A 
(Subsidiary) 
Firm C 
(Subsidiary) 
Firm B 
(Subsidiary) 
MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS OF THE SUBSIDIARY AT THE LOWEST BASE OF THE PYRAMID 
(SUBSIDARY) 
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management activities.  The lower the firm at the corporate pyramidal structure, the 
lower the cost of any losses of the subsidiary that the holding company has to bear 
assuming it controls at least 51% at every level.  
As a result, managerial entrenchment occurs (due to the affiliation of the managers to 
the controlling shareholders) and other people‘s money problems left unattended.  Thus, 
the risk of expropriation is highest at the bottom of the corporate pyramidal structure.  
The cost to minority shareholders as a result of managerial entrenchment in a corporate 
pyramidal structure is the minority shareholder expropriation cost.  This cost is basically 
due to the deviation of cash-flow rights from control rights, whereby the family 
controlling shareholder owns only 26% of the cash-flow rights of the subsidiary at the 
base of the pyramid but 51% control rights (adopting the 1-share-1-vote principle).  As 
pyramidal structures enable controlling shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders, there are certain incentives which encourage their usage for expropriation 
purposes. 
3.3.3 Incentives for Corporate Pyramidal Structures To Be Used For  
Expropriation 
In Malaysia, most firms particularly family businesses are highly diversified (Ayoib, 
Zuaini and Nor Aziah, 2003).  Overall, there is a high level of investment needed due to 
the different businesses that the firm engages in.  The relatively low investor protection 
and mediocre corporate governance (CG) (Joint Asian Corporate Governance 
Association (ACGA) and Credit Lyonnaise Securities Asia (CLSA) total average 
investor protection and CG score of 55 out of 100 (ACGA, 2012b)),  encourage family 
firms to utilise pyramidal structures to structure their different subsidiaries in order to 
expropriate minority shareholders.   This can be done by tunnelling profits from the 
subsidiary at the bottom of the corporate pyramidal structure to the holding company or 
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to other subsidiaries or associated companies.  Tunnelling is a common method of 
expropriation in corporate pyramidal structures because family controlling shareholders 
are able to control their subsidiaries at the bottom of their pyramidal structures with 
little cash-flow rights.  The usage of corporate pyramidal structures by family owners 
for expropriation purposes further support the argument that the principal-principal 
conflict is more prevalent in family firms compared to non-family firms.  
Riyanto and Toolsema (2008) further argue that the existence of corporate pyramidal 
structures in family firms is attributed to the anticipation of tunnelling and propping by 
rational outside investors.  Although tunnelling will be discussed in more detail in later 
sections, in the context of the study by Riyanto and Toolsema (2008); tunnelling refers 
to RPTs which move funds from a lower-level firm to a higher-level firm in the 
corporate pyramidal structures and propping refers to transfers of funds in the opposite 
direction (Friedman, Johnson and Mitton, 2003).  Tunnelling involves expropriation of 
minority shareholders of the lower-level firm.  Propping however, is only optimal to the 
controlling shareholder when it is used to guarantee future cash-flows, say to save the 
lower-level firm from insolvency, and thereby usually benefits minority shareholders 
(Riyanto and Toolsema, 2008). Riyanto and Toolsema (2008) point out that when 
investors are rational, tunnelling alone does not justify the existence of corporate 
pyramidal structures.  Rational shareholders anticipate the expropriation and adjust their 
willingness-to-pay for the firm‘s shares accordingly.  This fully eliminates the potential 
benefit to the family of self-dealing in the pyramidal structure, and the family will 
prefer the independent, horizontal structure.  Empirical evidence indicates that investors 
may be myopic and underestimate the extent of tunnelling.  However, a justification for 
pyramidal ownership relying on myopic investors may not be very attractive from a 
modelling perspective. 
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When the pyramidal structure does not only involve tunnelling but also propping, 
Riyanto and Toolsema (2008) argue that the family may indeed prefer to use the 
pyramidal ownership structure.  The possibility of propping in pyramidal business 
groups implicitly provides outside investors with an intercorporate insurance in case of 
financial distress.  In this case, rational outside investors are willing to be expropriated 
to some extent via tunnelling in exchange for a larger probability of realising positive 
returns from their investment in the future.  This explanation is consistent with Morck 
et.al. (2005), who argue that the benefit of intercorporate insurance is one of the factors 
that underlies the creation of pyramidal business groups.  Cheung et.al. (2006) analyze a 
sample of 328 filings of RPTs between Hong Kong public-listed companies and their 
controlling shareholders during the period 1998-2000, and find evidence that market 
participants do not discount firms with potential for expropriation beforehand.  This 
indicates that investors may deliberately accept tunnelling in exchange for the insurance 
against financial distress. Basically, the explanation by Morck et.al. (2005) and the 
findings by Cheung et.al. (2006) support the arguments by Riyanto and Toolsema 
(2008).  
Furthermore, the higher prevalence of principal-principal conflict in family firms is also 
due to the private objectives of family firms. 
3.3.4 Private Objectives of Family Firms 
The presence of private objectives within family firm owners can cause them to take 
actions, which advance their family welfare at the expense of minority shareholders 
(Schulze et.al., 2001).  These preferences cannot be fully quantified financially 
(Bergstrom, 1989).  In addition, the utility that family firm owners gain from indulging 
in private objectives is indistinguishable from the utility that they obtained from 
rationally motivated actions (Becker and Murphy, 1988; Thaler and Shefrin, 1981).  
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These private objectives can translate in many forms and one of these is the 
appointment of family members as agents of the firm (Faccio et.al., 2001a; Young et.al., 
2008).  Founding families of family firms can expropriate minority shareholders by 
appointing less-than-qualified family members or associates, friends or cronies to be 
agents of its firm (Faccio et.al., 2001a).  They can decide who sits on the board, 
therefore, effectively neutralize a board‘s ability to oversee the family controlling 
shareholder.  In addition, legal recourse for boards not overseeing minority 
shareholders‘ interests is limited. Such arrangements coupled with limited legal 
recourse provide family controlling shareholders the power to expropriate (Young et.al., 
2008).  Hence, it is argued that principal-principal conflict is more prevalent in family 
firms as compared to non-family firms.  Besides private objectives, the higher 
occurrence of principal-principal conflict in family firms can also be attributed to the 
stock market abuses by family owners and the negative perception of minority 
shareholders. 
3.3.5 Stock Market Abuses and Perception of Minority Shareholders in Asia 
Stock market abuses by family owners and the negative perception of minority 
shareholders are additional possible reasons why family firms are more prone to 
expropriation.  Backman (2001) argues that in Asian emerging markets, founding 
families of business groups only list unprofitable firms in stock exchanges.  Profitable 
firms are kept as privately limited companies in their groups. In other words, founding 
families list only unprofitable firms with the hope of securing capital for expropriation 
purposes.  When the founding family controlling shareholder expropriate resources 
from the firm, its creditors, minority shareholders and other unaffiliated major 
shareholders (blockholders) share the cost and risk of expropriation with the family 
controlling shareholder.  In the case of firm insolvency, family controlling shareholders 
will still be able to claim some of the firm‘s assets and profits (if any) after the principal 
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and interests have been repaid to the creditors (Radcliffe, 1997).  This explains why 
family controlling shareholders expropriate because they have more to gain through 
expropriation compared to what they can lose in the case of insolvency.  
After the family controlling shareholder had expropriated extensively from the listed 
firm in the stock exchange, the latter suffer extensive value losses and 
underperformance of stock returns. In this situation, the family controlling shareholder 
might no longer find it in their best interest to keep the firm public.  Hence, they might 
take the firm private (Du, He and Yuen, in press).  Du et.al. (in press) further argue that 
to minimise the compensation costs of privatisation, the family controlling shareholder 
might first increase their shareholding at a preferential share price through insider 
trading before the public disclosure of the privatisation plan, which helps them reduce 
the premium payment to minority shareholders in the subsequent privatisation scheme.  
Ultimately, the family controlling shareholders publicly announce their privatisation 
plan and squeeze out minority shareholders by taking the firm private.  Hence, minority 
shareholders are expropriated by the family controlling shareholder when the firm is 
taken private (Du et.al., in press). 
The fact that minority shareholders are expropriated by Asian family controlling 
shareholders shows that minority shareholders of Asian family firms are often viewed 
as outsiders.  Personal connections and relationships are everything in Asian businesses 
(Backman, 2001).  The concept of minority shareholder protection is alien to most 
Asian businesses particularly in developing countries.  Thus, Asian family controlling 
shareholders from emerging markets have a strong incentive to engage in minority 
shareholder expropriation (Backman, 2001).  Although stock market abuses by family 
owners and negative perception of minority shareholders could encourage minority 
shareholder expropriation in family firms, this problem can also be attributed to the 
altruistic behaviours of family owners. 
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3.3.6 Altruism of Family Owners 
Since, family-controlled firms are often run by the family controlling shareholder and 
his selected family members, there is a likelihood of altruistic behaviours within family 
controlling shareholders (Buchanan, 1975).  He argues that in family firms, control over 
the firm‘s resources makes it possible for family controlling shareholders to be 
unusually generous to their family members who serve in the management of the firm.  
For example, the family controlling shareholder could provide family members with 
secure employment and perquisites and privileges that they would not otherwise receive 
(Gersick, Hampton and Lansberg, 1997; Ward, 1987). Hendry (2002) argues that family 
firms are vulnerable to honest incompetence and shortage of expertise because they 
often have a self-imposed personnel selection criterion that provides preferential 
treatment or exclusive consideration to family stakeholders.  Generally, the altruistic 
behaviour of family owners is detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders due 
to the benefits and privileges given to family members, thus, contributing to the agency 
problem of self-control.  The agency problem of self-control refer to the attempts of 
individuals or families to maximise their welfare (in this case, their altruistic 
behaviours) which can lead to a loss of control and cause them to take actions that do 
not advance the common (economic) good (such as the interests of minority 
shareholders) (Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino, 2002).  This altruistic behaviour of family 
owners may also lead to reduction in firm monitoring. 
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3.3.7 Lack of Firm Monitoring 
Schulze, Lubatkin and Dino (2003) argue that altruism reduces the family controlling 
shareholder‘s ability to effectively monitor and discipline family agents.  Altruism 
systematically biases the family owner‘s perceptions and hence, the information that 
they filter and process about the family members that are employed.  Altruism reduces 
the effectiveness of a family controlling shareholder‘s monitoring function because 
family agents tend to free ride on the controlling shareholder whenever the 
responsibilities of the family controlling shareholder and family agent overlap 
(Lindbeck and Weibull, 1988).  The family owner‘s ability to discipline family agents is 
compromised by both the owner‘s altruism and by the consequences that such actions 
might have on familial relationships within the firm and the extended family outside the 
firm (Donovan, 1995).  Dharwadkar et.al. (2000) further argues that since the family 
agents are representing the controlling shareholders, they are able to circumvent the 
traditional monitoring functions such as board of directors, resulting in lack of firm 
monitoring (Liu et.al., 2010).  The lack of firm monitoring as a result of family owners‘ 
altruism and close relationship between the family members and the owner, encourage 
opportunistic behaviours of controlling shareholders.  In addition to lack of firm 
monitoring, opportunistic behaviours by family owners also could be encouraged by 
information asymmetry between family owners and non-family shareholders 
(Villalonga and Amit, 2010). 
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3.3.8 Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry may also encourage family owners to engage in minority 
shareholder expropriation.  This can be prevalent among family firms in industries 
where there is a large information asymmetry between family owners and non-family 
owners (Villalonga and Amit, 2010).  Using a sample of 8,104 firms from different 
industries in USA, Villalonga and Amit (2010) find that family firms with lower 
transparency in certain industries performed poorer compared to those with higher 
transparency in other particular industries.  They also find that firms with lower 
transparency are associated with higher family control.  Both these findings indicate the 
likelihood of expropriation by family owners in particular industries when there is 
information asymmetry between them and non-family owners.  The rationale for these 
findings is that family owners within a particular industry who possess information 
advantage compared to non-family owners, have a high tendency to take advantage of 
this information differences to fulfil their expropriation objectives.  Although the study 
by Villalonga and Amit (2010) is conducted in USA, their findings show that even in 
developed markets such as the USA with strong investor protection; information 
asymmetry between family owners and non-family owners could encourage 
opportunistic behaviours of the family owners.  In emerging markets with lower 
investor protection, the likelihood of this scenario occurring is even higher. 
Aside from information asymmetry between family owners and non-family owners, the 
higher prevalence of the principal-principal conflict in family firms can also be 
attributed to the non-dilution of the family owner‘s private benefits of control among 
other blockholders in the firm.  
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3.3.9 Undiluted Private Benefits of Control 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) argue that the private benefits of family controlling 
shareholders are undiluted even though there are other blockholders in the firm such as 
institutional investors, individual investors, etc.   On the other hand, if the controlling 
shareholder is a non-family owner, the dilution of private benefits of control will occur 
among the non-family owner and other blockholders.  Hence, family owners may 
possess a higher incentive to expropriate wealth from minority shareholders compared 
to non-family owners because the former‘s private benefits cannot be diluted among 
other blockholders.  This argument implies that Agency Problem Type II might be more 
prevalent in family firms compared to non-family firms (Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski and 
Skully, 2009).  
Part of the undiluted private benefits of control which encourage minority shareholder 
expropriation in family firms may include opportunistic investment by family owners. 
3.3.10  Opportunistic Investment 
The personalised authority structures of family firms provide huge latitude to family 
owners in allocating their investments and this is another factor which encourages 
minority shareholder expropriation in family firms (Carney, 2005).  Carney (2005) 
defines opportunistic investment as the ability to allocate organisational resources 
without regard to internal and external processes of accountability.  Controlling 
shareholders may analyse their investment decisions on the back of an envelope or 
utilise heuristic methods or mental calculus rather than a careful and exact accounting 
calculation (Redding, 1990).  This approach to analysis encourages fast decision making 
and provides advantages in pursuing fleeting opportunities where time is of the essence 
and in situations where it is ―better to be always first than always right‖ (Williamson, 
1997, p.55). 
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Controlling shareholders possess larger latitude to allocate resources on the basis of 
‗animal spirits‘ or ‗gut feel‘ and to pursue opportunities which can only be rationalised 
by particularistic or intuitive criteria.  Accountable only to themselves, controlling 
shareholders are free to donate, hide, liquidate and generally shift assets into and out of 
unfavourable environments; hence, opportunistic investment provides them the ability 
to expropriate minority shareholders.  This liberty is an advantage in environments 
characterised by corruption and weak property rights such as those in emerging markets 
(Carney, 2005). 
In contrast to the factors that encourage minority shareholder expropriation, reputational 
effects play a positive role in influencing family firms to treat minority shareholders 
well rather than expropriating them. 
3.3.11 Reputational Effects in Family Firms 
One of the pioneering studies on reputational effects in emerging markets is by Gomes 
(2000).  In a multi-period model, Gomes (2000) argues that a family can build a 
reputation for treating minority shareholders well by retaining large shareholdings and 
voluntarily bearing the cost of under-diversification.  This represents a credible 
commitment because the family will repeatedly need to raise capital and any 
expropriation will be penalized by discounts of its future stock offerings.  The Gomes 
model predicts that the reputational effect is actually more intense when cash-flow and 
control rights are separated.  A non-expropriating controlling family derives payoff 
mainly from future sales of shares.  The ability to subsequently sell the shares without 
losing control improves the credibility of the family‘s initial ownership retention signal.  
Based upon the Gomes model, family controlling shareholders possess the incentives to 
preserve its corporate reputation due to their need to raise external capital.  Any 
105 
 
minority shareholder expropriation that takes place will discount future stock offerings.  
Hence, they have the tendency to treat minority shareholders well. 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) argue that reputational effects of treating minority 
shareholders well enable family business groups in emerging markets to obtain 
credibility for new business ventures among suppliers and customers.  Family firms also 
can have superior access to foreign capital and technology if they possess a good 
reputation in treating minority shareholders well.  Therefore, these benefits encourage 
family controlling shareholders not to engage in minority shareholder expropriation. 
Khanna and Yafeh (2007) further reiterate that family controlling shareholders in 
emerging markets have the incentives to preserve corporate reputation by risk sharing.  
The risk sharing is conducted by providing assistance to poorly performing companies 
within the family business group.  This feature reduces the default risk of group-
affiliated companies.  This risk sharing is viewed positively by minority shareholders as 
it portrays an image to them that the firm is taking care of their interests.  Therefore, the 
engagement by family controlling shareholders in risk sharing within their business 
groups, enhances the interests of minority shareholders. 
In Malaysia, reputational effects could possibly have a positive influence on the 
treatment of minority shareholders in family firms.  This could occur in the aftermath of 
the Transmile case.  In the Transmile case, the firm‘s revenue was inflated in the 
financial statement (Securities Commission, 2011c).  The aftermath of this incident 
have possible reputational effects on family firms because investors‘ confidence was 
shattered after the incident (Song, 2010).  This reputational effect is particularly 
prevalent in large family business groups where family controlling shareholders possess 
very high ownership stakes.  This is because Transmile is a subsidiary of the Kuok 
Group of Companies and this family business group is an established family business 
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conglomerate in Malaysia.  The dent in the reputation of Transmile provides incentives 
for other large family owners to improve their reputation.  The reputational effects 
operate in the following manner. As the shareholding of family controlling shareholders 
increases, they possess higher ownership of their firms.  Consequently, they possess 
higher incentives to preserve their reputation considering the Transmile negative 
publicity.  Low reputation can affect them and their family members in terms of their 
future job prospects and raising external capital for their firms (Gomez, 1999; Loy, 
2010).  Thus, when the shareholding of family controlling shareholders increases, the 
reputational concerns help align their incentives to those of minority shareholders. 
The Transmile experience not only affects the family controlling shareholders but their 
independent directors as well (Oh, 2011).  Independent directors particularly in family 
firms, would like to preserve their corporate reputation (Abdullah et.al., 2010; Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1978) because poor reputation can lower their job prospects as 
independent directors with non-family firms (Othman and Rahman, 2010).  
Consequently, as their tenure increases, independent directors in family firms may fully 
utilise their knowledge and experience gained to improve firm performance in order to 
maintain the company‘s reputation. 
Despite the possible reputational effects on family firms in emerging markets, these 
effects are considered a poor substitute for weaknesses in the institutional structures 
such as poor minority shareholder rights protection (Peng and Jiang, 2010).  The reason 
is that in these markets, even reputable firms expropriate particularly during periods of 
economic recessions (Johnson et.al., 2000a).  However, this line of reasoning is 
incomplete because it does not take into consideration the effect of corporate 
governance fiascos such as the Transmile case in Malaysia, which could have a strong 
reputational impact on the corporate governance of family firms.  For that reason, the 
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assertion that reputational effect is a poor substitute for institutional deficiencies may 
not be valid. 
One of the methods of minority shareholder expropriation which reputational effect can 
help to reduce is through related party transactions (RPTs). 
3.4 RELATED PARTY TRANSACTIONS (RPTs)  
Related party transactions (RPTs) are diverse complex business transactions between a 
company and its managers, directors or principal owners (Gordon, Henry and Pahlia, 
2004b).  RPTs are defined as transactions entered into by the listed issuer or its 
subsidiaries which involves the interest, direct or indirect of a related party (Bursa 
Malaysia, Listing Requirements, Part E, Section 10.02 para k).  A related party can be a 
subsidiary, joint venture partner, a family member or a company affiliated with any of 
the related individuals within the firm (Gordon et.al., 2004b, 2004c).  RPTs can be 
classified by three categories (Cheung et.al., 2006). Table 3.2 illustrate these three 
different categories of RPTs. 
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Table 3.2: Classifications of Related Party Transactions (RPTs) 
Type of connected 
transaction 
Description 
Panel A: Transactions that are a priori likely to result in expropriation of the listed firm’s minority shareholders 
Asset acquisitions Transactions that involve the acquisition of tangible or intangible assets by the listed company from a connected person or from a 
private company majority-controlled by this person. 
Asset sales Transactions that involve the sale of tangible or intangible assets by the listed company to a connected person or to a private 
company majority-controlled by this person. 
Equity sales Transactions that involve the sale of equity stake in the listed company to a connected person or a private company majority-
controlled by this person. 
Trading relationships Transactions that involve the trade of goods and services between the listed company and a private company majority-controlled 
by a connected person. They can be purchases by the listed company or sales or both. 
Cash payments Transactions that involve direct cash payments by the listed company to a connected person or to a company controlled by this 
person or to a subsidiary (including loans and cash assistance) and the provision of cash guarantees by the listed company for debts 
owed by the connected person or by the companies controlled by this person. 
Panel B: Transactions likely to benefit the listed firm’s minority shareholders 
Cash receipts Transactions that involve direct cash assistance or loans provided by the connected person to the listed company. 
Subsidiary relationships Transactions between a listed company and one of its subsidiaries. They could involve acquisitions or sales of equity stakes or 
assets and trading relationships. 
Panel C: Transactions that could have strategic rationales and perhaps are not classified as expropriation 
Takeover offers and joint 
ventures 
Cases in which the listed company receives a takeover offer by another publicly listed company that holds a toehold, and cases in 
which the listed company forms a joint venture or strategic alliance with another company that already holds a stake in the listed 
company. 
Joint venture stake 
acquisitions 
Transactions that involve acquisitions by the listed company from a third party of a stake in a joint venture in which the company 
participates as a joint venture partner. The connected person is the third party in his or her capacity as subsidiary shareholder. 
Joint venture stake sales Transactions that involve the sale by the listed company to a third party of a stake in a joint venture in which the company 
participates as a joint venture partner. The connected person is the third party in his or her capacity as subsidiary shareholder. 
Source: Cheung et.al. (2006)
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Panel A lists the transactions that are likely to result in expropriation whereas 
transactions listed in Panel B and C are unlikely to be used for expropriation.  Based 
upon these classifications, it is the transactions listed in Panel A which raise concerns as 
these transactions can be detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders. 
Aside from these classifications, there are two opposing views on RPTs held by 
scholars.  The ‗efficient transactions‘ view argue that RPTs promote better co-
ordination and feedback between related parties and the firm because information flows 
faster, information reliability is higher, contracting efficiency increases and holdup 
problems are reduced
15
 (Ryngaert and Thomas, 2007).  RPTs can also be more cost 
effective and cost efficient to firms compared to transactions with unrelated parties 
(Gordon et.al., 2004b, 2004c; Ryngaert and Thomas, 2007).  Moreover, these 
transactions also fulfil the economic demands of a company by helping to secure in-
depth skills and expertise from related parties as well as providing alternative forms of 
compensation to them (Wahab et.al., 2011).  
Pizzo (2011) argues that the efficient transaction hypothesis assumes RPTs represent 
sound business exchanges, efficiently fulfilling the underlying economic needs of the 
firm.  These transactions do not harm the interests of shareholders and they constitute 
efficient contracting arrangements where there is incomplete information.  Pizzo (2011) 
further contends that RPTs represent internal dealings, alternative to contractual or 
market exchanges, enables the reduction of transactions costs and overcome difficulties 
obstructing production which is consistent with the transaction cost theory (Coase, 
1937; Williamson, 1985) and supporting evidence has been provided by numerous 
studies (Fan and Goyal, 2006).  Specifically, in institutional contexts without efficient 
capital, labour and product markets such as those in emerging markets; information 
                                                          
15
  The holdup problem is a situation where  two parties may work most efficiently by cooperating but they are refrained from 
doing so due to concerns that they may give the other party increased bargaining power and thereby reducing their own profits 
(Che and Sakovics, 2008). 
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asymmetry, agency problems and market imperfections increase risks related to firm 
activity, while group structures and internal dealings may provide a better allocation of 
financial resources, economies of scale, easier access to finance, more opportunities, 
increased influence, etc (Pizzo, 2011).  Therefore, internal markets may be created with 
beneficial effects for the entire group when external funds are scarce and uncertain 
(Khanna and Palepu, 1997).  Furthermore, the scale and scope of internal markets also 
help resolve difficulties related to the impairment of production in emerging markets 
(Fisman and Khanna, 2004).  It also contributes to profitability, supplementing 
inefficient capital markets and reducing transaction costs (Chang and Hong, 2000). 
Unfortunately, the ‗efficient transaction‘ view is not considered a persuasive view by 
many scholars.  Empirical evidence is not always supportive of its premises and the idea 
that RPTs always satisfy economic needs is still not accepted by many scholars.  RPTs 
are often deemed to be harmful to shareholders and lowering confidence in the capital 
markets.  It is not surprising that the rules affecting RPTs disclosure and monitoring 
have been largely influenced by this negative view which is called the ‗conflict of 
interest‘ view (Pizzo, 2011). 
The ‗conflict of interest‘ view argues that RPTs are detrimental and value decreasing to 
shareholders.  Under this view, RPTs compromise agents‘ responsibilities to 
shareholders or the board of directors‘ monitoring function (Gordon et.al., 2004b, 
2004c).  This argument is based on the notion of agency costs that arise due to Agency 
Problem Type I and II.  Gordon et.al. (2004b, 2004c) argue that RPTs are detrimental to 
shareholders due to the agency costs which arise as a result of being used as a tool for 
expropriation by managers and controlling shareholders.  Gordon, Henry, Louwers and 
Henry (2007) assert that involvement in RPTs will increase the incentives for directors 
to manage their earnings to justify their perquisites or mask their expropriation.  They 
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argue that this scenario not only represents expropriation of firm resources but they can 
conflict and eliminate the monitoring function of the board of directors.  
Pizzo (2011) further argues that RPTs may imply moral hazard and may be carried out 
in the interest of directors in order to expropriate wealth from shareholders.  The 
disadvantages of RPTs are listed in Table 3.3. 
The disadvantages of RPTs are often associated with abnormal stock returns (Cheung 
et. al., 2006), firms‘ poor performance (Chen and Chien, 2004) or lower firm value 
(Gordon et. al., 2004b,c; Jian and Wong, 2004).  Claessens and Fan (2002) also argue 
that investors discount share prices in order to take into consideration potential agency 
issues such as RPTs.  The drawbacks as shown in Table 3.3 supports the idea that these 
transactions represent conflicts of interest and they are inconsistent with shareholder 
wealth maximisation (Emshwiller, 2003).  
Within this framework, RPTs are often associated with the misuse of firm resources and 
the misrepresentation of private information as well as potential bias in financial 
statements, with a negative impact on their reliability and relevance.  This creates more 
uncertainty and weakens the contractual effectiveness in mitigating agency conflicts 
(Pizzo, 2011). 
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Table 3.3: Disadvantages Of Related Party Transactions (RPTs) 
No. Disadvantages Of Related Party Transactions (RPTs) 
1 RPTs may weaken corporate governance of the firm.  RPTs may undermine non-executive directors‘ functions, changing them into affiliated or 
―grey‖ directors (Denis and Sarin, 1999; Klein, 2002; Vicknair, Hickman and Carnes, 1993; Weisbach, 1988).  Furthermore, weaker corporate 
governance makes these transactions more likely to occur and reducing board independence (Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2004; Gordon et.al., 
2004b,c). 
2 RPTs may encourage earnings management.  Earnings management is defined as a purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting 
process, with the intent of obtaining some private gains (Schipper, 1989).  Directors possess the incentives to manage earnings to increase or 
legitimise their perquisites or to hide expropriation wealth. RPTs may turn out to be a useful tool for managing earnings (Jian and Wong, 2010; 
Aharony, Yuan and Wang, 2005) and operating results for the purposes to avoid delisting, new equity issue placement, etc (Jian and Wong, 
2004; Ming and Wong, 2003).  
3 RPTs also encourage tunnelling such as wealth transfers out of a company for the benefit of shareholders with a controlling interest (Johnson 
et.al., 2000a).  A company may pay a related party above market prices or pay market prices for goods or services of inferior quality.  Transfer 
of assets and profits, although common in developed markets, becomes more prevalent and frequent in emerging economies where external 
markets are insufficient or corporate governance rules are lacking and presumably, less effective (Jian and Wong, 2004; Jiang et.al., 2010). 
4 RPTs encourage employment of relatives in family firms.  A director can be appointed or promoted owing to his family influence over the 
firm. 
5 RPTs are considered unreliable compared to arm‘s length transactions. 
Source: Pizzo (2011) 
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Figure 3.2 provides a brief explanation of the efficient transactions and the conflict of 
interest view on RPTs. 
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Figure 3.2: Traditional Views on RPTs 
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Alternatively, Pizzo (2011) argues for a contingency approach towards RPTs.  He 
argues that RPTs should be viewed as transactions which may fulfil sound business 
needs (efficient transactions view) as well as be intended for deceptive or fraudulent 
purposes (conflict of interest view) and stresses that the organisational context and the 
institutional environment play a fundamental role in shaping the nature and purpose of 
these transactions. Figure 3.3 portrays the contingency approach to RPTs. 
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Figure 3.3: RPTs under a Contingency Perspective 
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Based upon the contingency approach, it is argued that weak corporate governance 
practices (Young et.al., 2008) and poor investor protection (ACGA, 2012b) in emerging 
markets ultimately provides a conducive environment for RPTs to be used as an 
expropriation tool by controlling shareholders.  Hence, in these markets, RPTs are more 
likely to be detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders rather than benefiting 
them.  As a result, a firm value is reduced. 
Although, the usage of RPTs is generally considered to have a negative impact on the 
interests of minority shareholders, there is still limited empirical evidence which proves 
that the usage of specific types of RPTs is detrimental to firm value particularly in 
family firms (Jiang et.al., 2010).  The type of RPTs that is being referred here is those 
transactions classified in Panel A Table 3.2 which include asset acquisitions, asset sales, 
equity sales, trading relationships and cash payment to related parties.  
The scarcity in these studies is due to the fact that in most corporate governance 
research, expropriation is indirectly inferred by separation of ownership and control 
rights (ratio of cash-flow rights to control rights) (Claessens et.al., 2002; Krishnamurti 
et.al., 2005; Mitton, 2002; among others), dividend rates (Faccio et.al., 2001a; La Porta 
et.al., 2000a; among others), price paid for corporate control (Zingales, 1994; Dyck and 
Zingales; Nenova, 2003; Atanasov, 2005) and the legal system (Djankov et.al., 2008; 
Johnson et.al., 2000a; La Porta et.al., 1998; 2000b; among others). 
Claessens et.al (2002) examine 1,301 public-listed firms in eight East Asian firms for 
1996 and find that firm value increases with the cash-flow ownership of the controlling 
shareholder, consistent with the incentive alignment effect.  However, firm value 
decreases when the control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow 
ownership, consistent with the entrenchment effect. Krishnamurti et.al. (2005) 
conducted a study on 2,980 East Asian firms between 1998 and 2000 and find that there 
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is no relationship between ratio of cash-flow rights to control rights and a firm value.  
Mitton (2002) study 398 firms from Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and 
Thailand between 1997 and 98 and found that lower cash-flow rights to control rights 
ratio reduces a firm value.  
Faccio et.al. (2001a) analyse 5,897 firms in France, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand 
and the United Kingdom in terms of their dividend rates between 1992 and 1996.  They 
find that European firms generally pay higher dividends than Asian firms, suggesting 
that expropriation is higher among the latter.  La Porta et.al. (2000a) study 4,103 firms 
from 33 countries globally in terms of dividend payout between 1989 and 1994 and find 
that firms in countries which protect minority shareholders better pay higher dividends. 
Zingales (1994) examines all public-listed firms which have both a voting and non-
voting stock in the Milan Stock Exchange, Italy between 1987 and 1990 and finds that 
private benefits of control i.e. the price paid for corporate control is worth more than 
60% of the value of nonvoting equity.  The relatively high private benefits of control 
encourage expropriation of minority shareholders.  Dyck and Zingales (2004) analyse 
the private benefits of control i.e. the price paid for corporate control in 39 countries 
globally between 1990 and 2000 and find that these private benefits are smaller in 
countries with better investor protection, better tax enforcement and more media 
pressure.  Nenova (2003) examines the value of corporate voting rights, specifically of 
the control block of votes for 661 dual-class firms in 18 countries for 1997 and 
discovers that the value of control block votes ranged from -2.88% of firm value in 
Hong Kong to 48% of firm value in South Korea.  They argue that minority shareholder 
expropriation problems will arise if a value of control-block votes has a range up to one-
half of firm market capitalisation.  Atanasov (2005) analyse 81 privatisation funds in 
Bulgaria for 1996 and find that the price for corporate control is 85% of firm value 
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which suggest a high private benefits of control which encourage minority shareholder 
expropriation. 
Djankov et.al. (2008) present a new measure of legal protection of minority 
shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders, namely, the anti-self-dealing 
index.  This index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003 
and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval and 
litigation which govern a specific self-dealing transaction. Johnson et.al. (2000a) 
examine 25 emerging markets between 1996 and 1999 and found that the rule of law is 
one of the factors which can explain the extent of exchange rate depreciation and stock 
market decline in the Asian financial crisis.  La Porta et.al. (1998) study 49 countries 
globally on the legal rules covering protection of shareholders and creditors, the origin 
of these rules and the quality of legal enforcement and found that common-law 
countries possess the strongest legal protection of investors and creditors, followed by 
German and Scandinavian civil law countries and the French civil law countries had the 
weakest protection.  La Porta et.al. (2000b) conduct a similar study by describing the 
legal differences and the enforcement effectiveness across countries, discuss the 
possible origins of these differences, summarise their consequences and assess potential 
strategies of corporate governance reform.  They argue that the legal approach is a more 
fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional 
distinction between bank-centred and market-centred financial systems.   
Although these studies analyse and indirectly infer the existence of expropriation, they 
do not examine the specific types of transactions that could be used for minority 
shareholder expropriation.  In addition, the firm value effects of these transactions have 
not been widely examined (Jiang et.al., 2010).  Basically, the extant literature only 
provides limited evidence with respect to these transactions. 
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Cheung et. al. (2006) find that RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation reduces 
the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) in Hong Kong public-listed companies.  
Cheung et. al. (2009) and Peng et. al. (2011) also find similar results for companies 
listed in the Chinese Stock Exchange.  However, they used an event study approach 
which is based upon the market reaction (market valuation) to the announcement of 
RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation.  The time period which they used to 
assess the market reaction is within a maximum of twenty days (i.e. maximum ten days 
before the announcement and maximum ten days after the announcement).  The studies 
conducted by Cheung et.al. (2006), Cheung et.al. (2009) and Peng et.al. (2011) contain 
certain weaknesses.  Their research results do not provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the firm value effects.  Event studies only deal with changes around a 
particular time and are usually conducted within a short timeframe surrounding the 
events that occur (MacKinlay, 1997). 
In studies related to minority shareholder expropriation, event studies do not provide a 
complete picture of the effects of expropriation because a firm value effects should not 
be assessed within a short period of time i.e. days.  An examination over a longer 
period, in terms of years, would be more appropriate because minority shareholder 
expropriation can last for years within the firm as shown by the studies of Faccio et.al. 
(2001a), Krishnamurti et.al. (2005), La Porta et.al. (2000a), Mitton (2002), among 
others.  
Therefore, the measurement of the effects of expropriation over a period of several 
years, for example, will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the effects of 
minority shareholder expropriation.  This helps provides a better indication of whether 
expropriation by controlling shareholders exists within the firm or not.  A regression 
which analyse a period of a few years is able to provide a clearer analysis of 
expropriation because it emphasises the change of a particular variable over a period of 
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time.  Any changes on that variable can be discerned more clearly  as the process 
involves repeated measurements of that same variable over time (Diggle et.al., 1994; 
Rajulton, 2001).  
Since, there is a an absence of this kind of studies on RPTs which are likely to result in 
expropriation particularly in family firms and that these transactions are likely to be 
detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders; this research examines the firm 
value effects of RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation using an approach 
which analyses a period of a few years (i.e. 3 years) rather than an event study 
approach.  This enhances the robustness of empirical evidence on RPTs in extant 
literature.  
In addition, there is insufficient evidence with respect to whether expropriation through 
RPTs is more prevalent in Malaysian family firms or non-family firms.  So far, only 
Munir and Gul (2011) provide some evidence with regards to this issue.  However, their 
study did not examine those specific RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation.  
Furthermore, they examined the period prior to 2007.  In periods after 2007, particularly 
after the Transmile case, reputational effects as well as enhanced corporate governance 
reforms as set out in MCCG 2007 and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 2008 may 
have an influence on firms‘ corporate governance practices.  Hence, their studies are 
limited to a certain extent in terms of the timeframe analysed and their research results 
do not reflect changes in the corporate governance environment post 2007.  This study 
compares the firm value effects of RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation 
between family firms and non-family firms post 2007.  This is conducted so that an 
assessment can be made whether expropriation through RPTs is more prevalent in 
family firms or non-family firms within the context post 2007 institutional setting in 
Malaysia.  
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With respect to the research gaps highlighted as well as the discussions in the literature, 
the following research questions are being examined: 
Is there a negative relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) which are 
likely to result in expropriation and firm value in Malaysian firms? 
If there is a negative relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) which are 
likely to result in expropriation and firm value in Malaysian firms, is this negative 
relationship stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms? 
Since, RPTs are likely to be detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders, board 
oversight is important particularly the role of independent directors (Securities 
Commission, 2012). 
3.5 ROLE OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS  
Fama (1980) argues that independent directors are professional referees whose task is to 
ensure the effectiveness of the firm‘s top management.  Gregory (2000) defines an 
independent director as one who is capable of performing his duties independently from 
the management, controlling shareholders and the corporation.  Chapter one, page 5, 
para.4  of the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements 2012 defines independent directors 
as directors who are independent from management and do not have any business or 
other relationship which could interfere with the exercise of independent judgment or 
the ability to act in the best interests of a firm (Bursa Malaysia, 2012b). The Malaysian 
Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2007 Part 2 Para.3 defines independent 
directors as persons of calibre, credibility and who have the necessary skills and 
experience to bring an independent judgment to bear on issues of strategy, performance 
and resources including any appointments and standards of conduct of the firm.  Part 2 
Para.3 further proposes that independent directors need to comprise at least one-third of 
the firm‘s board membership.  In addition to the one-third requirement, the Companies 
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Act (1965) also requires independent directors to become members of the audit, 
remuneration and also nominations committee.  The audit committee is established to 
ensure the integrity of financial statements issued by the firm and also to ensure that 
there are proper internal checks and controls with respect to financial management.  In 
the remuneration committee, independent board members must ensure that management 
does not over-compensate them.  In the nomination committee, the independent 
directors are responsible for searching and screening incoming directors and filling 
senior appointments.  They must ensure that the new directors have sufficient skills, 
knowledge and contribute to the diversity of the board. 
Considering the various functions that they need to perform, independent directors are 
believed to be a crucial part of the internal control and monitoring mechanism of firms 
(Sulong and Nor, 2008).  Fama and Jensen (1983b) argue that the inclusion of 
independent directors increase the board‘s monitoring efficiency and independence 
because they possess incentives to develop their reputation as experts in decision 
control.  Board independence particularly matter in firms held by controlling 
shareholders, especially, family firms (Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell, 2009).  Dahya 
et.al. (2009) note that an increase in board independence among these firms is 
associated with an increase in their market-based performance measure.  
There are two conflicting views concerning the effectiveness of board independence, 
namely, the agency theory perspective and the managerial hegemony theory perspective 
(Abdullah, 2004).  The supporters of agency theory believe that having independent 
directors provides an effective monitoring tool for the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983a).  
On the other hand, managerial hegemony theorists
16
 question the ability of independent 
directors to fulfil their duties when the management dominates and controls the board of 
                                                          
16
  Managerial hegemony theorists are theorists who argue that management may pursue their own interests at the expense of 
owners (Spear, Conforth and Aiken, 2007). 
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directors (Abdullah, 2004).  In Malaysia, due to the dominant role played by controlling 
shareholders in selecting directors, it is argued that independent directors may not be 
able to perform their duties effectively.  This raises the concern about the efficacy of 
independent directors (Abdullah, 2004).  Ineffective independent directors may not 
monitor controlling shareholders‘ expropriation activities.   
Consistent with the managerial hegemony theory, one of the reasons why independent 
directors failed to be truly independent as expected by shareholders is that there are no 
proper plans by the firm‘s board with respect to the tenure of the independent directors.  
Independent directors could stay as long as they want once they are hired.  The longer 
the directors stay on the board; the likelihood of their independence being compromised 
is higher (MSWG, 2010; Thillainathan, 1999).  For example, the average tenure of 
independent directors for family firms in this research is 6.03 years and for non-family 
firms is 5.53 years.  The length of these periods could possibly affect the ―true 
independence‖ of independent directors as they are relatively long.  A definite term for 
independent directors would be better as it would increase the likelihood that non-
performing directors are not re-elected (Patton and Baker, 1987).  Hence, MCCG 2012 
Part 3, Para.3.3, recommends that the tenure of independent directors should be limited 
to a maximum of nine years (Securities Commission, 2012) due to the potential 
negative effects of tenure on directors‘ independence and the fact that a majority of 
firms which already recognise this, as well as trends in other countries‘ jurisdictions 
(Securities Commission, 2011a). 
Since long tenured independent directors are likely to compromise their independence, 
the entrenchment and negative firm value effects due to long board tenure is likely to 
occur in Malaysia given the relatively mediocre investor protection (ACGA, 2012b) as 
well as the voluntary nature of the adoption of the principle to limit the maximum 
tenure of independent directors to nine years in MCCG 2012 (Securities Commission, 
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2012).  As a consequence of the voluntary adoption, Malaysian firms have no urgency 
to comply with this principle as they are only required to state their level of compliance 
to the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) in their annual reports 
(Securities Commission, 2012). Hence, they have the tendency to continue to allow 
independent directors to have long tenure attachment with the firm so that their 
controlling shareholders could influence them as the voluntary nature of codes of 
corporate governance may reduce the effectiveness of codes of corporate governance as 
a governance tool for firms (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). 
Despite the possible impact of independent directors‘ tenure on firm value in Malaysia, 
conventional wisdom based on agency theory assumes that the more independent the 
board, the more effective the board as well as the firm‘s performance.  While some 
empirical studies support the former link (Dahya, McConnell and Travlos, 2002; Perry 
and Shivdasani, 2005; Weisbach, 1988), those studying the latter have produced 
inconclusive or negative results (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat and Black, 1999; 
Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir, Laing and McKnight, 2002).  It is important to note 
that these earlier studies consider independent directors as a homogenous group.  This 
approach does not analyse the differences in directors‘ characteristics and the potential 
effects of these characteristics on the firm.  It is only recently that research has started 
unbundling the characteristics of directors and started investigating the link between 
individual director characteristics and a firm‘s  value.  Examples of such analyses 
include the investigation of the effects of an independent director‘s tenure.  However, 
the extant literature provides very limited empirical evidence with respect to this 
analysis.  Particularly lacking is the evidence on the effects of an independent director‘s 
tenure in family firms.  Previous studies only provide evidence on the effects of 
independent directors‘ tenure on CEO compensation (Vafeas, 2003), timeliness of 
corporate internet reporting (Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008) and earnings 
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management (Liu and Sun, 2010).  However, the evidence is for all types of firms and 
not restricted to family firms. 
Vafeas (2003) using a sample of 800 firms listed on the 1994 Forbes list finds that 
longer tenured independent directors are  associated with higher CEO compensation.  
He finds that senior independent directors who are members of the firms‘ compensation 
committees pay CEOs significantly higher compensation compared with other 
positions, particularly in cases where the CEO is most powerful.  Vafeas (2003) 
concludes that given the opportunity, senior independent directors compromise 
shareholder interests by inflating CEO salaries.  He argues that the presence of directors 
with twenty or more years of service on the board appears to be a sign of CEO 
entrenchment. 
Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) find that for a sample of 44 Irish public-listed 
companies, the average tenure of independent directors is positively related to the firm‘s 
timeliness of corporate internet reporting.  Their studies use independent directors‘ 
tenure as a proxy for board independence and find that the latter does play a positive 
role in influencing the timeliness of corporate internet reporting. 
Using a sample of 7,700 US firms for the period 1998 to 2005, Liu and Sun (2010) find 
that longer tenured independent directors on the independent audit committees are 
negatively associated with earnings management, suggesting that independent audit 
committee members with long board tenure possess greater expertise and experience to 
effectively oversee financial reporting. 
Although these three studies analysed the effects of independent directors‘ tenure, they 
did not analyse directly the effects of independent directors‘ tenure on firm value.  This 
type of analysis provides a more effective and more direct measurement of the influence 
of independent directors‘ tenure on minority shareholder expropriation.  
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Therefore, in this study, the relationship between independent directors‘ tenure and firm 
value is examined.  This would contribute to the corporate governance literature in 
evidencing whether this relationship is more prevalent in Malaysian family firms or 
non-family firms.  Therefore, a comparison of the research results of this relationship 
between family firms and non-family firms is conducted. 
With respect to the research gaps highlighted as well as the discussions in the literature, 
the following research questions are being examined: 
Is there a negative relationship between independent directors’ tenure and firm value in 
Malaysian firms? 
If there is a negative relationship between independent directors’ tenure and firm value 
in Malaysian firms, is this negative relationship stronger in family firms compared to 
non-family firms? 
Since, the tenure of independent directors may affect their impartiality in performing 
their duties, other corporate governance mechanisms are needed to mitigate corporate 
governance problems.  One such mechanism is bank monitoring.  Studies that examine 
the economic effects of loan announcement agreements between firms and banks 
provide empirical evidence regarding the ability of banks to act as good corporate 
governance mechanisms in terms of being an external monitor of firms (Byers, Fields 
and Fraser, 2008).  A point to note is that domestic banks are considered to act as good 
monitors (Boot and Thakor, 2000; Fok et. al., 2004). 
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3.6 DOMESTIC BANKING RELATIONSHIP   
Generally, in certain countries where the economic system is characterised by bank 
financing as external sources of funds, corporate governance is enhanced through direct 
ownership or financing mechanisms (Charkham, 1995).  One of these countries where 
bank financing is extensive is Malaysia.  In Malaysia, foreign-owned banks comprise 
only 16.7% of the total assets of financial institutions whereas domestic banks comprise 
57% of the total assets (Detragiache and Gupta, 2006). 
Since bank financing is extensive in emerging markets such as Malaysia, it is expected 
that banks play a significant corporate governance role in monitoring their clients.  The 
objectives of bank monitoring is to reduce the banks‘ credit risk by preventing 
borrowers from engaging in opportunistic behaviours before and after the loan is 
approved.  Prior to the loan approval, borrowers can take opportunistic actions to 
indicate higher borrowing capacity, obtain lower interest rates and lower contract costs 
(Mishkin and Eakins, 2003).  Borrowers have the incentives to manage their earnings to 
achieve such objectives. In this instance, earnings management is not only conducted by 
managing discretionary accruals in financial statement reporting but also through real 
activities (Hermawan and Dina, 2011).  After the loan is approved, borrowers still 
possess incentives to perform opportunistic actions.  One of the reasons is to avoid 
defaults due to inability to meet debt covenants.  Some covenants are accounting-based 
measures, which depends on the borrowers‘ financial performance.  Generally, 
violations of debt covenants would have a negative effect such as higher interest rates, 
obligations for early repayment of loans and additional restrictions on the borrowers‘ 
activities (Beneish and Press, 1993).  Hence, banks have specific interest to reduce the 
possibility of borrowers taking such opportunistic actions which can reduce their 
repayment capacity.  
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Basically, bank monitoring complements the monitoring function of internal corporate 
governance mechanisms of firms (Hermawan and Dina, 2011).  Treacy and Carey 
(2000) find that major banks in USA use qualitative and quantitative measurements for 
evaluating their credit risk.  Their study shows that banks examine borrowers‘ risk 
factors such as the financial statements reliability, the management quality and the 
financial conditions.  These findings support the significance of effective bank 
monitoring on management actions in order to achieve good corporate governance.  
In general, domestic banks are able to act as good monitors due to their  business of 
issuing relationship loans.  The distinctive feature of relationship loans is repeated 
borrower-lender interactions.  These repeated interactions allow the bank to accumulate 
information about borrowers and therefore, enhance firm monitoring (Boot and Thakor, 
2000).  Although domestic banks can act as good monitors, this monitoring becomes 
ineffective when a company deals with many banks as its source of debt financing 
(Hermawan and Dina, 2011).  This is because each bank might rely on other banks to 
perform the monitoring function on their borrowers and does not do the monitoring on 
its own (Hermawan and Dina, 2011).  This monitoring inefficiency may encourage 
opportunistic behaviours on the part of the borrowers such as loan expropriation as debt 
provides incentives for expropriation particularly in emerging markets (Faccio et.al., 
2001c).  In emerging markets, these opportunistic behaviours are further aggravated by 
the availability of bank-directed lending through the domestic banking system (Ang and 
Sen, 2011).  The prevalence of bank-directed lending in Malaysia (Ang, 2009; Ang and 
Sen, 2011; Claessens and Fan, 2002; IMF, 1998; Kroszner, 1998; Kwack, 2000; 
Laeven, 1999; Oh, 1998; Perera, 2011; Sharma, 2001; Thillainathan, 1999) may 
increase expropriation activities by controlling shareholders.  In essence, the 
opportunistic behaviours of borrowers (i.e. controlling shareholders of firms) induced 
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by multiple domestic banking relationships may ultimately be detrimental to the 
interests of minority shareholders and reduce firm value. 
However, these opportunistic behaviours may be reduced due to the credit crunch in 
emerging markets such as Malaysia during the global financial crisis (Tong and Wei, 
2011). Shortage of liquidity were strongly felt in these markets during this period 
(Claessens, Dell‘Ariccia, Igan and Laeven, 2010) due to the reduced bank-lending. 
During this crisis, domestic banks experienced a reduction in cross-border lending 
which ultimately reduced their own lending capacity (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2010). 
When domestic bank-lending capacity is reduced, controlling shareholders particularly 
from family firms have less opportunities to expropriate from the domestic loans which 
their firms undertake. 
Despite these arguments, the extant corporate governance literature only provides 
limited evidence with regards to the impact of the number of banking relationships as 
well as the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value. 
Degryse and Ongena (2001) examine all the Norwegian public-listed companies for the 
period 1979 to 1995 and reveal that an increase in the number of banking relationships 
decreases sales profitability.  Castelli, Dwyer and Hasan (2012) investigate a sample of 
4,680 Italian manufacturing firms for the period 1998 and 2000 and show that an 
increase in the number of banking relationships decreases the return on equity (ROE) 
and return on assets (ROA) of those firms.  They also find that the decrease in ROE and 
ROA is stronger for smaller firms compared to larger firms. On the other hand, 
Angelini, Di Salvo and Ferri (1998) study a sample of Italian firms and find  that firms 
borrowing from a limited number of banks have a positive effect on firm performance.  
Although the studies by Degryse and Ongena (2001), Castelli et.al. (2012) and Angelini 
et.al. (1998) show the effects of multiple banking relationships on firm value, their 
studies did not analyse specifically the effects of the number of domestic banks that the 
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firm engages with on firm value.  Instead, their studies were merely focused on the 
number of banking relationships in general, without analysing in detail, the effects of 
domestic banking relationships on firm value.  Fok et.al. (2004) evidence this in their 
study of the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages 
with and firm value in Taiwan.  Fok et. al. (2004) use a sample of 178 public-listed 
firms in Taiwan and find that there is a negative relationship between the number of 
domestic bank relationships and firm value before the Asian financial crisis (1994-
1996) and after the Asian financial crisis (1997-1998).  Fok et. al. (2004) attribute this 
negative relationship to the domestic banks‘ lower operating efficiency compared to that 
of foreign banks.  
However, Fok et.al‘s. (2004) findings are contextual by nature because the strength of 
monitoring in domestic banks is dependent upon its institutional context (Thillainathan, 
1999).  Therefore, the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages and firm value in countries other than Taiwan may differ.  Even if it is the 
same, the institutional context behind it could be different.  Currently, the extant 
literature does not provide any evidence on this relationship in Malaysia particularly for 
family firms.  Malaysia possesses a unique institutional setting which encourages such 
analysis to be conducted.  The unique institutional setting refers to the existence of 
bank-directed lending in the domestic banking system (Ang, 2009; Ang and Sen, 2011; 
Economic Planning Unit, 1981, 2001, 2006, 2011).  With the presence of bank-directed 
lending, loan expropriation is encouraged because debt provides incentives for 
expropriation in emerging markets particularly in family firms (Faccio et.al., 2001c).  In 
Malaysia, loans are also issued without much proper scrutiny (Bhattacharya, 2001; 
Laeven, 1999; Perera, 2011; Sharma, 2001; Thillainathan, 1999).  Hence, the more 
domestic banks are engaged by the firm, the more loans the firm can obtain via bank-
directed lending (IMF, 1998; Kroszner, 1998; Kwack, 2000; Oh, 1998; Perera, 2011; 
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Sharma, 2001; Thillainathan, 1999).  Therefore, an increase in the number of domestic 
banks that the firm engages with provides more opportunities for loan expropriation by 
controlling shareholders particularly from family firms and as a result, it is likely that 
the firm value is reduced.  This study therefore, examines the effects of the number of 
domestic banks that Malaysian firms engage with on firm value. 
Furthermore, the extant literature does not provide any evidence with respect to whether 
this relationship is more prevalent in Malaysian family firms or non-family firms.  
Therefore, a comparison of the research results of this relationship between family firms 
and non-family firms is also conducted. 
With respect to the research gaps highlighted as well as the discussions in the literature, 
the following research questions are being examined: 
Is there a negative relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with and firm value in Malaysian firms? 
If there is a negative relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with and firm value in Malaysian firms, is this negative relationship stronger in 
family firms compared to non-family firms? 
Since, domestic banks may not act as effective monitors in emerging markets; it may be 
possible to improve corporate governance by controlling shareholders self initiatives.  
This may occur when controlling shareholders‘ ownership increases (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
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3.7 MODERATING ROLE OF CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS’ 
OWNERSHIP   
In corporate governance research, it is generally assumed that ownership concentration 
leads to better governance because these owners possess higher incentives to monitor 
and control the managers (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010).  Morck and Yeung (2003) 
argue that while this view may be valid in the United States (USA), it is by and large 
insufficient, if not in error, with regards to family-controlled business firms in countries 
outside USA.  They identify at least three specific problems which affect the wealth and 
interests of minority shareholders.  These are referred to as ―other people‘s money‖, 
managerial entrenchment and tunnelling.  The ―other people‘s money‖ problem refers to 
a situation where a family may possess effective control over a firm with very little 
investment in that firm (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010).  ‗Managerial entrenchment‘ 
refers to a decline in firm value which occurs when managerial ownership rises beyond 
a certain threshold (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  ‗Tunnelling‘ refers to self-dealing 
within a family-owned business group, whereby through non-market prices the 
controlling family transfers profits to firms within the group in which they possess 
higher shareholding from firms with lower shareholding (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 
2010). 
Family-controlled firms may also encounter two additional agency problems.  Firstly, 
because of large ownership by family owners, there is no market for corporate control 
and hence, the capital market possesses little ability to discipline family owners. 
Secondly, there may be a significant difference in the risk preferences of family owners 
and minority shareholders.  Minority shareholders, especially those who seek financial 
gains, typically possess diversified portfolios and hence, would prefer individual firms 
to undertake higher levels of risk.  Family owners, on the other hand, have most of their 
wealth tied up with the firm and hence, are likely to be more risk averse than minority 
shareholders (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010).  
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Although ownership concentration may not resolve the principal-principal conflict 
especially in emerging markets; there is still limited empirical evidence on this issue.  
Past studies have generally examined the role of ownership structure as a form of 
corporate governance but they did not specifically examine the moderating role of 
controlling shareholder‘s ownership on minority shareholder expropriation.  Table 3.4 
summarises the past key research on ownership as a form of corporate governance. 
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Table 3.4: Summary of Past Key Research on Ownership Structure as a Form Of Corporate Governance 
Owner Type Key Issues Studies Addressing The Issue 
Executive ownership 
 
 
 Empirical support for the agency theory benefits of executive ownership has been mixed.  
Studies show conflicting evidence on how executive ownership influences risk-taking and goal 
alignment. 
Dalton, Daily, Certo and Roengpitya (2003); 
McGuire and Matta (2003); Rajgopal and 
Shevlin (2002), Desai and Dharmapala (2006); 
Devers, Cannella, Reilly and Yoder (2007). 
Board ownership  Board ownership signals long-term earnings potential.  Independent directors differ considerably 
in their ownership but less empirical research focuses on this group. 
Certo, Covin, Daily and Dalton (2001); 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003); Kosnik (1990). 
Employee ownership 
(non-executive) 
 Creates a social-psychological bond that is linked with effectiveness, satisfaction and 
performance. 
Blasi, Kruse and Berstein (2003); Jones and 
Kato (1995); Welbourne and Gomez-Mejia 
(1995); Buchko (1993). 
Blockholders  Empirical research on individual ownership is focused on insiders, usually ignoring individual 
outsiders or lumping them together with institutional shareholders. 
 Family ownership rarely creates value as these owners seek to protect their socio-emotional 
endowment. 
 Corporate ownership can have negative effect for the target firm. 
 Empirical research highlights the problems associated with state ownership, such as soft budgets, 
decreased innovation, corruption and limited competition. 
 Multiple blockholders create power-dependencies. 
Holderness (2003); Shleifer and Vishny (1997); 
Mehran (1995). 
Anderson and Reeb (2003); Gomez-Mejia, 
Larraza-Kintana and Makri (2003). 
Bogert (1996); Rosentein and Rush (1990). 
Tihanyi and Hegarty (2007); Megginson and 
Netter (2001); Shirley and Walsh (2001). 
Maury and Pajuste (2005) 
Agent owners  Overcome obstacles to governance encountered by other shareholders, but also create a dual 
agency relationship. 
 Pressure-sensitive institutional shareholders are poor governors of firm activity. 
 Pressure-indeterminate institutional shareholders do not possess a systematic governance role. 
 Pressure-resistant institutional shareholders possess a strong influence on a wide range of firm 
outcomes. 
 Short-term and long-term institutional shareholders possess different and sometimes competing 
interests. 
Arthurs, Hoskisson, Buscnitz and Johnson 
(2003); Grinstein and Michaely (2005). 
 Edwards and Hubbard (2000). 
Brickley, Lease and Smith (1988). 
 
Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt (2003); 
David, Hitt and Gimeno (2001). 
Connelly, Tihanyi, Certo and Hitt (2010); 
David, O‘Brien, Yoshikawa and Delios (2010). 
Private equity  Venture capitalists may be inactive, active-advice-giving, or hands-on; they may work together 
in syndicates. 
 The influence of business angels and venture capitalists varies with their institutional 
environment. 
Elango, Fried, Hisrich and Polonchek (1995); 
Lockett and Wright (2001). 
Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine and Wright 
(2009). 
Source: Connelly et.al. (2010)
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In fact, the extant literature only provides limited empirical evidence on the moderating 
effects of different kinds of ownership on minority shareholder expropriation.  So far 
these studies are limited to Iskandar et.al. (2012) and Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2010).  
Iskandar et.al. (2012) conduct a study on a sample of 477 public-listed companies in 
Malaysia for the year 2005 and find that foreign and managerial ownership positively 
moderates the relationship between free cash-flow and asset utilisation.  Asset 
utilisation is an indirect indicator of expropriation as low asset utilisation indicates 
lower efficiency of asset usage, thus, increasing agency costs.  Poor asset utilisation 
may increase agency costs as managers do not act in the best interests of minority 
shareholders in terms of efficiently utilising the firm‘s assets (Fleming, Heaney and 
McCosker, 2005).  The presence of free cash-flow may lead to inefficient asset 
utilisation as it encourages opportunistic behaviours of managers in using the firm‘s 
financial resources (Jensen, 1986).  Basically the study by Iskandar et.al. (2012) shows 
the significance of the moderating role of foreign and managerial ownership in reducing 
expropriation via free cash-flow in Malaysian public-listed firms. 
Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2010) analyse the entire population of Over-The-Counter 
(OTC) family-controlled firms in Japan between 1998 and 2002 and show that bank 
ownership positively moderates the relationship between family directors and dividend 
payout.  However, they find no conclusive evidence on the moderating effect of foreign 
ownership on the relationship between family directors and dividend payout as well as 
between family directors and firm value.  Dividend payouts are an indirect indicator of 
expropriation (Gomes, 2000; Jensen, 1986).  Dividend payouts signify a reduction in 
agency problems because less discretionary cash-flows are available to family owners 
and directors for them to engage with opportunistically.  This helps reduce their 
expropriation activities (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2010).  Yoshikawa and Rasheed 
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(2010) findings show that bank ownership plays a significant moderating role in 
reducing minority shareholder expropriation in Japanese OTC firms. 
Although the studies by Iskandar et.al. (2012) and Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2010) show 
the significance of the moderating role of foreign, managerial and bank ownership on 
expropriation; they did not analyse the moderating effects of controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership on the relationship between RPTs, independent directors‘ tenure and the 
number of domestic banks that the firm engages with, against the firm value.  Therefore, 
this study will analyse the moderating role of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on 
these relationships. 
Furthermore, it is also likely that the positive moderating effect of controlling 
shareholders‘ ownership on expropriation is stronger in family firms due to the 
corporate reputational effects as predicted previously.  Hence, it would be timely to 
investigate empirically whether this positive moderating effect is stronger in Malaysian 
family firms or non-family firms.  
With respect to the research gaps highlighted as well as the discussions in the literature, 
the following research questions are being examined: 
Is there a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership on the 
relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) which are likely to result in 
expropriation and firm value in Malaysian firms? 
Is there a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership on the 
relationship between independent directors’ tenure and firm value in Malaysian firms? 
Is there a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership on the 
relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm 
value in Malaysian firms? 
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If there is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership on the 
relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) which are likely to result in 
expropriation and the firm value in Malaysian firms, is the positive moderating effect 
stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms? 
If there is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership on the 
relationship between independent directors’ tenure and firm value in Malaysian firms, 
is the positive moderating effect stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms? 
If there is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership on the 
relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm 
value Malaysian firms, is the positive moderating effect stronger in family firms 
compared to non-family firms? 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter discusses and synthesises the relevant literature related to minority 
shareholder expropriation and family firms in order to identify the research gaps. 
Specific focus is given to family firms in terms of their inclination towards 
expropriation. Furthermore, the relevant research questions have been identified. The 
next chapter will discuss the research paradigm, theoretical framework and hypotheses 
development. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter discusses the research objectives, the research paradigm and how the 
research is to be concluded. The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 
discusses the philosophical paradigm used in this research. Section 4.3 discusses the 
theoretical framework. Section 4.4 discusses the hypotheses development.  
4.2 RESEARCH PARADIGM 
The hypotheses developed in the previous sections are based upon the functionalist 
research paradigm. The functionalist paradigm assumes that society has a concrete 
existence and follows certain orders. These assumptions lead to the existence of an 
objective and value-free social science, which can produce true explanatory and 
predictive knowledge of the reality out there (Ardalan, 2007).  It assumes that scientific 
theories can be assessed objectively by reference to empirical evidence (i.e. from the 
regression results in this research).  It attributes independence to the observer from the 
observed. It also assumes there are universal standards of science, which determine 
what constitutes an adequate explanation of what is observed (e.g., the findings are 
based upon the statistical significance, the coefficients and the coefficient signs of the 
research results).  Furthermore, it assumes there are external rules and regulations 
governing the external world. The goal of the researcher is to find the orders that prevail 
within that phenomenon (i.e. finding the coefficient signs, coefficients and the statistical 
significance in the research results) (Ardalan, 2007). 
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I believe that corporate governance is a technical matter and focus on this aspect in my 
research.  The corporate governance principle used is basically based on agency theory.  
I contend that corporate governance is based on the existence of potential agency 
problems that arise from separation of ownership and control in modern corporations 
(Ardalan, 2007). Hence, a functionalist approach would be a better approach to study 
corporate governance compared to other approaches (such as interpretative approach, 
etc) because there is a dominant theory (i.e. agency theory) which could be used to 
explain what is observed (Ardalan, 2007). Generally, the functionalist paradigm has 
become dominant in mainstream academic finance, which includes corporate 
governance (Ardalan, 2007).  
4.3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In emerging markets, the principal-principal conflict (Agency Problem Type II) 
constitutes a main concern particularly among family firms such as those in Malaysia 
and this creates the incentives for expropriation by family controlling shareholders 
(Morck and Yeung, 2003; Young et.al., 2008).  The following justifications explain why 
expropriation involves the following variables and how it affects firm value as well as 
the moderating effects on the relationship between these variables and their firm value.  
In addition, the relevant theories are also discussed. 
From the discussions earlier, RPTs can be used by controlling shareholders to tunnel 
resources out from the firm.  Hence, these transactions are one of the channels of 
expropriation and ultimately, it can reduce firm value.  Since, RPTs can be used for 
tunnelling purposes; the Conflict Of Interest Hypothesis is applicable here as RPTs are 
more likely to result in negative effects on firm value.  The conflict of interest 
hypothesis constitutes part of agency theory as RPTs can be abused by controlling 
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shareholders and this is against the interests of minority shareholders.  Another aspect 
of agency theory which is involved in this research is its assumptions. 
Agency theory assumes that independent directors are able to carry out their tasks in 
providing checks and balances to board decision-making in an effective manner without 
being influenced by controlling shareholders.  This constitutes one of the basic 
assumptions of agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 1983b).  However, managerial 
hegemony theorists argue that this assumption may not hold in emerging markets. 
Managerial hegemony theorists argue that minority shareholders and management who 
are aligned with the controlling shareholder possess differing interests. However, the 
controlling shareholder controls the main levers of power in the firm. As a result, the 
controlling shareholder may pursue further own interests at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Spear et.al., 2007) by influencing the independent directors for 
expropriation purposes which further aggravates Agency Problem Type II. This is likely 
to occur especially in emerging market firms with poorer investor protection. Hence, 
longer directors‘ tenure will likely reduce firm value in the context of emerging markets 
such as Malaysia.  
Furthermore, according to agency theory, due to the issue of moral hazards that affect 
domestic banks as well as the prevalence of bank-directed lending in the context of the 
Malaysian institutional setting; it is postulated that firms that possess more domestic 
banks as their principal bankers, engage in more debt expropriation, i.e. more 
expropriation of bank loan; which reduces firm value compared to those with less 
domestic banks as their principal bankers.  
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Aside from agency theory, the theory of ownership structure is also relevant in this 
research.  The theory of ownership structure explains how changes in ownership 
structure such as changes in ownership concentration, identity of owners, etc affect firm 
value and hence, shareholders‘ interests, directly or indirectly (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985). It is postulated that the moderating effects of controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership on the relationship between RPTs, independent directors‘ tenure and the 
number of domestic banks that the firm engages with, and firm value will be positive 
for family firms, due to the reputational effects after the Transmile case.  This 
postulation adds to the theory of ownership structure. 
Finally, an assessment whether expropriation as well as the moderating effects of 
controlling shareholders‘ ownership on expropriation, are more prevalent in Malaysian 
family firms or non-family firms is conducted.  It is postulated that expropriation is 
likely to be more prevalent in family firms because according to agency theory, 
principal-principal conflict (i.e. minority shareholder expropriation) may be more 
prevalent in these types of firms (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
In addition to that, the positive moderating effects of controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership on expropriation, is likely to be more prevalent in family firms due to the 
corporate reputational effects after the Transmile fiasco.  These comparisons provide a 
new perspective to agency theory by empirically examining its interplay with corporate 
reputational effects and financial crisis in one single study. 
Considering these justifications, Figure 4.1 shows the theoretical framework for this 
research: 
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Figure 4.1: Theoretical Framework 
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4.4  HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
4.4.1 Related Party Transactions (RPTs)  
Although there are benefits of RPTs as according to the Efficient Transaction 
Hypothesis (Gordon et.al., 2004b,c; Ryngaert and Thomas, 2007)
17
; the Conflict Of 
Interest Hypothesis is more applicable as RPTs are more likely to result in negative 
effects towards firm value.  This is because these transactions are used by controlling 
shareholders for tunnelling purposes (Djankov et.al., 2008).  
The ‗conflict of interest‘ hypothesis and the potential for tunnelling is demonstrated in 
well-known corporate scandals in the world such as Enron, Adelphia, and Tyco, as 
shown in excerpts from the business press below (Gordon, Henry and Pahlia, 2004a) : 
―Enron told the world that these [dozens of off balance sheet] partnerships allowed it to 
hedge against fluctuations in the value of its investments. Well, hedge, schmedge. It was 
the disclosure, in October, that $1.2 billion of its market value had disappeared as a 
result of these "related party" transactions with private partnerships caused Enron to 
slash its reported earnings since 1997 by almost $600 million. A week later, those pesky 
side deals caused Enron to reveal that it was out another $700 million.  Investors trust 
understandably collapsed, and, presto, Chapter 11‖. 
"What Was Enron?' Editorial, Wall Street  Journal,  
December 12, 2001. A.18 (as cited in Gordon 
et.al., 2004a) 
 
                                                          
17
  Ryngaert and Thomas (2007) outlined several potential benefits from related party transactions. The first benefit is coordination 
of activities and feedback between contracting parties as it would be worthwhile to have related parties on board of directors as 
means to obtain quick feedback on operations. They argue that these benefits arises from the need of fast information from 
vendors, the available information obtained from related parties are more reliable than from unrelated parties and the due 
process of renegotiating contracts could be achieved with less hassle with related parties. Secondly is to promote contract 
efficiency facilitated from related parties‘ familiarities with each other. The third potential benefit is mitigation of holdup 
problems in the contracting process and the facilitation of investment in firm-specific relationships. They argue related parties 
have financial incentives to avoid holdup if they have substantial investment in related firms. Ryngaert and Thomas (2007) also 
argue on the viewpoint of purely strategic business decision (e.g. advertising strategy) that related parties‘ transactions could be 
beneficial. 
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Warning that corporate crimes will result in "handcuffs and a jail cell," federal 
authorities arrested the founder of Adelphia Communications and two sons Wednesday 
on charges they looted the now-bankrupt cable giant and used it as their "personal piggy 
bank."  
"Government Arrests Founder of Adelphia, Two 
Sons."         Associated Press Newswires, July 25, 
2002 (as cited in Gordon et.al., 2004a). 
 
From 1997 to 2002, the SEC said Mr. Kozlowski improperly borrowed $242 million 
from a Tyco program intended to help executives pay taxes on restricted stock grants.  
Instead of using the funds for that purpose, Mr. Kozlowski spent the money on yachts, 
fine art, estate,  jewellery and luxury apartments.  Mr. Swartz similarly used $72 million 
in loans from the program for personal investments and business ventures, the SEC said.  
"Former Tyco Executives Are Charged --- New York 
Prosecutors Say Ex-CEO, Finance Officer Ran `Criminal 
Enterprise.'" Wall Street Journal, September 13, 2002 (as 
cited in Gordon et.al., 2004a). 
 
These scandals provide extreme examples of probable abuses of RPTs by executives 
and board members of the firm (Gordon et.al., 2004a).  In general, the view that RPTs 
represent a conflict of interest is consistent with agency problems argued by Berle and 
Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976). Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain the 
agency conflict between a manager and outside shareholders as the manager's incentive 
to extract private benefits from the firm for personal consumption, like perquisites.  As 
such, RPTs present the potential for the expropriation of the firm's resources and hence, 
reduces firm value.  This is detrimental to the interests of minority shareholders 
(Gordon et.al., 2004a). 
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RPTs are basically detrimental to minority shareholders when the expected benefit from 
it is less than the value of an unrelated party transaction (Ryngaert and Thomas, 2007).  
This could occur as RPTs provide direct opportunities for related parties such as 
controlling shareholders to extract cash and other resources from listed companies 
through tunnelling activities (Djankov et.al., 2008).  Tunnelling refers to the transfer of 
resources out of a company to its controlling shareholder (Johnson et.al., 2000b).  
Tunnelling comprises two forms.  
First, a controlling shareholder can transfer resources from the firm for its private 
benefits through self-dealing transactions.  Such transactions include outright theft or 
fraud; asset sales and contracts which utilise transfer pricing advantages to the 
controlling shareholder; excessive executive compensation; loan guarantees; 
expropriation of corporate opportunities, etc. Atanasov, Black and Ciccotello (2008) 
provide further explanations and examples of these transactions.  They point out that 
cash-flow tunnelling includes sale of a firm‘s output at below-market prices to another 
firm in which the family has significant or complete cash-flow rights, or overpayment 
for inputs purchased from such firms.  Cash-flow tunnelling may also result in 
excessive salaries or perquisites for family members (or insiders).  Asset tunnelling 
could also occur and it involves the transfer of a firm‘s assets to firms (usually) fully 
owned by the families and it can significantly affect a firm‘s long-term ability to 
generate cash-flows.  
Second, the controlling shareholder can increase his or her share of the firm without 
transferring any assets through dilutive share issues, minority freeze-outs, or other 
financial transactions that discriminate against minority shareholders (Johnson et.al., 
2000b).  Atanasov et.al. (2008) further argues that such form of tunnelling include 
equity tunnelling.  Equity tunnelling involves actions which benefit the families at the 
expense of a reduction in the value of the shares owned by the other investors, e.g. sale 
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of new shares to the families at a below-market price, delisting and taking a firm 
private, and the issue of loans to the families which would not have to be repaid if the 
associated business venture were unsuccessful.   
Djankov et.al. (2008) argue that the first form of tunnelling enables controlling 
shareholders to utilise RPTs to expropriate resources from their firms.  This can be 
easily achieved if the family firm have low cash-flow rights-to-ownership rights ratio 
(Johnson et.al., 2000b).  Evidence of tunnelling by family owners in emerging markets 
has been found in Bulgaria (Atanasov, 2005); China (Gao and Kling, 2008) and India 
(Betrand et.al., 2002).  
Since RPTs is a tool for tunnelling, Atanasov et.al. (2008) summarises the impact of 
tunnelling on firm value in terms of its impact on share value.  They assume that 
tunnelling is stealing such that, unlike in the case of transfer pricing, there is zero cash-
flow accruing to the firm from which cash-flow or assets are being tunnelled.  In the 
absence of tunnelling, the value of each share is given by the following: 
VNT = (ROA x A) / K 
ROA: Return On Assets 
A: Stock of Assets 
K: Cost of Capital 
If now, a proportion δ of the cash-flow is tunnelled away, the value of each share would 
be the following: 
VCT = [(1- δ) x ROA x A] / K 
If, however, π proportion of the assets itself is tunnelled away, and if this act reduces the 
ROA by λ percent, then, the value of each share would be as following: 
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VAT = [(1- π) x (1- λ) x ROA x A] / K 
One possible reason for the negative firm value effects of RPTs is the assumption that 
non-controlling shareholders (i.e., non-affiliated blockholders and minority 
shareholders) will anticipate this expropriation and price protect against it (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).  In Malaysia, this is possible as investors could view previous years‘ 
RPTs that are disclosed in annual reports due to FRS124 mandatory disclosure 
requirements.  With access to previous years‘ RPTs information, non-affiliated 
blockholders and minority shareholders could anticipate what kind of RPTs that 
controlling shareholders could use for expropriation purposes for the current year as 
well as their estimated transaction value and subsequently price protect against it.  
Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) argue that in corporations with controlling shareholders 
holding less than 100% equity stake, equilibrium of controlling shareholder 
opportunism and non-controlling shareholders price protection could exist.  Controlling 
shareholders benefit from RPTs expropriation while non-controlling shareholders price 
protect against the consequences of this expropriation, and neither has reasons to change 
their actions (Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 2010).  This results in reduction in a firm value 
and it is likely to persist as long as it does not become so severe that the market-for-
corporate control is utilised to change the firm‘s ownership (Kohlbeck and Mayhew, 
2010).  
It is argued that the anticipation of RPTs and the subsequent price protection (i.e. firm 
value reduction) occurs in firms which possess significant divergence between voting 
and cash-flow rights and those that are closely affiliated to groups (Faccio et.al., 2001a).  
Claessens et.al. (2002) find that in East Asia, divergence between cash-flow rights and 
voting rights of family firms reduces Tobin‘s Q of the firms.  They estimated that a 10 
percentage point divergence between cash-flow and voting rights triggered a 6 
percentage point discount in the market valuation of a firm.  Similarly, the anticipation 
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of RPTs and subsequent price protection also could occur in affiliated Indian firms, 
which facilitate tunnelling (Khanna and Palepu, 2000).  This occurs as Indian investors 
and creditors are aware of the propensity among group-affiliated firms to transfer 
financial resources to other group companies which are inefficient and hence incapable 
of raising capital on their own, usually in the form of inter-corporate loans.  As a result, 
insolvency of any of the group of companies results in a significant reduction in access 
to investment and credit for all remaining firms in the group (Gopalan, Nanda and Seru, 
2007).  
As tunnelling facilitates expropriation through RPTs, it is argued that the negative 
effects of RPTs on firm value are more severe in family firms compared to non-family 
firms.  It is also argued that these effects are more profound in family firms with family 
members involved in management.  The reason is that family controlling shareholders 
possess incentives to enhance the interests of their family members within their firms.  
This could be achieved through related sales, related lending, loan guarantees and 
related borrowings (Yeh, Shu and Su, 2012).  For example, loan guarantees can be 
provided to family members so that they can obtain financing at a lower interest rate 
from the bank.  These loan guarantees provide family members with the option of loan 
default, thus, leaving the burden of repayment to family controlling shareholders 
(Berkman, Cole and Fu, 2009).  
Furthermore, related sales or related purchases, which benefit family members could 
also take place (Cheung et.al., 2006; Lo, Wong and Firth, 2010).  Family members 
could purchase assets from their company such as properties or vehicles at a discounted 
rate in comparison with the market value.  Vice versa, family members could also sell 
these assets at inflated prices to the company.  Both these RPTs enhance the interests of 
family members at the expense of minority shareholders (Cheung et.al., 2006; Lo, 
Wong and Firth, 2010).  Jian and Wong (2010) further shows that related sales could be 
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used to prop up earnings of private companies controlled by family members, resulting 
in negative effects on family firm performance.  This could happen in family firms that 
engage related sales transactions with its family members.  
Considering all the above explanations, the following hypotheses are developed: 
H1a:  There is a negative relationship between related party transactions (RPTs)(which 
are likely to result in expropriation) and firm value in Malaysian firms. 
H1b:  The negative relationship between related party transactions (RPTs)(that are 
likely to result in expropriation) and firm value in Malaysian family firms will be 
stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. 
4.4.2 Independent Directors’ Tenure and Firm Value  
One of the scepticisms about the ‗true independence‘ of independent directors is with 
regards to the effects of their tenure.  However, there are conflicting views with respect 
to the effect of directors‘ tenure on directors‘ behaviour.  The expert‘s hypothesis 
suggests that long-term directors‘ engagement is associated with higher experience, 
commitment and competence; because it provides them with important knowledge 
about the firm and its business environment (Vafeas, 2003).  Vance (1983) argues that 
forcing directors to retire leads to a waste of talent and experience.  Buchanan (1974) 
finds that extended tenure enhances organisational commitment and willingness to 
expend effort towards company goals.  Salancik (1977) suggests organisational 
commitment increases with tenure because employees make certain ‗side bets‘ within 
the firm (for example, buying company stock).  Organisational commitment increases 
because seasoned employees are more likely to have developed confidence and 
competence in doing their job.  
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Watts and Zimmerman (1978) and Abdullah et. al. (2010) further argue that reputational 
effects could have a positive influence on independent directors‘ behaviour.  This could 
occur after the Transmile fiasco in 2007.  Subsequent to the Transmile case, 
independent directors of family firms may prefer to increase their productivity as they 
want to increase the image and reputation of their firms (Oh, 2011).  Poor reputation 
will likely reduce their chances of working as independent directors with non-family 
firms (Othman and Rahman, 2010).  As a result, the longer they work with the firm; the 
firms‘ value may increase as they productively contribute their experience and skills 
gained to add value to the firm.   
However, corporate reputational effect is generally considered a poor substitute for 
weaknesses in the institutional setting in emerging markets (Peng and Jiang, 2010).  
These weaknesses include poor legal protection of minority shareholders, voluntary 
adoption of corporate governance policies, etc.  This is because even reputable 
companies are shown to expropriate minority shareholders in these markets especially 
during periods of economic crisis (Johnson et. al., 2000a).   
Nevertheless, this line of reasoning is insufficient as it does not consider the effect of 
corporate governance fiascos such as the Transmile case in Malaysia, which indicate a 
strong reputational effect on the behaviour of independent directors of family firms.  
Hence, the argument that reputational effect is a poor substitute for institutional 
deficiencies may not be valid. 
On the contrary, Katz (1982) finds that extended tenure reduces intra-group 
communication, and isolates groups from key information sources.  He finds that the 
performance of groups is non-linearly related to tenure, increasing because of a learning 
effect initially, and declining thereafter.  Lipton and Lorsch (1992) recognise that lead 
directors may attempt to usurp some of the CEO‘s functions through time, and 
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therefore, advocate term limits for directors.  Vafeas (2003) proposes a management 
friendliness hypothesis, suggesting that seasoned directors are more likely to befriend, 
and less likely to monitor managers.  Over time, directors may be co-opted by 
management as directors become less mobile and less employable.  This phenomenon is 
more likely to occur in firms with more powerful CEOs.  Vafeas (2003) further suggests 
that the length of board tenure serves as an observable proxy for the extent to which 
non-executive directors are affiliated with management.   
Anderson et.al. (2004), Lin et.al. (2011b) and Yunos et.al. (2011) further argue that 
board independence is likely to be compromised by long-serving independent directors 
as these directors may be highly influenced by controlling shareholders or managers 
related or aligned to them, to suit their expropriation incentives which result in the 
increased social cohesion between the CEO and the independent directors (Westphal, 
1999). This particularly applies to firms in emerging markets as firms in these markets 
possess high ownership concentration and are mostly family-controlled (Claessens 
et.al., 2000a; Morck and Yeung, 2003).  Furthermore, studies by Bebchuk, Fried and 
Walker (2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003) suggest that management may use their 
power to influence the nomination process of directors as well.  Independent directors 
with strong personal ties with the management are more likely to be  re-appointed and 
survive a longer term.  These directors will not operate independently because they 
already possess strong personal ties with the management (Canavan, Jones and Potter, 
2004).  In addition to that, long tenure directors are less mobile and less employable 
(Vafeas, 2003).  As business operations become more sophisticated and frequently 
changing, long tenure directors increasingly find it difficult to keep track of the changes 
in technology, financial dealings, and business strategies as compared to their new 
counterparts (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Canavan et.al., 2004).  The former also lack 
talent to deal with new issues (Canavan et.al., 2004). 
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Moreover, it can be argued that the entrenchment effects of long board tenure could be 
higher in family firms compared to non-family firms in the Malaysian capital markets 
because family controlling shareholders have the incentives to exert more influence on 
the independent directors due to their interest in managing the firm in their own way to 
fulfil their private objectives at the expense of minority shareholders (Anderson and 
Reeb, 2003). 
Hence, the MCCG 2012 Part 3, Para.3.3 recommends that independent directors‘ tenure 
be limited to a maximum of nine years.   The entrenchment effects of long board tenure 
is likely to persist in Malaysia as the adoption of the principle to limit the maximum 
tenure of independent directors to nine years as stated in the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2012 is voluntary.  Hence, Malaysian firms possess no 
urgency to comply with this principle as they will continue to allow independent 
directors to have long tenure attachment with the firm so that their controlling 
shareholders could influence them as the directors‘ tenure increases. 
Considering the literature on long tenure directors as well as in line with the proposal by 
MCCG 2012 to limit the maximum tenure of independent directors to nine years, I 
would argue that long tenure directors are more likely not to be beneficial to Malaysian 
family firms.   
Thus, the following hypotheses are developed: 
H2a: There is a negative relationship between independent directors’ tenure and firm 
value in Malaysian firms. 
H2b: The negative relationship between independent directors’ tenure and firm value in 
Malaysian firms will be stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. 
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4.4.3 The Number of Domestic Banks that the Firm Engages With 
In emerging markets, it is argued that controlling shareholders undertake debt such as 
bank loans to expropriate minority shareholders rather than to discipline management 
(Grullon and Kanatas, 2001; Ellul, Guntay and Lel, 2007; Faccio et.al., 2001b; Harvey 
et.al., 2004).  The theoretical underpinning of this scenario is as follows.  Firms with 
concentrated ownership and control in emerging markets usually belong to business 
groups where inside shareholders have control rights that are often in excess of their 
cash-flow or ownership rights.  This is achieved through various types of corporate 
control structures such as pyramids and cross-shareholdings (La Porta et.al., 1999).  
Under pyramidal control structures, business groups are organised through a chain of 
companies with firms higher in the pyramid possessing higher ownership rights 
compared to firms lower in the pyramid.  The affiliate at the top of the pyramid, in 
which a controlling shareholder has direct control, controls another group affiliate next 
in the pyramidal chain, which in turn controls another affiliate, etc (Claessens et.al., 
2000a).  
According to established literature, in an environment of weak investor protection and 
large private benefits of control, such ownership structures enable inside shareholders to 
expropriate minority shareholders through the use of unfair priced transactions to divert 
or ‗tunnel‘ resources from affiliated companies lower down in the pyramid where the 
divergence between control and cash-flow rights are relatively higher than those higher 
up the pyramid where the divergence is lower (Bertrand et.al., 2002; Johnson et.al., 
2000b).  Under such a scenario, debt such as bank loans, alone can facilitate 
expropriation by enabling shareholders to increase their control over group affiliates.  
By increasing the proportion of debt relative to equity in the capital structure, insiders 
can possess greater control over the resources of group affiliates without having to 
commit additional equity (Harris and Raviv, 1988a; Stulz, 1990).  This increase in 
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control, transmitting through pyramids as well as cross-shareholdings, in turn can create 
more tunnelling opportunities for expropriating minority shareholders.  Furthermore, by 
undertaking additional bank loans in affiliates where they possess low cash-flow but 
high control rights, controlling shareholders can potentially increase the resources that 
can be diverted from these affiliates through related lending or transfer pricing to ones 
where their cash-flow rights are higher (Ellul et.al., 2007; Faccio et.al., 2001b).  
Nevertheless, in an emerging market setting where investor protection is relatively 
poorer and debt expropriation has a higher likelihood to occur; it is argued that the 
disadvantages of the domestic banking system in this country outweigh its benefits as it 
could be used as a tool for expropriation particularly by family controlling shareholders. 
The more domestic banks that are engaged by highly concentrated firms such as family 
firms; the more opportunities are available for expropriation by the family controlling 
shareholders.  Therefore, it is expected that an increase in the number of domestic banks 
engaged by the family firm will increase the agency costs of the firm, thus, reducing 
firm value.   
Furthermore, the issue of loan expropriation from bank-directed lending can be argued 
to be potentially more severe in family firms compared to non-family firms because 
family owners can use the bank-directed loans to enhance their private objectives such 
as firm survival at the expense of minority shareholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  
This difference is attributed to the failure of the disciplinary effects of debt to impose 
higher costs on family controlling shareholders compared to their expropriation benefits 
(Ellul et.al., 2007; Faccio et.al., 2001b).  Firstly, in family firms, controlling 
shareholders usually take up managerial positions and their performance is not 
necessarily tied to the debt liabilities of the firm.  This is different from professional 
managers who generally care about the associated loss of job tenure or reputation as a 
result of debt default and insolvency (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2008).  Secondly, reputational 
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considerations in family firms with pyramidal ownership and cross-shareholdings can 
be intrinsically weak because if an affiliated firm goes bankrupt because of excessive 
leverage, it may be difficult to pin accountability on the controlling shareholder 
immersed in the complex corporate structure of its firm.  Both of these factors 
contribute to the failure of the disciplinary effects of debt on family firms and due to 
this failure; family controlling shareholders may expropriate the loans obtained from 
banks (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2008).  Hence, loan expropriation from bank-directed lending 
is argued to be potentially more severe in family firms compared to non-family firms.  
As a result, the negative impact of the number of domestic banks that the firm engages 
with on firm value is argued to be more severe in family firms compared to non-family 
firms. 
Aside from agency costs of loan expropriation, there are other factors which also 
influence firm value within the bank-firm relationship.  Domestic banks possess lower 
operating efficiency compared to foreign banks, resulting in higher interest costs for 
firms and reducing firm value (Fok et.al., 2004).  It is argued that this interest cost effect 
towards firm value is controlled by leverage (control variable) in the research model of 
this study because the larger the amount of loans undertaken by the firm, the higher 
their leverage and the larger the interest cost that the firm have to pay to service their 
bank loans.  
Moreover, multiple banking relationships by the firm also influence a firm value 
through the reduction of the firm‘s liquidity risk (Detragiache, Garella and Guiso, 2000) 
and costly reduction in information asymmetry (Diamond, 1984).  The latter results in 
the firm‘s higher financing costs (interest costs) (Diamond, 1984).  In addition to that, 
bank loans too could have a positive effect on the firm value (Fama, 1985; Yosha, 
1995).  
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In the research model of this study, it is argued that the effects of liquidity risk towards 
firm value is controlled by firm‘s risk (control variable) because liquidity risk of the 
firm is part of the firm‘s idiosyncratic risk which is a component of the firm‘s total 
risk
18
.  The effects of higher bank financing costs (as a result of costly reduction of 
information asymmetry) and bank loans towards firm value is controlled by leverage 
(control variable) because bank loans are part of the firm‘s leverage and the higher the 
amount of bank loans undertaken by the firm, the higher the leverage and the larger the 
cost of bank financing for the firm.  
Therefore, it is argued that the resulting effect of the number of domestic banks engaged 
by the firm towards its firm value can be attributed to the characteristics of the loans 
provided by these domestic banks to the firm; which are more likely to be relationship 
and bank-directed loans (Fok et.al., 2004) and they are prone to be expropriated by 
controlling shareholders particularly from family firms (Ellul et.al., 2007; Faccio et.al., 
2001b;  Grullon and Kanatas, 2001; Harvey et.al., 2004). 
Thus, the following hypotheses are developed: 
H3a:  There is a negative relationship between the number of domestic banks that the 
firm engages with and a firm value in Malaysian firms. 
H3b:  The negative relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with and firm value in Malaysian firms will be stronger in family firms 
compared to non-family firms. 
 
                                                          
18  Total firm risk constitutes the firm-specific risk (idiosyncratic risk) and the market risk (Beja, 1972; Modigliani and Pogue, 
1974; Radcliffe, 1997; Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2002; Howard, 2006; Crundwell, 2008). 
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4.4.4 The Moderating Effects of Controlling Shareholders’ Ownership  
The moderating role of ownership concentration on expropriation is a significant issue 
to be investigated particularly in emerging markets, due to the prevalence of high 
ownership concentration (Claessens et.al., 2000a; Morck and Yeung, 2003).  Analysis 
of this role requires a prior understanding of the theory of ownership structure.  Morck 
et.al. (1988) argue that controlling shareholders respond to two opposing forces when 
their ownership increases.  They argue that the relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm value depends on which force dominates over any particular 
range of equity ownership by the controlling shareholder (McConnell and Servaes, 
1990; Morck et.al., 1988).  The opposing forces work in the following way.  
As controlling shareholders‘ ownership increases, they are naturally inclined to allocate 
their firms‘ resources to their own best interests, which may conflict with the interests 
of minority shareholders, hence, the entrenchment effect (McConnell and Servaes, 
1990; Morck et.al., 1988).  Simultaneously, as controlling shareholders‘ ownerships 
increase, their interests are also likely to be more aligned with the interests of minority 
shareholders because the former bear higher cost of the non-pecuniary benefits that they 
could enjoy from the firm, hence, the incentive alignment effect (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  The first of these forces has a negative effect on firm value, and hence, a 
negative moderating effect of ownership concentration on expropriation whereas, the 
second has a positive effect, and hence a positive moderating effect of ownership 
concentration on firm value effects (McConnell and Servaes, 1990; Morck et.al., 1988).  
Morck et.al. (1988) argue that it is not possible to predict which force will dominate at 
any level of ownership concentration beforehand.  Therefore, the relationship between 
firm value and ownership concentration as well as the moderating effects of ownership 
concentration on expropriation remains an empirical issue. 
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Until today, this empirical issue has been mostly analysed in developed markets.  In 
these markets, Amzaleg and Barak (2013), Anderson and Reeb (2003), Arosa, Iturralde 
and Maseda (2010), Bhabra, G.S. (2007), Davies, Hillier and McColgan (2005), Emma 
and Pedro (2011), McConnell, Servaes and Lins (2008), McConnell and Servaes (1990, 
1995), Miguel, Pindado and Torre (2004), Morck et.al. (1988), Setia-Atmaja et.al. 
(2009), Short and Keasey (1999), Stulz (1988) and Thomson and Pedersen (2000) found 
that this relationship is concave.  
Initially, there is a positive effect of ownership concentration on firm value and hence, a 
positive moderating effect of ownership on expropriation.  This occurs because as 
ownership concentration initially increases, the firm‘s owner possesses fewer incentives 
to expropriate from the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Maury, 2006).  In this 
process, the interests of the owner are aligned with those of minority shareholders.  As 
ownership concentration increases after a certain point, the entrenchment effect 
dominates the owner and he will extract resources from the firm, thus, reducing firm 
value and hence, a negative moderating effect of ownership on expropriation.  The 
reason this occurs is when ownership exceeds a particular threshold, increased 
ownership reduces the efficacy of corporate governance mechanisms which limit the 
owner‘s expropriation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  The resulting concave relationship 
shows that there is an optimal ownership structure for the firm (Demsetz, 1983; 
McConnell, McKeon and Xu, 2010).  This optimal ownership structure is the peak of 
the concave curve where firm value is maximised (Demsetz, 1983; McConnell et.al., 
2010). 
However, the concavity findings as explained is not the only finding available in the 
literature. Aside from the curvilinear (concave) relationships, some scholars such as La 
Porta et.al. (2000b) have found a positive relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm value (hence, a positive moderating effect of ownership concentration on firm 
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value effects). On the other hand, Loderer and Martin (1997) have found a negative 
relationship (hence, a negative moderating effect of ownership concentration on firm 
value effects). Moreover, in Asia, Heugens et.al. (2009) specifically argue that there is 
no clear cut solution with regards to the costs and benefits of concentrated ownership. 
Theoretically compelling arguments can be furnished in favour of each finding 
(Heugens et.al., 2009).  
In the context of the developing countries particularly in Asia, it is argued that there is a 
positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm value (Heugens et.al., 
2009)(hence, a positive moderating effect of ownership concentration on firm value 
effects). In institutional setting where markets are underdeveloped such as those in Asia, 
investors have no choice but to accept their role as firm monitors, which they can only 
exercise effectively by concentrating their equity holdings. Concentrated ownership 
provides them both more powerful incentives to become involved in governance, as 
well as a means to influence managers by means of direct access strategies and the 
threat of using their concentrated voting rights (David, Hitt and Liang, 2007). 
Consequently, controlling shareholders can stimulate or even coerce the corporate 
leadership to work in their interest (Heugens et.al., 2009). Hence, increased ownership 
concentration may possibly allow controlling shareholders to increase their corporate 
control and this reduces Agency Problem Type I i.e. the conflict between controlling 
shareholders and managers and hence, induce a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm value (hence, a positive moderating effect of ownership 
concentration on firm value effects). 
In addition, in the context of the Malaysian institutional setting and corporate 
governance environment, I would further argue that after the Transmile case, 
reputational concerns possibly play a role in influencing a positive moderating effect of 
family controlling shareholders‘ ownership on expropriation.  These reputational effects 
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are particularly prevalent in family owners in large family firms who usually hold high 
equity stakes.  These family owners would like to improve their reputation after the 
Transmile case because Transmile is owned by the Kuok Group of Companies which is 
an established family business conglomerate in Malaysia.  Large family owners would 
like to see that their reputation improved because poor corporate reputation can affect 
them and their family members (Gomez, 1999; Loy, 2010).  It is argued that the 
reputational effects work the following way.  As the shareholding of family owners 
increases, they possess higher ownership stakes of their firms.  Consequently, they have 
higher incentives to take care of their reputation by reducing minority shareholder 
expropriation.  Thus, increased ownership helps align the incentives of family owners to 
those of minority shareholders due to the reputational effects (Loy, 2010).  In other 
words, reputational effects help align the incentives of family owners to those of 
minority shareholders and this help reduce Agency Problem Type II i.e. the conflict 
between the controlling shareholder and the minority shareholders. Ultimately this 
induce a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on firm 
value effects i.e. a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on 
the impact of controlling shareholders‘ expropriation on firm value. 
Considering both these arguments, it is hypothesised that controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership is likely to positively moderate the firm value effects of the key variables 
analysed in this research. 
 
 
 
 
160 
 
Hence, the following hypotheses are developed: 
H4a:  There is a positive moderating effect of the controlling shareholder’s ownership 
on the relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) that are likely to 
result in expropriation and firm value in Malaysian firms. 
H4b:  The positive moderating effect of the controlling shareholder’s ownership on the 
relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) and firm value in 
Malaysian firms will be stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. 
H5a:  There is a positive moderating effect of the controlling shareholder’s ownership 
on the relationship between independent directors’ tenure and firm value in 
Malaysian firms. 
H5b:  The positive moderating effect of the controlling shareholder’s ownership on the 
relationship between independent directors’ tenure and firm value in Malaysian 
firms will be stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. 
H6a:  There is a positive moderating effect of the controlling shareholder’s ownership 
on the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages 
with and firm value in Malaysian firms. 
H6b:  The positive moderating effect of the controlling shareholder’s ownership on the 
relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with 
and firm value in Malaysian firms will be stronger in family firms compared to 
non-family firms. 
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
This chapter  discussed the research paradigm, hypotheses development and theoretical 
framework. The next chapter will discuss the research models, variables measurements, 
sampling design and data analysis methods used. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the various issues related to research design and methodology. 
Section 5.1 discusses the research model. Section 5.2 discusses the variable 
measurements. Section 5.3 discusses the sampling design and finally, Section 5.4 
discusses the data analysis techniques used in this research. Section 5.5 discusses the 
assumptions of statistical analysis. Section 5.6 discusses the model selection criteria. 
Section 5.7 discusses the relevant statistical issues such as endogeneity, correlation, 
multicollinearity and normality. Section 5.8 discusses the robusting testing method. 
Section 5.9 concludes. 
5.1 RESEARCH MODEL 
This research uses panel data analysis that are the pooled ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression model and the Fixed Effect Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) Model to 
empirically test the hypotheses proposed in this research. The pooled ordinary least 
square (OLS) and the Fixed Effect Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) method used 
also control for heteroscedasticity problems in the data.  The model for this study is 
similar to the model used by Anderson and Reeb (2003), Claessens et.al. (2002) and Xu 
and Wang (1999), which do not allow for non-linearity in order to maintain model 
parsimony as well as to prevent significant multicollinearity problems from arising 
(Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  The models for this research are as follows: 
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Family Firm Model 
1. Qit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + β9(NAB)it + 
β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + 
β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
2. MBVRit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
3. ROEit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
4. ROAit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
Non-Family Firm Model 
5. Qit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + β9(NAB)it + 
β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + 
β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
6. MBVRit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
7. ROEit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
8. ROAit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
Pooled Model (Family And Non-Family Firms) 
9. Qit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + β9(NAB)it + 
β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + 
β18(OC)it(Banks)it + β19FTit + µit 
10. MBVRit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + β19FTit + µit 
11. ROEit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + β19FTit + µit 
12. ROAit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + β19FTit + µit 
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Qit: Performance measured by Tobin‘s Q at time t. 
MBVRit : Performance measured by Market-to-Book Value Ratio at time t. 
ROEit : Performance measured by Return On Equity at time t. 
ROAit : Performance measured by Return On Asset at time t. 
RPTit: Amount of Related Party Transactions That Are Likely to Result in 
Expropriation at year t divided by Total Related Party Transactions Value at year t. 
Tenureit: Average tenure of independent directors in the firm at year t 
Banksit: Quantity of domestic banks engaged by the firm at year t 
OCit: Controlling shareholders‘ ownership concentration in the firm at year t (%) 
(OC)it(RPT)it: Controlling shareholders‘ ownership concentration in the firm at year t 
multiplied by the amount of related party transactions that are likely to result in 
expropriation ratio at year t. 
(OC)it(Tenure)it: Controlling shareholders‘ ownership concentration in the firm at year t 
multiplied by average tenure of independent directors in the firm at year t. 
(OC)it(Banks)it: Controlling shareholders‘ ownership concentration in the firm at year t 
multiplied by quantity of domestic banks engaged by the firm at year t 
Control Variables 
SIZEit: Firm Size (Ln(Total Assets)) at year t 
RISKit: ln(Firm Risk (Standard Deviation of monthly stock returns between 2007-
2009)) at year t 
LEVit: ln(Leverage (Long-term Debt/Total Assets)) at year t 
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IDRit: Independent Directors Ratio (No. of independent directors/Board Size) at year t 
NABit: Non-affiliated Blockholder Shareholding at year t 
AGEit: ln(Age) at year t 
SGit: Sales Growth at year t  
RDSit : Research and Development Expenditure-to-Sales at year t 
CSit: Capital Expenditure-to-Sales at year t 
MSit: Marketing and Advertising Expenditure-to-Sales at year t 
GDPit
19
: Gross Domestic Product at year t 
FTit : Firm type dummy variable at year t, 1 for family firms, 0 for non-family firms. 
µit: Stochastic error term at year t 
5.2 MEASUREMENTS OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE AND INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES  
The following are the definitions and measurement of the variables used in this study: 
5.2.1  Dependent Variable: Firm value  
This study investigates the relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) which 
are likely to result in expropriation, independent director‘s tenure and the number of 
domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value.  This research also 
investigates the moderating effects of controlling shareholders‘ ownership concentration 
on these relationships. 
                                                          
19  GDP could only be included in the Pooled OLS Model and not the Fixed Effects Model due to near singular matrix problems as 
well. 
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For these reasons, this study utilises financial accounting information, which can be 
divided into accounting measures and market-based measures to acquire the empirical 
findings on firm values. 
5.2.2 Accounting-Based Firm Value Measurement  
Financial accounting can be expressed as an area of accounting related with reporting 
financial information to interested external parties such as investors, lenders, 
management, suppliers, customers and also other users of financial information.  
Financial accounting information is the company‘s accounting and external reporting 
systems that present the quantitative data relating to the financial position and company 
firm value for a specified period.  According to Sloan (2001), the company‘s 
management must provide financial statements for external audit to verify that all 
financial statements are prepared in accordance with the commonly applicable statutory 
and professional principles. Furthermore, Sloan (2001) argued that for corporate 
governance, accounting data provides a significant information source, which can 
reduce the firm‘s agency problems.  
The accounting data used to measure firm value can be categorized into operational 
analysis, resource management and profitability from the management‘s viewpoint.  
However, not all these firm value measures will be implemented in this research.  The 
selection of firm value measures are based on the ease of natural calculation and their 
acceptability to academicians and practitioners (Ibrahim, 2009). 
Hence, this study will use two measurement tools on accounting data to measure firm 
value of the firm.  The first, is profitability measured by return on assets (ROA), which 
concerns the management of the organisation who are responsible to monitor the short 
and long-term firm value.  The other tool is return on equity (ROE) which relates to the 
investors‘ perspective who expect something in return for their investment.  Both tools 
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have been selected because these measures use profit as the main focus and this is very 
important to management and owners of organisations (Ibrahim, 2009).  ROA is 
measured by Net Income / Total Assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Holderness and 
Sheehan, 1988). ROE is measured by Net Income / Total Common Equity (Holderness 
and Sheehan, 1988; Rechner and Dalton, 1991).  
5.2.3  Market-Based Firm Value Measurement  
Most past studies formerly adopted the accounting measures as an indicator of firm 
value and placed less attention on the market measures.  According to Oswald and 
Jahera (1991) and Chakravarthy (1986), academicians and researchers have made an 
argument that accounting measures are insufficient as an indicator to evaluate the 
efficiency of firm value.  Hence, this study will utilise market-based firm value 
measures to gauge firm value. 
A market-based performance measure is used as the firm value indicator because unlike 
accounting-based measures, market-based measures are not influenced by firm-specific 
reporting, idiosyncrasies and potential managerial manipulation.  The stock of well-
managed firms has been favoured by most investors and is believed to be superior to 
stock price performance, which increases market value, and hence, experiences superior 
growth and profitability (Antunovich, Laster and Mitnick, 2000).  In this research, 
Tobin‘s Q is chosen as a market-based measure for firm value because it has been used 
extensively among academicians, researchers and practitioners and it is claimed to be 
one of the established market measurement tools.  Tobin‘s Q is one of the market 
measures pioneered by James Tobin who wanted to examine the causal relationship 
between q value and investment.  He introduced the variable of q as scaled by the ratio 
of market value to replacement cost (Brainard and Tobin, 1968; Tobin, 1969, 1978).  He 
claims that firms possess an incentive to invest if the margin q value exceeds unity, 
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since the new capital investment value will exceed its cost (Lindenberg and Ross, 
1981).  
In this study, the q value will be used, which is an approximation of Tobin‘s Q that has 
been adopted by Chung and Pruitt (1994), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Mishra, Randoy 
and Jenssen (2001), Perfect and Wiles (1994) and Villalonga and Amit (2006).  Other 
empirical studies, similar to this research, for example, Anderson and Reeb (2003), 
Faccio et.al. (2000c), McConaughy et.al. (1998), McConnell and Servaes (1990), Morck 
et.al. (1988), Setia-Atmaja et.al. (2009), Yermack (1996) and others also use the q value 
to measure the market value of the firm.   Moreover, Khanna and Palepu (2000) and 
Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) also adopt this similar q value measure in their studies to 
examine the relationship between shareholder concentration and firm value in India and 
corporate ownership structure in Sweden.  The q value is measured by the ratio of (Total 
Market Value of Equity + Total Book Value of Liabilities)/ (Total Book Value of 
Equity + Total Book Value of Liabilities).  The higher the q value the better the 
market‘s perception of company performance and the more effective the corporate 
governance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). 
As an alternative measure to the q value, the market to book value ratio (MBVR) is also 
used.  MBVR is calculated as the ratio of the product of the number of equity shares and 
the closing price of the stock on the last day of the financial year to total equity (Reddy, 
Locke and Scrimgeour, 2010; Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000).  MBVR is empirically a cleaner 
measure than the q value and has been utilised as an alternative to Tobin‘s Q for 
emerging market studies (e.g. by Xu and Wang (1997) on China), as well in other 
studies (Capon et.al., 1996).  This measure is also more aligned to shareholders‘ 
objectives (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000).  However, it excludes debt.  Hence, both the q 
value and MBVR are utilised in this research to check for the robustness of the results 
to alternative measures of market-based performance. 
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5.2.4  Independent Variables 
5.2.4.1  Related Party Transactions (RPTs)  
The number  of RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation will be measured as per 
disclosed in the section of RPTs in the annual report and as according to the definition 
of Cheung et.al. (2006). For this research, RPTs which are likely to result in 
expropriation is proxied by the following : (1) the acquisition or sale of tangible or 
intangible assets by the listed company from or to a connected person or from or to a 
private company majority-controlled by this person (2) the sale of equity stake in the 
listed company to a connected person or a private company majority-controlled by this 
person.  
The sum of values of (1) and (2) are divided by the total RPTs value to obtain the ratio.  
This ratio is used to reduce the number of outliers in the distribution.  In an environment 
of highly concentrated ownership structure and high incentives to expropriate such as 
this country, it is expected that related party transactions that are likely to result in 
expropriation provide opportunities for expropriation and the higher the amount of these 
transactions, the lower the firm value. 
5.2.4.2  Independent Directors’ Tenure  
The tenure of independent directors is measured by adding up the tenure of each 
independent director of the firm (each tenure is measured from the year he or she was 
appointed as an independent director until the year of the annual report being analysed) 
and divided  by the number of independent directors in order to obtain the average 
value.  This measurement indirectly indicates the likelihood of independent directors 
being influenced by controlling shareholders and therefore, no longer ‗truly‘ 
independent.  This measurement is used in board independence studies (Abdelsalam and 
El-Masry 2008; Vafeas  2003).  Since, directors‘ independence are very likely to be 
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compromised as their tenure increases (Anderson et.al., 2004; Lin et.al., 2011b; 
Securities Commission, 2011a; Yunos et.al., 2011), it is expected that there is a negative 
relationship between independent directors‘ tenure and firm value. 
5.2.4.3 Domestic Banks  
This value will be calculated based upon data as disclosed in the organisational profile 
of the annual report.  Domestic banks are defined as banks and other bank-like 
institutions (i.e. institutions which take deposits and make loans) in which the majority 
shareholding is held by the private sector (incorporated in Malaysia), public sector or 
residents of Malaysia.  It excludes banks, which are majority owned by foreigners (non-
Malaysians).  This definition is similar to the one used by Brownbridge (1998) except 
for the inclusion of public sector majority shareholding as part of the definition of 
domestic banks, as certain banks in this country are majority owned by the government 
such as Maybank and CIMB Bank.  As argued in the hypothesis development section, 
the higher number of domestic banks that the firm engages provide more opportunities 
for firms to engage in loan expropriation, it is expected that the higher number of 
domestic banks that the firm engages reduces firm value. 
5.2.4.4 Ownership Concentration 
This is extracted from the data of the substantial shareholding in the annual report.  It is 
measured in terms of percentage of total equity held by each controlling shareholder 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Gul, Kim and Qiu, 2010; Maury, 2006; Wruck, 1989).  A 
controlling shareholder of a firm is defined as an individual or entity who can obtain 
enough shares to assure at least 20% of the firm‘s voting rights and the highest 
percentage of voting rights inside the firm in comparison with other shareholders 
(Chakrabarty, 2009; La Porta et.al., 1999; De Vries and Manfred, 1993).  This translates 
to at least 20% of cash-flow rights and the highest percentage of cash-flow rights inside 
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the firm, as Malaysian public-listed firms adopt the 1-share-1-vote principle 
(Thillainathan, 1999).  20% of voting rights is considered sufficient for effective control 
of the firm (Faccio et.al., 2001a; La Porta et.al., 1999).   
In the context of Malaysian annual reports, the substantial shareholding (i.e. the highest 
shareholding in the firm held by a shareholder) is calculated by summating the direct 
and indirect shareholding of that shareholder. These direct and indirect shareholding do 
cover (if any) shareholding via nominees or nominee companies as well as holding 
companies. There are notes in the annual reports stating who this substantial shareholder 
is through the direct shareholding as well as how this substantial shareholder is related 
to his or her indirect shareholding (if any). 
5.2.5 Control Variables  
5.2.5.1 Firm Size 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argued that firm size is one of the general forces that could 
affect firm value.  The firm‘s resources are related to the size of the firm.  The larger the 
size of the company, the larger the company‘s resources of capital, and the bigger is the 
market value of the fraction of the ownership of the shareholder.  Hence, firm size can 
increase firm value.  However, the ability of the minority shareholder to intervene in the 
operations of the company is reduced when a firm‘s size increases.  As a result, firm 
size can reduce a firm value.  Therefore, firm size is an important control variable to be 
included in this research and the expected sign in its relationship with firm value can be 
either positive or negative.  ‗Firm size‘ in this research is measured by taking the natural 
logarithm of the total asset value of the firm as a proxy (Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  
The natural logarithm helps to reduce the number of outliers in the distribution.  
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5.2.5.2 Firm Risk  
In finance, risk is defined as the probability that the actual return will be different from 
the expected return (Van Horne, 1980).  The risk that a firm encounters (i.e. the firm‘s 
total risk) is comprised of 2 components i.e. systematic risk and unsystematic risk (Beja, 
1972; Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2002; Crundwell, 2008; Howard, 2006; Modigliani and 
Pogue, 1974; Radcliffe, 1997).  Systematic risk is the market risk encountered by the 
firm e.g. economic risks, political risks, natural disaster risks, etc., whereas 
unsystematic risk is the idiosyncratic or firm-specific risk that is encountered by the 
firm i.e. risk that is due to the firm‘s business, financial and organisational strategies 
and policies; management style, business model, etc.  
The former cannot be diversified away because this is the risk encountered by all firms 
in the market whereas the latter can be diversified away by holding a diversified 
portfolio of securities or assets in accordance with Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) 
introduced by Harry Markowitz in 1952 and 1959 (Beja, 1972; Brigham and Ehrhardt, 
2002; Crundwell, 2008; Howard, 2006; Modigliani and Pogue, 1974; Radcliffe, 1997).  
Modern portfolio theory (MPT) states that the investment risk for a particular expected 
return of investment can be minimized by carefully selecting the proportions of 
various assets or securities to be invested (Markowitz, 1952, 1959; Radcliffe, 1997; 
Tom and Buchanan, 2007).  
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) shows that the expected returns of a 
particular stock is directly proportionate to the stock‘s systematic risk, β and the market 
risk premium (Mossin, 1966; Sharpe, 1964; Treynor, 1961, 1962, 1999).  Empirical 
evidence by Chen (2003), Lau, Lee and McInish (2002) and Shum and Tang (2005) 
support the CAPM by showing that there is a significant positive relationship between 
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systematic risk, β of a stock20 and its returns.  Moreover, Goyal and Santa-Clara (2003), 
Huang, Liu, Ghon and Zhang (2010), Malkiel and Xu (2001) and Pukthuanthong-Le 
and Visaltanachoti (2009) empirically found that idiosyncratic risk is also positively 
related to the firm‘s expected returns.  Therefore, it is expected that the total risk of the 
firm is positively related with its firm value and ‗firm risk‘ is an important control 
variable in gauging firm value effects. 
In this study, firm risk (i.e. total risk) is measured by the standard deviation (σ) of daily 
stock returns, which is similar to the measurement used by Anderson and Reeb (2003) 
and Crundwell (2008) which used the standard deviation (σ) of monthly stock returns.  
The only difference is that the standard deviation of daily stock returns is a more 
accurate measurement of stock price volatility as compared to the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns because the sample size of the former is larger (Shintani, 2006).  
In this study, the standard deviations (σ) of daily stock returns between 2007 and 2009 
are measured.  The natural logarithm is taken to reduce the number of outliers in the 
distribution as taking the logarithm will reduce the dispersion between the values of the 
data analysed (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
5.2.5.3 Leverage 
Past study by Singh and Davidson III (2003) has shown that leverage affects firm value. 
Furthermore, Helfert (2003) states that the use of debt to asset ratio is important to 
lenders and creditors who are concerned about the degree of financial leverage 
employed, and the availability of specific residual asset values, which determine the 
margin of protection against risk.  Therefore, a high debt to asset ratio indicates a 
greater risk for the lender.  Higher debt means higher interest expense; therefore, net 
income will be lower and hence, affecting accounting-based firm value likes ROA and 
                                                          
20 Systematic risk, β, of a stock is defined under the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as the amount of market risk that the 
stock contributes to a well-diversified market portfolio of stocks (Brigham and Ehrhardt, 2002; Sharpe, 1964). 
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ROE.  Higher debt also means higher risk of insolvency; hence, investors will discount 
the share price of the firm by selling off its shares (assuming they are risk-averse).  This 
affect market-based firm value such as stock returns.  These discounts due to investor 
sell-off (because of higher risk of insolvency); will reduce market-based firm value such 
as Tobin‘s Q.  In addition, debt-to-asset ratio or ‗firm leverage‘ may be related to 
agency costs in large firms, thereby, reducing firm value.  
On the other hand, leverage can also be a tool to control the firm‘s financial resources 
from being used for unprofitable investment in accordance with Free Cash-flow 
Hypothesis (Jensen, 1986).  Thus, leverage may also help increase firm value.  Leverage 
is measured as the ratio of Long-term Debt / Total Assets (Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  
Based upon the explanations, the expected sign for the relationship between leverage 
and firm value is either positive or negative. 
5.2.5.4 Independent Directors   
This variable helps control the overall effects of the independent directors.  The higher, 
the number of independent directors; the better the monitoring of the firm; hence, firm 
value is expected to increase with the number of independent directors.  However, an 
increase in independent directors may increase the board size and this may be less 
effective as compared to small boards (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003).  Moreover, if 
there are too many independent directors on the board, some independent directors may 
become free riders (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). Therefore, an increase in the 
number of independent directors in the firm could reduce firm value. Independent 
directors are measured by the fraction of the independent directors serving on the board 
divided by board size (Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  Based upon the explanations, the 
expected sign for the relationship between independent directors (i.e. the proportion of 
independent directors) on the board and firm value is either positive or negative. 
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5.2.5.5 Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
Other substantial shareholders such as mutual funds or pension funds etc; may also play 
an important role in monitoring and disciplining controlling shareholders and managers.  
As such, the controlling shareholder‘s influence in the firm may be substantially lower 
in the presence of outside blockholders (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). Hence, it is 
expected that the presence of non-affiliated blockholders have a positive effect towards 
firm value.  The larger their block, the higher the firm value.  Bursa Malaysia listing 
requirements defines a blockholder as a shareholder with at least 5 percent equity stake 
in the firm (Bursa Malaysia, 2012c).  Unaffiliated blockholders are defined as an entity 
with no relationship with the controlling shareholder or the firm other than their equity 
stake (Anderson and Reeb, 2003). The shareholding of these non-affiliated blockholders 
is measured in percentage and it is obtained from the analysis of shareholding section 
(substantial shareholder subsection) in annual reports.  It includes direct and indirect 
shareholding. 
5.2.5.6 Firm Age 
Firm age can influence firm value due to the market knowledge, learning curve, firm 
experience, reputation and survival bias (Ibrahim, 2009).  Hence, it is expected that 
older firms are likely to be more efficient as compared to younger and newer firms.  
Thus, it is expected that there is a positive relationship between firm age and firm 
performance (Ang, Cole and Lin, 2000; Yammeesri and Lodh, 2004).  Firm age is 
measured as the natural logarithm of the number of years since the firm‘s inception 
(Anderson and Reeb, 2003).  The natural logarithm is taken to reduce the number of 
outliers in the distribution as taking the logarithm will reduce the dispersion between the 
values of the data analysed (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
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5.2.5.7 Sales Growth 
Sales growth can influence firm value because faster growing companies are likely to 
possess higher valuation (Maury and Pajuste, 2005).  Sales growth is measured by the 
percentage change in sales year-on-year. It is expected that there is a positive 
relationship between sales growth and firm value (Maury and Pajuste, 2005). 
5.2.5.8 Research and Development (R&D) Expenditure  
Research and development (R&D) expenditure can possibly influence firm value 
because it provides economic benefits to the firm (Chauvin and Hirschey, 1993).  
Empirically, Ben-Zion (1978), Chan, Martin and Kensinger (1990) and Chung, Wright 
and Kedia (2003) find that there is a positive relationship between R&D investment and 
firm value.  Hence, it is expected that R&D expenditure has a positive relationship with 
firm value.  In this research, R&D expenditure is measured as the ratio of R&D expense 
to sales revenue (Chung et.al., 2003). 
5.2.5.9 Capital Expenditure  
The ‗theory of the firm‘ views investment decisions as one of the fundamental and 
central activities of the modern firm. The normative aspect of the theory claims that a 
firm‘s resources should be allocated to value-creating positive net present value (NPV) 
projects (Bhana, 2008).  Nevertheless, the extant literature provides empirical evidence 
that firm value is positively influenced by the firm‘s capital expenditure (Bhana, 2008; 
McConnell and Muscarella, 1985; Woolridge, 1988).  Hence, in this research, it is 
expected that capital expenditure is positively related to firm value.  Capital expenditure 
is measured by the ratio of capital investment to sales revenue (Daley, Mehrotra and 
Sivakumar, 1997). 
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5.2.5.10 Marketing and Advertising Expenditure  
Srinivasan and Hanssens (2009) argue that investment (expenditure) in marketing and 
advertising activities create (intangible) market-based assets, which in turn enhance firm 
value.  These market-based assets include customer satisfaction, brand equity, customer 
equity, channel structure and perceived product quality (Ramaswami, Srivastava and 
Bhargava, 2009; Srinivasan and Hanssens, 2009).  Empirical evidence found that 
marketing and advertising expenditures do enhance firm value (Hirschey and 
Weygandt, 1985; O‘Brien, 2003).  However, other studies found no significant 
relationship with firm value (Connolly, Hirsch and Hirschey, 1986) and negative 
relationship with firm value (Jose, Nichols and Stevens, 1986; Han and Manry, 2004).  
Hence, it is expected that there is a positive, negative or no significant relationship 
between marketing and advertising expenditure and firm value.  In this research, 
marketing and advertising expenditure is measured by the ratio of marketing and 
advertising expense to sales revenue (Anderson, Fornell and Mazvancheryl, 2004; 
Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988). 
5.2.5.11 Gross Domestic Product 
De Miguel, Pindado and De La Torre (2004) and Lee and Grewal (2004) argue that 
macroeconomic variables such as economic volatility do influence a firm‘s 
performance.  Economic volatility is measured by change in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (Lee and Grewal, 2004).  This is measured by annual growth of GDP in 
percentage (BNM, 2012).  The annual GDP growth rates are obtained from the Central 
Bank (Bank Negara)‘s website (BNM, 2012). If the economy is good (i.e. positive 
GDP), firm value will increase. Vice versa, if the economy is not good (i.e. negative 
GDP), firm value will decrease. Hence, it is expected that there is a significant negative 
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or positive relationship between GDP and firm value depending on the overall strength 
of the economy over a certain period of time. 
5.3 SAMPLE SELECTION 
This research analyses secondary data concerning the types of ultimate owner, financial 
information and board statistics for the period 2007 to 2009.  The period 2007 to 2009 is 
chosen because this research analyses the interplay between agency theory, corporate 
reputational effects and the global financial crisis in a single study.  All the data are 
obtained from companies‘ annual reports as well as from Bloomberg‘s database.  
Data of firm value and the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with are 
extracted from the balance sheet.  The amount of RPTs which are likely to result in 
expropriation is extracted from the RPTs disclosure section of the annual report.  The 
data to calculate average independent directors‘ tenure is obtained from the directors‘ 
profile section.  Data for the controlling shareholder‘s ownership concentration in terms 
of shareholding percentage is extracted from the section of substantial shareholding of 
the firm in the annual report. 
A total of 530 firms which comprise of 379 family firms and 151 non-family firms  
listed on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia are selected as a sample as at 18
th
 January, 
2011.  Since this research involves family firms, it is important to have a proper 
definition of family firms.  
To recap, the definition of family firms in this study utilises the definition of Barnes and 
Hershon (1976) whereby a firm is classified as a family firm if an individual or 
members of a single family is the controlling shareholder; with at least 20% 
shareholding and family involvement in the management of the firm (Cascino et.al., 
2010).  Hence, the definition of family firms used in this study is based upon a threshold 
of 20% family shareholding as well as family involvement in the management of the 
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firm. This study did not select firms listed on the ACE markets due to differences in the 
type of listed firms and listing requirements
21
.  As a panel data study, it is significant to 
ensure that all firms were active for the entire period of study.  Therefore, exclusion 
criterion were used on the population of listed firms (Cooper and Schindler, 2001). 
To be selected in the sample, the company must be active or have survived the entire 
period of analysis i.e. from 2007 to 2009.  Companies that are newly listed after 31
st
 
December, 2007 or delisted from the Main Market are excluded from the sample.  
However, the study includes firms, which changed their companies‘ names during the 
study period.  In addition, the firm must have completed a full accounting period or 12 
months business operations for each year and should be consistent with the same year-
end throughout the 3-year period. Additionally, the study excludes financial related 
firms in the stock exchange (48 of them are family firms) since the accounting standards 
for income and profits for these firms are very different from other industries (Campbell 
and Keys, 2002; Claessens et.al., 1999a,b; Lemmons and Lins, 2003).  
Table 5.1 shows how the final sample of family firms and non-family firms from 2007 
to 2009 are derived.  The non-family firms comprise of state-owned firms, foreign 
firms, corporate-owned firms and mixed ultimate ownership firms. State-owned firms 
are firms are firms where the largest shareholder is the government or a government-
owned corporation (USGA, 2011). Foreign-owned firms are firms where the largest 
shareholder is a foreign individual or a corporation incorporated overseas (Davies and 
Lyons, 1991). Corporate-owned firms are firms where the largest shareholder is a local 
private corporation or a local institutional investor. Firms with mixed ultimate 
ownership are firms with different type of ultimate owners for different years.
                                                          
21 ACE market mainly comprise of technology firms similar to the NASDAQ in the United States (Bursa Malaysia, 2012a). 
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Table 5.1: Family Firms and Non-Family Firms Sample 
Data Description Number of Companies 
 Family Non-Family Firms 
State-Owned Firms Foreign Corporate
-Owned 
Mixed Ultimate 
Ownership 
Total Main Market firms listed on Bursa Malaysia and 
could be utilised in the research, as at 31
st
 December, 2007  
498 66 75 44 29 
Minus : Financial related firms 48 9 2 13 0 
Minus : Firms with missing data 3 1 3 1 1 
Minus : Firms with less than 20% ownership 38 9 11 11 11 
Minus : Family firms with at least 20% family ownership 
but no family members involved in management 
30 - - - - 
Number of Firms available for observation 379 56 59 19 17 
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The full list of family firms and non-family firms used in this study are listed in 
Appendix A of this research. 
5.4 DATA ANALYSIS METHODS 
This research provides univariate statistics (descriptive statistics) and utilises panel data 
pooled in ordinary least square (OLS) regression model for data analysis.  In addition to 
that, the research uses the panel data from  the Fixed Effect Least Square Dummy 
Variable (LSDV) Model for the purposes of robustness testing
22
.  The panel data also 
use control methods for heteroscedasticity problems in the data. The control function is 
the Period SUR function in the E-Views Version 6 software which is used in the data 
analysis. Data examination will also be conducted upon the raw data for the purposes of 
producing descriptive statistics.  
5.5 ASSUMPTIONS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
This study examines the relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in 
expropriation, independent directors‘ tenure and the number of domestic banks that the 
firm engages with, and firm value.  It also examines the moderating effects of 
controlling shareholders‘ ownership on these relationships. In order to visualise this 
scenario, data was collected from 530 firms comprising 379 family firms and 151 non-
family firms for the period 2007 to 2009 (a three year period).  According to Diggle 
et.al. (1994), there are important components in analysis, which are exploratory and 
confirmatory or empirical analysis.  The exploratory analysis involves the techniques 
used to explore and see patterns in the data.  On the other hand, the confirmatory or 
empirical analysis relates to obtaining the evidence to be tested against the hypotheses. 
 
                                                          
22  Justification based upon the statistical results of the Hausman Test (Gujarati and Porter, 2009; Hausman, 1978). 
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After cleaning and screening the data, the study calculated the data based on panel data 
averages for each firm and then averaging across all firms.  The univariate analysis and 
panel regression analysis are utilised to analyse the data and obtain the results.  Prior to 
statistical testing, it is important to assess the underlying assumptions of the univariate 
analysis and select the model for panel regression analysis.  The following sections 
explain the major assumptions which have to be met before performing the regression 
analysis. 
5.5.1 Independence of Observations and Variables 
It is important to ensure that the data is independent of one another, which means that 
observations or independent variables must not be influenced by other independent 
variables (Pallant, 2005).  Stevens (1996) argues that it is very serious if this assumption 
is violated.  He further argues that each study must ensure that all observations are 
independent i.e. free from severe correlation and multicollinearity problems.  In this 
study, correlation analyses and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values are used to gauge 
the independence of variables analysed. These issues are further discussed in Sections 
5.7.2 and 5.7.3.  
5.5.2 Normal Distribution, Homoscedasticity and No Serial Correlation 
In regression analysis, normality of the distribution of the variables analysed is 
important (Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  Skewness and kurtosis are two components in 
determining normality (Pallant, 2005).  The issue of normality is further discussed in 
Section 5.7.4.  
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The heteroscedasticity problem refers to the situation where the conditional variance is 
not constant between variable x and y.  Indeed, the classical linear regression model 
assumes that the variance of each disturbance is constant or has the same variance (i.e. 
homoscedastic).  In the analysis, the study uses the pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
and fixed effect regression model with cross section and time series weighting for 
individual and period effect in order to correct the problem of cross-section and time 
series heteroscedasticity. The E-Views panel data analysis tool includes this 
heteroscedasticity solution which is the Period SUR function in the E-Views Version 6 
software that is used in the data analysis.  The problem of serial correlation refers to the 
possible time series interdependencies in the error terms of the dependent and 
independent variables respectively.  The classical linear regression model assumes that 
there is no serial correlation or auto-correlation between the error terms. The E-Views 
panel data analysis tool includes solutions to resolve this serial correlation problem.  
The Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic is used to analyse the problem of serial correlation.  
If the E-Views panel data regression results produces a DW statistic value of two, this 
means that there is perfectly no serial correlation problems in the data (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009).  However, if the DW statistic value is not far from two, this indicates that 
there are no significant serial correlation problems.  Basically, the E-Views panel data 
analysis tool used in this study include functions which significantly resolve the 
heteroscedasticity and serial correlation problems. The problem of heteroscedasticity 
and serial correlation is already controlled by the Period SUR function in E-Views 
Version 6 software which is used in the data analysis. 
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5.6 SELECTIONS IN THE POOLED DATA ANALYSIS 
The aim of this study is to observe the pattern of outcomes across the study period by 
using the pooled data set. The next section explains the selections which are needed in 
this pooled data analysis. 
5.6.1 Model Selection Criteria 
The researcher has to choose which regression model is the best without violating the 
assumptions of model selection criteria.  This selection applies to the choice between 
the Fixed Effects Model and the Random Effects Model as an alternative test to the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model.  A Fixed Effects Model assumes differences in 
intercepts across groups or time periods, whereas a Random Effects Model explores 
differences in error variances. A Fixed Effects Model is appropriate if it strongly 
believes that the individual or cross-sectional units in the sample are not random 
drawing from a larger sample.  However, the Random Effects Model is appropriate if 
the cross-sectional units in the sample are regarded as random drawing (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009).  The Hausman Test in the E-Views software helps in this process of 
model selection. The Hausman Test results imply 2 choices. Either only the Fixed 
Effects Model is only suitable to be used or it doesn‘t matter whether to use the Fixed 
Effects Model or the Random Effects Model. The following hypotheses illustrate this 
test (Gujarati and Porter, 2009) : 
H0 : The Fixed Effects Model or the Random Effects Model do not differ substantially 
and either can be used. 
H1 : The Random Effects Model is not suitable to be used and is rejected. 
 
 
185 
 
The results of the Hausman Test are as following : 
Table 5.2: Family Firms Regression Model (Tobin’s Q as dependent variable) 
Test Summary Chi-Square 
Statistic 
Chi-Square 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Probability 
Cross-Section 
Random 
63.508563 18 0.0000 
 
Table 5.3: Non-Family Firms Regression Model (Tobin’s Q as dependent variable) 
Test Summary Chi-Square 
Statistic 
Chi-Square 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Probability 
Cross-Section 
Random 
28.103939 17 0.0437 
 
Table 5.4: Pooled (Family and Non-family Firms) Regression Model (Tobin’s Q as 
dependent variable). 
Test Summary Chi-Square 
Statistic 
Chi-Square 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Probability 
Cross-Section 
Random 
71.422737 18 0.0000 
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Based upon the Hausman Test results, H0 is rejected for both family firms regression 
model, non-family firms regression model and the pooled regression model at 1% and 
5% significance level. Hence, the Random Effects Model is not suitable to be used and 
the Fixed Effects Model is utilised for both models. Since, the model with Tobin‘s Q as 
dependent variable uses the Fixed Effects Model, other models with MBV, ROE and 
ROA as dependent variables also use the Fixed Effects Model for consistency purposes. 
5.7 STATISTICAL ISSUES 
5.7.1 Endogeneity Issues  
Empirical studies relating firm value to ownership concentration potentially suffer from 
the problem of endogeneity (Andres, 2008).  The observed relation between ownership 
and firm value possibly involve reverse causality.  High firm value could prompt 
controlling shareholders to keep their shares whereas low firm value might be an 
incentive to give up control.  Moreover, controlling shareholders usually come from  
part of the firm‘s board of directors and the rest of the board is usually hired by 
shareholders as well.  This enables the controlling shareholder to gain insights into the 
firm and hence, possess information advantage as compared to other shareholders in 
predicting future firm performance.  Therefore, there could be a possibility that 
ownership concentration by the controlling shareholder could be determined by firm 
value (Andres, 2008).  However, the argument that firm value determines ownership 
concentration is questionable for several reasons.  Although controlling shareholders 
possess advantageous information  about the firms‘ future prospects, it seems 
unreasonable to assume that they are able to predict the performance over the decades 
(Andres, 2008).  Thus, the endogeneity test is performed to test whether this reverse 
causality exists or not.  
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The possibility of reverse causality between ownership concentration with firm value 
creates the following possible simultaneous equations: 
1) Qit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + 
β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + 
β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it + β16(OC)t(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
2) OCit = α0 + α1Qit + α2Qi(t+1) + …….. +  α3Qi(t+n) + νit 
3) MBVit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + 
β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + 
β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it + β16(OC)t(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
4) OCit = α0 + α1MBVit + α2MBVi(t+1) + …….. +  α3MBVi(t+n) + νit 
5) ROEit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + 
β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + 
β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it + β16(OC)t(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
6) OCit = α0 + α1ROEit + α2ROEi(t+1) + …….. +  α3ROEi(t+n) + νit 
7) ROAit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + 
β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + 
β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it + β16(OC)t(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
8) OCit = α0 + α1ROAit + α2ROAi(t+1) + …….. +  α3ROAi(t+n) + νit 
 
Qit, OCit : Endogenous Variables 
The rest of variables: Exogenous Variables 
Qit: Performance measured by Tobin‘s Q at year t. 
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MBVit: Performance measured by Market-to-Book Value at year t. 
ROEit : Performance measured by Return On Equity at year t. 
ROAit : Performance measured by Return On Asset at year t. 
RPTit: Amount of RPTs Which Are Likely to Result in Expropriation at year t divided 
by Total Related Party Transactions Value at year t. 
Tenureit: Average tenure of independent directors in the firm at year t 
Banksit: Quantity of domestic banks that the firm engages with at year t 
OCit: Controlling shareholders‘ ownership concentration in the firm at year t (%) 
(OC)it(RPT)it: Controlling shareholders‘ ownership concentration in the firm at year t 
multiplied by the amount of RPTs Which Are Likely To Result in Expropriation ratio at 
year t. 
(OC)it(Tenure)it: Controlling shareholders‘ ownership concentration in the firm at year t 
multiplied by average tenure of independent directors in the firm at year t. 
(OC)it(Banks)it: Controlling shareholders‘ ownership concentration in the firm at year t 
multiplied by the quantity of domestic banks that the firm engages with at year t. 
SIZEit: Firm Size (Ln(Total Assets)) at year t 
RISKit: ln(Firm Risk (Standard Deviation of monthly stock returns between 2007-
2009)) at year t 
LEVit: ln(Leverage (Long-term Debt/Total Assets)) at year t 
IDRit: Independent Directors Ratio (No. of independent directors/Board Size) at year t 
NABit: Non-affiliated Blockholder Shareholding at year t 
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AGEit: ln(Age) at year t 
SGit: Sales Growth at year t  
RDSit: Research and Development Expenditure-to-Sales at year t 
CSit: Capital Expenditure-to-Sales at year t 
MSit: Marketing and Advertising Expenditure-to-Sales at year t 
GDPit: Gross Domestic Product at year t 
µit: Stochastic error term at year t 
νit:   Stochastic error term at time t  
n:  No. of years 
 
The Hausman Specification Test is performed to test for these endogeneity issues 
(Hausman, 1978) for family firms and the pooled model (family firms and non-family 
firms). To run the Hausman Test, first, the following simultaneous equations which 
exist in this research are identified : 
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Family Firm Model 
1. Qit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + β9(NAB)it + 
β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + 
β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
2. MBVRit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
3. ROEit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
4. ROAit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
Non-Family Firm Model 
5. Qit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + β9(NAB)it + 
β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + 
β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
6. MBVRit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
7. ROEit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
8. ROAit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
Pooled (Family and Non-Family Firms) Model 
9. Qit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + β9(NAB)it + 
β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + 
β18(OC)it(Banks)it + β19FTit + µit 
10. MBVRit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + β19FTit + µit 
11. ROEit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + β19FTit + µit 
12. ROAit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(OC)it + β5(SIZE)it + β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + 
β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + β19FTit + µit 
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Ownership Concentration Model (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; Himmelberg, 
Hubbard and Pahlia, 1999) 
13. OCit = β0 + β1(SIZE)it + β2(SIZE)
2
it + β3(RISK)it + µit 
Qit: Performance measured by Tobin‘s Q at time t. 
MBVRit : Performance measured by Market-to-Book Value Ratio at time t. 
ROEit : Performance measured by Return On Equity at time t. 
ROAit : Performance measured by Return On Asset at time t. 
RPTit: Amount of Related Party Transactions That Are Likely to Result in 
Expropriation at year t divided by Total Related Party Transactions Value at year t. 
Tenureit: Average tenure of independent directors in the firm at year t 
Banksit: Quantity of domestic banks engaged by the firm at year t 
OCit: Controlling shareholders‘ ownership concentration in the firm at year t (%) 
(OC)it(RPT)it: Controlling shareholders‘ ownership concentration in the firm at year t 
multiplied by the amount of related party transactions that are likely to result in 
expropriation ratio at year t. 
(OC)it(Tenure)it: Controlling shareholders‘ ownership concentration in the firm at year t 
multiplied by average tenure of independent directors in the firm at year t. 
(OC)it(Banks)it: Controlling shareholders‘ ownership concentration in the firm at year t 
multiplied by quantity of domestic banks engaged by the firm at year t 
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Control Variables 
SIZEit: Firm Size (Ln(Total Assets)) at year t 
(SIZE)
2
it : Square of Firm Size (Ln(Total Assets)) at year t 
RISKit: ln(Firm Risk (Standard Deviation of monthly stock returns between 2007-
2009)) at year t 
LEVit: ln(Leverage (Long-term Debt/Total Assets)) at year t 
IDRit: Independent Directors Ratio (No. of independent directors/Board Size) at year t 
NABit: Non-affiliated Blockholder Shareholding at year t 
AGEit: ln(Age) at year t 
SGit: Sales Growth at year t  
RDSit : Research and Development Expenditure-to-Sales at year t 
CSit: Capital Expenditure-to-Sales at year t 
MSit: Marketing and Advertising Expenditure-to-Sales at year t 
GDPit : Gross Domestic Product at year t 
FTit : Firm type dummy variable at year t, 1 for family firms, 0 for non-family firms. 
µit: Stochastic error term at year t 
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Subsequently, ownership concentration is regressed against all the exogenous variables 
in the system as shown in the following equations : 
Family Firm Model 
1. OCit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(SIZE)it + β5(SIZE)
2
it 
β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + 
β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
Non-Family Firm Model 
2. OCit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(SIZE)it + β5(SIZE)
2
it 
β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + 
β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it + µit 
Pooled (Family And Non-Family Firms) Model 
3. OCit = β0 + β1(RPT)it + β2(Tenure)it + β3(Banks)it + β4(SIZE)it + β5(SIZE)
2
it 
β6(RISK)it + β7(LEV)it + β8(IDR)it + β9(NAB)it + β10(AGE)it + β11(SG)it + 
β12(RDS)it + β13(CS)it + β14(MS)it +  β15(GDP)it +  β16(OC)it(RPT)it + 
β17(OC)it(Tenure)it + β18(OC)it(Banks)it +  β19FTit + µit 
From these 3 regression models, the residual error terms are obtained from the research 
results and this residual error terms will be an additional independent variable to be 
inserted into the original family firm model, non-family firm model and pooled (family 
firms and non-family firms) model as shown in the research results below. If the 
coefficient of the residual error term is significant at 1%, 5% or 10% significance level, 
then, endogeneity between ownership concentration and firm value exist within the 
model. The following are the Hausman Test results: 
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Table 5.5: Hausman Test Results To Test For Endogeneity (Family Firms) 
Expected 
Signs   
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Expected 
Signs   
Independent Variables 
And Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
+/- Intercept 0.361772 0.266652 2.267641 0.878473 +/- Intercept -2.088197*** -3.017289 -0.829943*** -3.814889 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 
0.348876 0.927835 -0.510859 -0.723507 
- Related Party 
Transactions That Are 
Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 0.450544** 2.287656 0.188338*** 3.060041 
+ Ownership Concentration 
(OC)  0.062693 1.523812 -0.015920 -0.205166 
+ Ownership Concentration 
(OC)  0.050199** 2.347683 0.021062*** 3.161753 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) 0.164605 1.536513 -0.074135 -0.366995 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) 0.160297*** 2.873749 0.058634*** 3.377870 
- No. of Local Banks 
Engaged by the Firm 
(Banks) 0.392699 1.583034 -0.052880 -0.112935 
- No. of Local Banks 
Engaged by the Firm 
(Banks) 0.252603** 1.965891 0.115216*** 2.873980 
+ Ln (Firm Risk) 0.145023*** 9.010783 0.155707*** 5.507733 + Ln (Firm Risk) 0.033421*** 3.206322 0.010100*** 3.227492 
+/- Leverage (LEV) 0.889480*** 13.53967 0.048349 0.407888 +/- Leverage (LEV) -0.046442 -1.129489 -0.047242*** -3.659139 
+/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.092799*** -3.608554 -0.011377 -0.238828 +/- Firm Size (SIZE) 0.009529 0.668077 0.002910 0.672716 
+/- Independent Directors 
Ratio (IDR) -0.254094* -1.854782 -0.454091** -1.820631 
+/- Independent Directors 
Ratio (IDR) -0.110150 -1.396618 -0.056312** -2.316877 
+ Non-Affiliated 
Blockholders (NAB) -0.000276 -0.463470 -0.003065*** -2.701755 
+ Non-Affiliated 
Blockholders (NAB) 0.000472 1.538525 0.000263*** 2.740953 
+ Ln (Age) -0.029304 -0.700505 -0.004256 -0.049870 + Ln (Age) -0.055773*** -2.810852 -0.022855*** -3.545273 
+ Sales Growth (SG) 0.0000405 0.379890 0.000289 1.468652 + Sales Growth (SG) 0.0000729 0.932113 0.0000221 1.190736 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.005181 0.549416 -0.005366 -0.289083 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) -0.000094 -0.019702 0.000681 0.453935 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-
Sales (CS) 0.000348 0.929199 0.000625 0.987198 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-
Sales (CS) -0.0000946 -0.283383 -0.0000903 -1.107108 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.002378 0.792681 0.007112 1.419872 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.000366 0.172214 -0.000526 -0.841882 
+/- Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) -0.002755 -1.336969 -0.004996 -1.349592 
+/- Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) 0.006327*** 3.168061 0.001352** 2.306059 
- OC  x RPT -0.007978 -0.858075 0.012984 0.742794 - OC  x RPT -0.011502** -2.368434 -0.004854*** -3.190333 
- OC  x Tenure -0.003638 -1.564768 0.001574 0.358890 - OC  x Tenure -0.003292*** -2.725062 -0.001214*** -3.225712 
- OC x Banks -0.009301 -1.567213 0.001065 0.095051 - OC  x Banks -0.006230** -2.026434 -0.002820*** -2.939852 
 Residual Error Term (μ) -0.063568 -1.539828 0.010301 0.132358  Residual Error Term -0.044375** -2.065447 -0.019214*** -2.870671 
 N 379  379   N 379  379  
 Adjusted R-Squared (%) 19.6937  4.485   Adjusted R-Squared (%) 7.3558  8.654  
 F-Statistic 15.66228***  3.807476***   F-Statistic 5.747159***  6.664348***  
*                            10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
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Table 5.6: Hausman Test Results To Test For Endogeneity (Non-Family Firms) 
Expected 
Signs   
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Expected 
Signs   
Independent Variables 
And Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
+/- Intercept 14.18125** 2.372054 -10.88282 -0.797932 +/- Intercept -3.128019 -1.554398 0.020049 0.020889 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 
-1.368459 -1.578253 1.808529 0.920927 
- Related Party 
Transactions That Are 
Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 0.274104 0.794234 -0.063291 -0.399767 
+ Ownership Concentration 
(OC)  -0.213454* -1.773176 0.237244 0.843629 
+ Ownership Concentration 
(OC)  0.065004 1.618830 0.001219 0.063570 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) -0.541457* -1.851542 0.614591 0.896213 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) 0.160035* 1.659227 0.022546 0.490341 
- No. of Local Banks 
Engaged by the Firm 
(Banks) -2.071665* -1.767417 2.036337 0.749028 
- No. of Local Banks 
Engaged by the Firm 
(Banks) 0.607619 1.533693 -0.039176 -0.207772 
+ Ln (Firm Risk) 0.307616*** 4.146559 0.117055 0.749104 + Ln (Firm Risk) 0.003640 0.106609 0.024120 1.623427 
+/- Leverage (LEV) 1.601398** 2.057950 0.376291 0.220763 +/- Leverage (LEV) -0.181632 -0.666721 -0.012783 -0.100894 
+/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.112925** -2.076239 0.066490 0.510270 +/- Firm Size (SIZE) 0.015510 0.799241 0.002320 0.264880 
+/- Independent Directors 
Ratio (IDR) -1.172505*** -2.770615 0.056230 0.071020 
+/- Independent Directors 
Ratio (IDR) -0.068429 -0.316712 -0.045076 -0.490415 
+ Non-Affiliated 
Blockholders (NAB) -0.001719** -2.571455 -0.000710 -0.513585 
+ Non-Affiliated 
Blockholders (NAB) -0.0000465 -0.158763 -0.00000678 -0.050301 
+ Ln (Age) 0.042536 0.448760 0.189936 0.673388 + Ln (Age) 0.000279 0.008030 -0.010039 -0.660516 
+ Sales Growth (SG) 0.000847 0.874225 -0.002490 -1.334121 + Sales Growth (SG) -0.0000247 -0.041717 0.000522** 2.526868 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) -0.097910 -1.291904 -0.003910 -0.037182 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) -0.016695 -0.359077 0.024969 1.586697 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-
Sales (CS) -0.004801 -1.422059 0.002988 0.521492 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-
Sales (CS) -0.000992 -0.590119 -0.000418 -0.591475 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.013801 1.471536 -0.016678 -0.795735 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.001341 0.386799 0.000562 0.359010 
+/- Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) -0.014555 -1.426563 0.011321 0.737398 
+/- Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) -0.014439* -1.848635 0.000597 0.237762 
- OC  x RPT 0.030295 1.428510 -0.051957 -1.072144 - OC  x RPT -0.008025 -0.999250 0.001283 0.345902 
- OC  x Tenure 0.011499* 1.872589 -0.012394 -0.860509 - OC  x Tenure -0.003248 -1.599977 -0.000363 -0.374792 
- OC x Banks 0.045896* 1.724769 -0.051227 -0.830245 - OC  x Banks -0.014121 -1.573267 0.000631 0.147513 
 Residual Error Term (μ) 0.212463* 1.760999 -0.222494 -0.790025  Residual Error Term -0.063017 -1.563690 0.000763 0.039446 
 N 151  151   N 151  151  
 Adjusted R-Squared (%) 4.4262  4.5375   Adjusted R-Squared (%) 0.975  4.1094  
 F-Statistic 2.101738***  2.130765***   F-Statistic 1.234241  2.019509***  
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Table 5.7: Hausman Test Results To Test For Endogeneity (Pooled Model Of Family Firms And Non-Family Firms) 
Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
+/- Intercept 3.704750** 2.264321 -1.318333 -0.399033 +/- Intercept -1.599306** -2.149192 -0.958144*** -4.026350 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) -0.341001 -0.993566 0.191601 0.281939 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 0.278347 1.632414 0.164443*** 3.058607 
+ Ownership Concentration 
(OC)  -0.012910 -0.297630 0.087863 0.998719 
+ Ownership Concentration (OC)  
0.041213** 2.110099 0.022858*** 3.655618 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) -0.051346 -0.464271 0.207390 0.922325 
- Average Independent Directors 
Tenure (Tenure) 0.137379*** 2.758968 0.065230*** 4.100468 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged 
by the Firm (Banks) -0.057942 -0.181758 0.605483 0.938912 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (Banks) 0.237817* 1.650909 0.147809*** 3.203740 
+ Ln (Firm Risk) 0.146109*** 8.371234 0.158613*** 6.123022 + Ln (Firm Risk) 0.048391*** 3.764550 0.012285*** 3.284655 
+/- Leverage (LEV) 0.843559*** 9.737699 0.163451 1.188322 +/- Leverage (LEV) -0.089763 -1.307647 -0.079035*** -4.181862 
+/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.083941*** -2.991393 -0.038103 -0.662046 +/- Firm Size (SIZE) 0.000738 0.054908 0.001960 0.464084 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.407986*** -2.649327 -0.330784 -1.318799 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.150465 -1.596708 -0.052667* -1.831683 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.001047** -2.431232 -0.001689** -1.993916 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) 0.0000431 0.194051 0.000138** 1.998963 
+ Ln (Age) 0.025552 0.660756 -0.011476 -0.113489 + Ln (Age) -0.025567 -1.450835 -0.016174** -2.939374 
+ Sales Growth (SG) 0.0000316 0.254192 0.0000544 0.265475 + Sales Growth (SG) 0.0000871 0.708127 0.0000425 1.447240 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) -0.000817 -0.066706 -0.015452 -0.622222 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.000429 0.061846 0.002444 1.136826 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.000120 -0.222769 0.000259 0.357830 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.000341 -0.862055 0.00000553 0.045314 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.001738 0.472249 0.001205 0.214460 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.001320 0.633715 0.000253 0.385771 
+/- Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) -0.003279 -1.081368 -0.003082 -0.772158 
+/- Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
0.001160 0.389074 0.001658** 2.019108 
- OC  x RPT 0.008580 1.019126 -0.004600 -0.275281 - OC  x RPT -0.007910* -1.927656 -0.004149*** -3.200916 
- OC  x Tenure 0.001057 0.447160 -0.004438 -0.922585 - OC  x Tenure -0.002717** -2.552863 -0.001321*** -3.884033 
- OC x Banks 0.001318 0.175060 -0.015319 -1.006791 - OC x Banks -0.005959* -1.751716 -0.003581*** -3.286005 
 Firm Type (FT) -0.275415*** -3.309776 -0.402419** -2.177021  Firm Type (FT) 0.062722* 1.698954 0.039572*** 3.361799 
 Residual Error Term (μ) 0.011144 0.256057 -0.077022 -0.874524  Residual Error Term -0.038130* -1.938837 -0.020645*** -3.277398 
 N 530  530   N 530  530  
 Adjusted R-Squared (%) 10.5606  4.2208   Adjusted R-Squared (%) 4.3274  7.242  
 F-Statistic 10.38108***  4.501197***   F-Statistic  4.593593***  7.202952***  
                                       * 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
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The Hausman Test results show that in the family firm and pooled (family firms and 
non-family firms) regression models, endogeneity exist between ownership 
concentration and ROE as well as between ownership concentration and ROA. This is 
because the residual error terms in these 2 accounting-based performance measures are 
significant at 1% and 10% significance level respectively. 
Below are the summary of the results as shown in Table 5.8, 5.9 and 5.10: 
Possible Endogeneity between Variables 
Table 5.8: Possible Endogeneity in Family Firms Regression Model 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable 
Ownership Concentration ROE, ROA 
 
Table 5.9: Possible Endogeneity in Non-Family Firms Regression Model 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable 
Ownership Concentration Tobin‘s Q 
 
Table 5.10: Possible Endogeneity in  
Pooled (Family Firms and Non-Family Firms) Regression Model  
Independent Variable Dependent Variable 
Ownership Concentration ROE, ROA 
 
With endogeneity issues involved in this research, the instrumental variable (IV) is a 
suitable variable to be used to eliminate the endogeneity problem (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009).  This IV is used to substitute the original ownership concentration variable and it 
will not have any correlation with the variance of the endogenous variable (i.e. in this 
case, firm value), hence, resolving the endogeneity problem (Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  
Since, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that ownership is a function of firm size and 
risk, the IV utilised in this research is the predicted value of ownership concentration.  
This value is obtained by regression of the original ownership concentration values 
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against firm size, the square of firm size and firm risk (Anderson and Reeb, 2003; 
Himmelberg et.al., 1999). The following is the IV model utilised: 
1. OCFit = β0 + β1SIZEit + β2(SIZE)
2
it + RISKit + µit 
OCFit: Predicted value of ownership concentration at year t. 
SIZEit: Firm Size at year t. 
(SIZE)
2
it: Square of Firm Size at year t. 
RISKit:  Natural logarithm of Firm Risk at year t. 
µit: Stochastic error term at year t. 
The IV (i.e. predicted value of ownership concentration) is subsequently substituted into 
the original research model, replacing the prior ownership concentration values and all 
the independent variables are regressed against the firm value again.   
5.7.2    Correlation Issues 
Hinkle, Wiersma and Jurs (2002) propose a rule of thumb for correlation between 
variables. Table 5.11 shows their rule of thumb: 
Table 5.11: Rule Of Thumb for Interpreting The Size of a Correlation Coefficient 
Size Of Correlation Interpretation 
0.90 to 1.00 (-0.90 to -1.00) Very high positive (negative) correlation 
0.70 to 0.90 (-0.70 to -0.90) High positive (negative) correlation 
0.50 to 0.70 (-0.50 to -0.70) Moderate positive (negative) correlation 
0.30 to 0.50 (-0.30 to -0.50) Low positive (negative) correlation 
0.00 to 0.30 (-0.00 to -0.30) Little if any correlation 
Source: Hinkle et.al. (2002) 
Table 5.12 shows the correlation matrix for family firms and Table 5.13 shows the 
correlation matrix for non-family firms. 
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Table 5.12: Correlation Matrix (Family Firms) 
 Q MBV ROE ROA RPT OC OCF AIDT BANKS LNRISK LEV FSIZE IDR NAB LNAGE SG RDS CS MS GDP 
Q 1.00                    
MBV 0.62 1.00                   
ROE 0.09 0.12 1.00                  
ROA 0.20 0.17 0.58 1.00                 
RPT 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.00 1.00                
OC 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.14 1.00               
OCF 0.05 0.00 0.12 0.18 0.13 0.06 1.00              
AIDT -0.02 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.02 0.09 0.08 1.00             
BANKS 0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05 0.05 -0.12 0.12 0.01 1.00            
LNRISK 0.33 0.20 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.12 0.13 0.24 0.01 1.00           
LEV 0.30 0.04 -0.02 -0.06 0.10 0.02 0.09 -0.08 0.06 0.16 1.00          
FSIZE 0.19 0.08 0.15 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.49 0.29 0.11 0.53 0.32 1.00         
IDR -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.07 1.00        
NAB -0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.09 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 0.12 0.00 0.04 -0.08 1.00       
LNAGE 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.17 0.07 0.39 0.00 0.14 -0.04 0.22 0.13 -0.04 1.00      
SG 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.06 -0.05 -0.03 0.10 0.01 0.07 -0.05 0.07 -0.05 1.00     
RDS 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.00 0.09 0.01 -0.02 1.00    
CS 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.06 0.08 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 1.00   
MS 0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.08 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 1.00  
GDP 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.09 -0.01 0.09 0.02 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 -0.07 0.13 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 1.00 
Q : Tobin‘s Q; MBV : Market-to-Book Value; ROE : Return On Equity; ROA : Return On Asset; RPT : Related Party Transactions Which Are Likely To Result In Expropriation; OC : Ownership Concentration; OCF : 
Predicted Ownership Concentration; AIDT : Independent Directors‘ Tenure; BANKS : Number Of Domestic Banks That The Firm Engages With; LNRISK : Natural Logarithm Of Firm Risk; LEV : Leverage; FSIZE : Firm 
Size; IDR : Independent Directors‘ Ratio; NAB : Non-Affiliated Blockholders; LNAGE : Natural Logarithm Of Firm Age; SG : Sales Growth; RDS : Research & Development Expenditure-To-Sales; CS : Capital Expenditure-
To-Sales; MS : Marketing & Advertising Expenditure-To-Sales; GDP : Gross Domestic Product
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Table 5.13: Correlation Matrix (Non-Family Firms) 
 Q MBV ROE ROA RPT OC OCF AIDT BANKS LNRISK LEV FSIZE IDR NAB LNAGE SG RDS CS MS GDP 
Q 1.00                    
MBV 0.79 1.00                   
ROE 0.08 0.22 1.00                  
ROA 0.16 0.05 -0.86 1.00                 
RPT -0.10 -0.08 0.00 -0.03 1.00                
OC 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.02 -0.14 1.00               
OCF 0.02 0.21 0.19 -0.07 -0.09 0.34 1.00              
AIDT 0.02 0.14 0.07 -0.02 0.20 0.11 0.16 1.00             
BANKS -0.07 -0.10 0.00 -0.04 -0.12 -0.21 -0.01 -0.10 1.00            
LNRISK 0.35 0.36 0.10 0.06 -0.07 0.23 0.58 0.10 -0.01 1.00           
LEV 0.04 0.15 0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.22 -0.04 0.08 0.01 1.00          
FSIZE 0.00 0.13 0.13 -0.05 -0.08 0.28 0.89 0.11 0.03 0.43 0.34 1.00         
IDR -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.12 -0.03 0.06 -0.04 1.00        
NAB -0.10 -0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.15 -0.02 -0.13 0.05 -0.08 -0.06 -0.13 -0.15 -0.05 1.00       
LNAGE 0.06 0.11 0.05 -0.03 0.12 0.09 0.17 0.46 0.06 0.17 0.00 0.13 0.10 -0.10 1.00      
SG 0.00 0.02 0.10 -0.01 0.03 0.10 0.16 -0.02 -0.03 0.15 0.07 0.10 -0.05 0.04 -0.06 1.00     
RDS 0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 0.02 -0.10 -0.10 0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 1.00    
CS -0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.08 -0.06 0.02 -0.03 0.41 0.12 -0.06 -0.07 -0.05 0.11 -0.01 1.00   
MS 0.06 0.08 0.04 -0.01 -0.11 0.06 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.04 -0.05 1.00  
GDP -0.01 0.02 -0.05 0.07 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 -0.01 0.11 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07 0.16 0.01 -0.05 0.01 1.00 
Q : Tobin‘s Q; MBV : Market-to-Book Value; ROE : Return On Equity; ROA : Return On Asset; RPT : Related Party Transactions Which Are Likely To Result In Expropriation; OC : Ownership Concentration; OCF : 
Predicted Ownership Concentration; AIDT : Independent Directors‘ Tenure; BANKS : Number Of Domestic Banks That The Firm Engages With; LNRISK : Natural Logarithm Of Firm Risk; LEV : Leverage; FSIZE : Firm 
Size; IDR : Independent Directors‘ Ratio; NAB : Non-Affiliated Blockholders; LNAGE : Natural Logarithm Of Firm Age; SG : Sales Growth; RDS : Research & Development Expenditure-To-Sales; CS : Capital Expenditure-
To-Sales; MS : Marketing & Advertising Expenditure-To-Sales; GDP : Gross Domestic Product
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Except for the correlation between predicted ownership concentration and firm size in 
non-family firms with a correlation coefficient of 0.89 (high positive correlation), there 
is no high correlation between the dependent variables and the independent variables as 
well as between the independent variables in the sample for family firms and non-
family firms. 
Due to the high correlation between predicted ownership concentration and firm size in 
the sample for non-family firms, the variable firm size is taken out from the regression 
of Tobin‘s Q against the independent variables for this sample.  The conclusions made 
as a result of these correlation analyses are further supported by the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) values in the analysis of multicollinearity.  
5.7.3    Multicollinearity Issues 
Except for predicted ownership concentration in non-family firms, there are no 
significant multicollinearity problems between the independent variables in the 
proposed research model as all the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values are less than 
five.  VIF values less than five means there are no multicollinearity problems (Gujarati 
and Porter, 2009).  For the predicted ownership concentration in non-family firms, the 
VIF value is 7.053 which is higher than 5.  This means that there are significant 
multicollinearity problems between predicted ownership concentration and the other 
independent variables.  Therefore, in order to reduce the multicollinearity problems, the 
independent variable firm size is taken out of the model for the regression of Tobin‘s Q 
against the independent variables for non-family firms.  When firm size is taken out, the 
VIF value for predicted ownership concentration is reduced to 1.595; hence, 
multicollinearity problems are significantly reduced. 
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Table 5.14 and 5.15 show the VIF values for family firms and non-family firms for each 
of the independent variables analysed in this research: 
Table 5.14: VIF Values for Family Firms and Non-Family Firms 
 Family Non-Family 
Independent Variables Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) 
RPT 1.038 1.063 
Ownership Concentration 1.055 1.098 
Independent Directors‘ Tenure 1.228 1.155 
Quantity Of Domestic Banks Engaged By 
The Firm 
1.016 1.030 
Firm Risk 1.235 1.216 
Leverage 1.08 1.193 
Firm Size 1.226 1.164 
Independent Directors Ratio 1.054 1.037 
Non-affiliated Blockholders 1.047 1.026 
Firm Age 1.375 1.175 
Sales Growth 1.084 1.114 
R&D Expenditure 1.055 1.017 
Capital Expenditure 1.061 1.143 
Marketing And Advertising Expenditure 1.014 1.018 
Gross Domestic Product 1.002 1.002 
 
Table 5.15: VIF Values for Family Firms and Non-Family Firms (With Predicted 
Ownership Concentration) 
 
 Family Non-Family 
Independent Variables Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) 
RPT 1.029 1.048 
Predicted Ownership Concentration 1.518 7.053 
Independent Directors‘ Tenure 1.229 1.155 
Quantity Of Domestic Banks Engaged By 
The Firm 
1.018 1.019 
Firm Risk 1.280 1.752 
Leverage 1.084 1.201 
Firm Size 1.659 4.650 
Independent Directors Ratio 1.056 1.039 
Non-affiliated Blockholders 1.034 1.026 
Firm Age 1.350 1.179 
Sales Growth 1.085 1.140 
R&D Expenditure 1.050 1.013 
Capital Expenditure 1.061 1.144 
Marketing And Advertising Expenditure 1.014 1.018 
Gross Domestic Product 1.001 1.001 
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5.7.4 Normality Issues 
Skewness and kurtosis are important issues for normality (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson 
and Tatham, 2006).  For a normal distribution, the skewness and kurtosis values should 
be zero (Hair et.al., 2006).  Table 5.16 shows the skewness and kurtosis values of the 
dependent and independent variables in this study for family firms whereas Table 5.17 
shows the skewness and kurtosis values for non-family firms. 
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Table 5.16: Skewness And Kurtosis Values For Family Firms 
 
Table 5.17: Skewness And Kurtosis Values For Non-Family Firms 
 Q MBV ROE ROA RPT OC OCF AIDT BANKS LNRISK LEV FSIZE IDR NAB LNAGE SG RDS CS MS GDP 
Skewness 5.1 8.7 -17.3 17.2 1.9 0.1 -1.1 0.9 1.4 0.1 1.6 0.6 0.9 2.9 -0.7 3.9 8.6 7.2 4.1 -0.6 
Kurtosis 38.4 91.7 345.4 346.5 4.9 2.5 4.8 3.5 8.1 3.2 5.2 3.9 3.7 12.9 3.2 31.3 91.2 79.0 25.2 1.5 
 
Q : Tobin‘s Q; MBV : Market-to-Book Value; ROE : Return On Equity; ROA : Return On Asset; RPT : Related Party Transactions Which Are Likely To Result In 
Expropriation; OC : Ownership Concentration; OCF : Predicted Ownership Concentration; AIDT : Independent Directors‘ Tenure; BANKS : Number Of Domestic 
Banks That The Firm Engages With; LNRISK : Natural Logarithm Of Firm Risk; LEV : Leverage; FSIZE : Firm Size; IDR : Independent Directors‘ Ratio; NAB : 
Non-Affiliated Blockholders; LNAGE : Natural Logarithm Of Firm Age; SG : Sales Growth; RDS : Research & Development Expenditure-To-Sales; CS : Capital 
Expenditure-To-Sales; MS : Marketing & Advertising Expenditure-To-Sales; GDP : Gross Domestic Product
 Q MBV ROE ROA RPT OC OCF AIDT BANKS LNRISK LEV FSIZE IDR NAB LNAGE SG RDS CS MS GDP 
Skewness 5.5 8.5 -3.9 -1.4 0.7 0.5 -1.5 1.5 1.1 0.3 7.2 0.7 0.7 3.1 -0.6 16.9 16.9 12.0 4.7 5.5 
Kurtosis 49.6 103.1 124.6 12.7 1.9 2.6 5.5 7.3 4.6 3.1 91.5 3.8 3.2 18.6 3.2 363.6 296.6 197.7 48.9 49.6 
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In the regression analysis, normality of the distribution of the variables analysed is 
important (Gujarati and Porter, 2009).  Skewness and kurtosis are two components in 
determining normality (Pallant, 2005). In this study, most of the variables‘ distribution 
is skewed to the left or the right of the curve, for example, sales growth  and R&D 
expenditures are highly skewed to the right whereas ROE is skewed to the left.  
Similarly, some of these variables possess a high positive kurtosis (example, sales 
growth , R&D expenditure and capital expenditure) and some a low positive kurtosis 
(example, ownership concentration, firm risk and firm age).  Both these descriptions 
indicate that there is a departure from normality.  However, the issue which involves the 
variables of non-normal distribution is quite common in research which involves a large 
sized sample (Pallant, 2005).  In fact, this argument is supported by Norusis (2000) and 
Kleinbaum, Kupper, Muller and Nizam (1998) who explain that variance analysis which 
is used in regression is not heavily dependent on the assumption of normality since the 
data set is large.  Consequently, the assumption of normality is not seriously offended in 
this research since this study covers a large sample size. 
5.8 ROBUSTNESS TEST 
Since the 1970s, industrial organisation economics has provided the theoretical basis for 
the determinants of a firm‘s performance (Hawawini, Subramaniam and Verdin, 2003). 
Porter (1980) argues that the structural characteristics of industries are the primary 
determinants of a firm‘s performance.  Various studies investigated factors explaining 
the consistent differences in performance between industries. The industrial 
organization economists‘ preferred framework is the structure-conduct-performance 
(SCP) model.  This model proposes the existence of a deterministic relationship 
between market structure and profitability.  Based upon this framework, Mason (1939) 
argues that the structural characteristics of an industry constrain the behaviour of its 
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component firms, which in turn led to differences in firm performance within different 
industries.  Hence, industry effects in this research are controlled. 
Hence, as a robustness test, potential industry effects by using the subset of industries 
that contain both family and non-family firms are controlled (i.e. industries with 100 
percent family or non-family firms are excluded).  If industry effects are not controlled, 
they can possibly cause bias to the regression results (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) 
because they may have an impact towards firm value (Mason, 1939; Porter, 1980). 
In this research, industries that contain one hundred percent family firms and non-
family firms respectively are excluded from the analysis.  This is because industries, 
which are exclusively restricted to only one type of firm, are found in these types of 
firms.   Hence, this robustness test is applicable to family firms and non-family firms. 
Those industries, which are exclusively restricted to only one type of firm, are shown in 
Table 5.18: 
Table 5.18: Exclusive Industries In Family Firms And Non-Family Firms 
Exclusive Industries 
Family Firms Non-Family Firms 
Gambling, Jewellery, Gaming, Funeral, 
Publishing, Travel, Beauty, 
Military, Logistics Engineering 
Postal Service, Tobacco 
 
The actual robustness test results are shown in the robustness test results in Chapter 6 of 
this research.  
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5.9 CONCLUSION  
This chapter  discussed the various issues related to research methodology such as 
research models, variables measurements, sampling design, data analysis methods used, 
relevant statistical issues and assumptions, endogeneity issues, model selection criteria 
and robustness testing. The next chapter will discuss the research results, descriptive 
statistics, hypotheses testing as well as robustness research results. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESEARCH RESULTS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter mainly discusses the research results, the hypotheses tested, the descriptive 
statistics and endogeneity issues that surfaced in this research. The remainder of this 
chapter discusses the assumptions of statistical analysis. The rest of the chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the R-Squared values and Adjusted R-
Squared values. Section 6.3 discusses the descriptive statistics. Section 6.4 discusses the 
research findings. Section 6.5 discusses the robustness test results. Section 6.6 discusses 
the hypotheses tested. Section 6.7 summarise the hypotheses. Section 6.8 concludes. 
6.2 THE R-SQUARED (R
2
) AND THE ADJUSTED R-SQUARED (R
2
) 
VALUES 
The R-Squared (R
2
) statistic measures the success of the regression in predicting the 
values of the dependent variable within the sample or can be interpreted as how much of 
the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variables.  While 
the adjusted R
2
 implies that as the number of independent variables is added to the 
model and increases less than R
2
.  Both are goodness of fit measures and as the value of 
R
2
 and the adjusted R
2
 are closer to 1, the better is the fit.  According to Theil (1978), it 
is good to use adjusted R
2
 rather than R
2
 when the numbers of explanatory variables 
used in the model are high, as the R
2
 tends to provide too optimistic a value of the fit of 
the regression.  Besides, R
2
 and adjusted R
2
 are both reported in most statistical 
packages and are used to measure the strength of association between dependent and 
independent variables (Malhotra, 2004; Gujarati and Porter, 2009). 
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6.3 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 present the descriptive statistics for the samples used in this 
research 
Table 6.1 : Descriptive Statistics For Family Firms 
Descriptive Statistics For Full Sample  
Family Firms 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimu
m 
Tobin’s Q 0.8780 0.7801 0.5226 7.0322 0.0631 
ROE  0.0396 0.0688 0.3043  3.0037  -5.3488  
ROA  0.0323  0.0386 0.0810 0.4117 -0.6432  
Market-to-Book 
Value (MBV) 
0.8027 0.5849 1.0694 16.2962 -0.3955 
Related Party 
Transactions Which 
Are Likely To Result 
In Expropriation  
Ratio (RPT) 
0.3285 0.1843 0.3528 0.9997  0.0000 
Ownership 
Concentration  
42.1420  41.1800 13.3102  99.1600  20.1800  
Predicted Ownership 
Concentration 
42.0626 42.5332 1.5741 44.0562 34.4134 
Average Independent 
Directors’ Tenure  
6.0354  5.3330 3.8628 31.0000  0.0000  
Banks 2.8179 2.0000 1.7385 10.0000 0.0000 
Ln(Firm Risk) -2.2835 -2.3327 0.9758 1.2590 -5.3454 
Leverage  0.1323  0.0885 0.1831  2.7988  0.0000  
Firm Size  19.6350  19.4900 1.2024  24.4960  16.9470  
Independent 
Directors Ratio  
0.4240  0.4000 0.1135 0.8330  0.1820  
Non-affiliated 
Blockholders 
27.2503 14.7600 38.9662 339.2600 0.0000 
Ln(Age) 2.9626 3.0910 0.7287 4.6347 0.0000 
Sales Growth 14.4226 6.4538 93.2761 2254.7070 -96.8719 
R&D Expenditure-
to-Sales 
0.1445 0.0000 1.8187 35.6826 0.0000 
Capital Expenditure-
to-Sales 
9.2843 3.6383 27.2080 561.4003 -37.0511 
Marketing and 
Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales 
2.3014 0.4010 4.0991 62.0660 0.0000 
Gross Domestic 
Product 
 3.2172 4.8075 3.5006 6.4802 1.6360 
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Table 6.2 : Descriptive Statistics For Non-Family Firms 
 
 
Descriptive Statistics For Full Sample  
Non-Family Firms 
 Mean Median Standard 
Deviation 
Maximum Minimum 
Tobin’s Q 1.0936 0.8798 0.8292 6.3110 0.2731 
ROE  0.0493 0.0780 0.6527 1.7116 -5.9661 
ROA  0.0520 0.0452 0.3644 3.2424 -1.0180 
Market-to-Book 
Value (MBV) 1.2166 0.7362 1.7598 12.1718 -0.6780 
Related Party 
Transactions 
Which  Are Likely 
To Result In 
Expropriation  
Ratio (RPT) 0.1645 0.0025 0.2997 0.9809 0.0000 
Ownership 
Concentration  42.2277 42.4463 0.0000 81.2725 16.3125 
Predicted 
Ownership 
Concentration 43.3272 43.9792 16.5626 49.5352 26.4726 
Average 
Independent 
Directors’ Tenure  5.5280 4.7918 4.4702 17.2500 0.1250 
Banks 2.4346 2.2500 3.6974 7.2500 0.2500 
Ln(Firm Risk) -1.8357 -1.8219 1.4465 0.8043 -4.0945 
Leverage  0.1234 0.0848 1.0434 0.5345 0.0000 
Firm Size  20.0469 19.9523 0.1277 22.7610 17.0480 
Independent 
Directors Ratio  0.4381 0.4155 1.2325 0.7708 0.1955 
Non-affiliated 
Blockholders 53.8517 28.4050 0.1202 338.8500 0.0000 
Ln(Age) 2.8587 2.9673 71.7713 4.1134 0.7945 
Sales Growth 6.5578 2.6558 0.7562 223.2143 -73.7574 
R&D 
Expenditure-to-
Sales 0.0523 0.0000 39.7378 2.0030 0.0000 
Capital 
Expenditure-to-
Sales 6.5516 3.2377 0.2321 115.9097 0.0000 
Marketing and 
Advertising 
Expenditure-to-
Sales 2.9750 0.4210 17.0700 28.9407 0.0000 
Gross Domestic 
Product 3.2172 4.8075 3.5006 6.4802 1.6360 
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Table 6.3 presents the T-Test results for the test of differences between the variable 
values in family firms and non-family firms. 
Table 6.3: T-Test Results (2-Tail) To Compare The Variable Values Of Family 
Firms And Non-Family Firms 
Variable Probability Of T-Test  
Tobin‘s Q 2.01068 x 10-7*** 
ROE 0.718450152 
ROA 0.154667 
Market-to-Book Value 
(MBV) 
0.000111*** 
Related Party 
Transactions Which  Are 
Likely To Result In 
Expropriation  Ratio 
(RPT) 
1.86 x 10
-24
*** 
 
Ownership 
Concentration 
4.12 x 10
-6
*** 
Predicted Ownership 
Concentration 
4.22 x 10
-43
*** 
Average Independent 
Directors‘ Tenure 
0.986281 
Banks 1.19 x 10
-6
*** 
Ln(Firm Risk) 6.31 x 10
-21
*** 
Leverage 0.439746 
Firm Size 1.7 x 10
-11
*** 
Independent Directors 
Ratio 
0.499935 
 
Non-affiliated 
Blockholders 
1.54 x 10
-11
*** 
Ln(Age) 0.797917 
Sales Growth 0.033909** 
R&D Expenditure-to-
Sales 
0.268763 
 
Capital Expenditure-to-
Sales 
0.158244 
 
Marketing and 
Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales 
0.002594*** 
 
    *10% significance level ** 5% significance level ***1% significance level 
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From the descriptive statistics and the t-test results as shown, it can be concluded that 
there is no significant difference in terms of leverage for family firms compared to non-
family firms as the probability of the t-test results (0.439746) is insignificant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level respectively. The result shows that family firms do not appear to have 
different level of leverage compared to non-family firms. This is consistent with the 
findings by Sraer and Thesmar (2007), Barontini and Caprio (2006), Anderson and 
Reeb (2003), Mishra et.al. (2001), Mishra and McConaughy (1999) and Gorriz and 
Fumas (1996) but inconsistent with  the findings by Croci et.al. (2011) who found that 
family-controlled firms raise more debt capital compared to non-family firms. One  of 
the reasons for this insignificance is possibly due to the effect of the credit crunch 
during the global financial crisis which affect both family and non-family firms in 
emerging markets such as Malaysia (Tong and Wei, 2011). This credit crunch reduce 
the number of loans that firms can take from banks and as a result, both family and non-
family firms have limited debts (leverage). Hence, there is no significant difference in 
terms of the level of leverage between family firms and non-family firms.  
In addition to that, it can also be concluded that there is no significant difference 
between the age of family firms compared to non-family firms because the probability 
of the t-test results (0.797917) is insignificant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
This is consistent with the findings by Ibrahim (2009) who found no significant 
difference in age between family and non-family firms in Malaysia. This result also 
suggests that Malaysian firms are well established since the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange (KLSE) operated on its own after separating from the Stock Exchange of 
Malaysia and Singapore (SEMS) in 1973 (Ibrahim, 2009). 
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Likewise, in terms of firm size, family firms are smaller than non-family firms (average 
natural logarithm of total asset value of 19.635 compared to 20.0469). This is 
significant at 1% significance level (probability of 1.7 x 10
-11
 in the t-test results). These 
statistics are consistent with the findings of Sraer and Thesmar (2007), Favero, Giglio, 
Honorati and Panunzi (2006), Villalonga and Amit (2006), Barontini and Caprio (2006), 
Mishra et.al. (2001) and Anderson and Reeb (2003). This result also possibly suggests 
that family firms have a lower cost of financing compared to non-family firms, as firm 
size has a significant positive relationship with the cost of debt (Reeb, Mansi and Allee, 
2001). 
For Tobin‘s Q and MBV, family firms possess lower valuation than non-family firms. 
This is significant at 1% significance level (probability of 2.01068 x 10
-7
 and 0.000111 
in the t-test results respectively). This is consistent with the findings of Favero et.al. 
(2006), Barontini and Caprio (2006) and Yeh et.al. (2001) but inconsistent with those of 
Mishra et.al. (2001) and Anderson and Reeb (2003). The significantly lower Tobin‘s Q 
and MBV of family firms compared to non-family firms suggest that minority 
shareholder expropriation may exists within family firms and consequently, investors 
discount the market valuation (market-based performance measures) of these firms as a 
result of their loss aversion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). In terms of Return On 
Assets (ROA), there is no significant difference between family firms and non-family 
firms because the t-test result probability is 0.154667 which is insignificant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance level respectively.  This is inconsistent with the findings of 
Mishra et.al. (2001) who find that family firms have a lower ROA than non-family 
firms.  It is also inconsistent with the findings of Sraer and Thesmar (2007), Barontini 
and Caprio (2006), Lee (2004) and Anderson and Reeb (2003) who find that family 
firms have a higher ROA than non-family firms .  As for Return On Equity (ROE), 
there is also no significant difference between family firms and non-family firms  
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because the probability of t-test results is 0.718450152 which is insignificant at 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance level respectively.  This is inconsistent with the findings of Sraer 
and Thesmar (2007), Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Gorriz and Fumas (1996) who find 
that family firms have a higher ROE than non-family firms. The insignificant difference 
for ROE and ROA between family and non-family firms suggest that accounting-based 
performance measures may be subject to manipulation by family firms (Prencipe and 
Bar-Yosef, 2011) rendering them to be insignificantly different from non-family firms. 
In terms of the proportion of independent directors in the firm, there is no significant 
difference between family firms and non-family firms because the probability of the t-
test result is 0.499935 which is insignificant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively. This result possibly suggests a high interlocking directorship (cross-
directorship) between independent directors in family firms and non-family firms which 
reduces the independent director‘s commitment towards a particular firm, hence, 
providing an opportunity for controlling shareholders to exert more influence on these 
directors in order to expropriate minority shareholders. This result also is inconsistent 
with the findings by Ibrahim (2009), Villalonga and Amit (2006), Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) and Mishra et.al. (2001) who find that family firms have lower proportion of 
independent directors in their firms compared to non-family firms.  Furthermore, on 
average, the percentage of independent directors in all samples is 43.1%, which means 
at least one third (1/3) of directors are non-executive (independent directors).  This is in 
compliance with the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia (Ibrahim, 2009).   
In terms of the average tenure of independent directors, there is no significant difference 
between family firms and non-family firms because the t-test result probability is 
0.986281 which is insignificant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.  
This is inconsistent with the findings of Dieleman (2012) and Schulze et.al. (2003) who 
find that family firms have longer tenure of independent directors compared to non-
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family firms. This result also possibly suggests a high interlocking directorship (cross-
directorship) between independent directors in family firms and non-family firms as 
explained previously, which result in the insignificant difference. 
In terms of RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation, family firms possess higher 
amount than non-family firms. The result is also significant at 1% significance level 
because the probability of t-test result is 1.86 x 10
-24
.  This is consistent with the finding 
of Munir and Gul (2011) which possibly suggests that minority shareholder 
expropriation through RPTs may be more prevalent in family firms compared to non-
family firms.  Lastly, in terms of the number of domestic banks that the firm engages, 
family firms engage with higher number of domestic banks than non-family firms. This 
is significant at 1% significance level because the probability of t-test result is 1.19 x 
10
-6
 which also possibly suggests that that minority shareholder expropriation through 
the domestic banking channel may be more prevalent in family firms compared to non-
family firms.  
6.4 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
The following are the actual research results: 
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Table 6.4: Actual Regression Results (Main Results) : Normal OLS Regression Pooled Model (Family Firms) 
Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
+/- Intercept 2.369519*** 6.420699 1.939126*** 2.807097 +/- Intercept -0.354824 -0.534456 -0.440873** -2.134911 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) -0.198689* -1.652542 -0.422146** -1.974463 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 0.516853 0.812091 0.118215 0.610946 
+ Ownership Concentration 
(OC)  -0.000453 -0.140789 -0.005677 -0.926907 
+ Predicted Ownership 
Concentration (OCF) 0.002286 0.137010 0.009287* 1.791445 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) 0.001169 0.080772 -0.047610* -1.757832 
- Average Independent Directors 
Tenure (Tenure) -0.032256 -0.444672 0.016488 0.753992 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged 
by the Firm (Banks) 0.014093 0.445018 0.008565 0.142616 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (Banks) -0.224939 -1.286172 -0.013591 -0.259033 
+ Ln (Firm Risk) 0.134404*** 9.254627 0.157321*** 6.236005 + Ln (Firm Risk) 0.026814*** 2.680369 0.008637*** 2.929133 
+/- Leverage (LEV) 0.894811*** 13.62808 0.046825 0.397282 +/- Leverage (LEV) -0.051418 -1.235410 -0.049596*** -3.805393 
+/- Firm Size (SIZE) 
 
-0.064134*** -3.603028 -0.015904 -0.473369 +/- Firm Size (SIZE) 0.020996*** 1.781532 0.006961** 1.995164 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.207928 -1.556100 -0.461441* -1.897754 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.086217 -1.102435 -0.040820* -1.712406 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000891** -2.028292 -0.002965*** -3.540177 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) 0.0000317 0.134420 0.0000649 0.913116 
+ Ln (Age) 0.013963 0.450606 -0.011212 -0.166711 + Ln (Age) -0.016441 -1.218349 -0.006800 -1.504764 
+ Sales Growth (SG) 0.000065 0.614829 0.000285 1.462980 + Sales Growth (SG) 0.0000841 1.069717 0.0000312* 1.687339 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.004754 0.504556 -0.005314 -0.286459 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.000404 0.083260 0.000720 0.479215 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) 0.000250 0.677411 0.000639 1.026481 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.000181 -0.538448 -0.000127 -1.570428 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.001992 0.666611 0.007173 1.438412 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.0000629 0.029205 -0.000718 -1.149163 
+/- Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) -0.002867 -1.390598 -0.004971 -1.344521 
+/- Gross Domestic Product  
(GDP) 0.006022*** 2.973868 0.001254** 2.116662 
- OC x RPT 0.005713** 2.131741 0.010767** 2.256633 - OCF x RPT -0.012669 -0.838188 -0.002955 -0.644278 
- OC x Tenure -0.000089 -0.295703 0.000998* 1.773421 - OCF x Tenure 0.000972 0.566151 -0.000322 -0.622006 
- OC x Banks -0.000238 -0.326688 -0.000406 -0.293887 - OCF x Banks 0.005096 1.236446 0.000242 0.195529 
 N 379  379   N 379  379  
 Adjusted R-Squared (%) 19.5837  4.5649   Adjusted R-Squared (%) 5.1093 
 
 
 
7.4912  
 F-Statistic 16.36934***  4.018787***   F-Statistic 4.398147***  6.110641***  
                                      * 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
217 
 
Table 6.5: Actual Regression Results (Main Results) : Normal OLS Regression Fixed Effects Model (Family Firms) 
Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
+/- Intercept 2.363890*** 6.452472 1.825755*** 2.662796 +/- Intercept -0.339265 -0.511053 -0.435943** -2.110675 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) -0.202508* -1.706911 -0.469336** -2.233266 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 0.517745 0.813304 0.118155 0.610435 
+ Ownership Concentration 
(OC)  0.0000467 0.014630 -0.004747 -0.782595 
+ Predicted Ownership 
Concentration (OCF) 0.002450 0.146814 0.009256* 1.784819 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) 0.003535 0.245440 -0.042014 -1.561480 
- Average Independent Directors 
Tenure (Tenure) -0.031439 -0.433256 0.016344 0.747055 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged 
by the Firm (Banks) 0.015970 0.507405 0.010079 0.169449 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (Banks) -0.224343 -1.282432 -0.013738 -0.261720 
+ Ln (Firm Risk) 0.132238*** 9.220905 0.155072*** 6.245850 + Ln (Firm Risk) 0.026645*** 2.662668 0.008664*** 2.936636 
+/- Leverage (LEV) 0.893023*** 13.80540 0.026543 0.229637 +/- Leverage (LEV) -0.050822 -1.220747 -0.049744*** -3.814554 
+/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.066326*** -3.739557 -0.013646 -0.407697 +/- Firm Size (SIZE) 0.020984* 1.779914 0.006967** 1.996397 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.162274 -1.223142 -0.363763 -1.510678 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.088793 -1.134489 -0.040227* -1.684573 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000815* -1.870934 -0.002815*** -3.401178 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) 0.0000266 0.112971 0.0000659 0.926996 
+ Ln (Age) 0.020166 0.650679 0.009941 0.147741 + Ln (Age) -0.016714 -1.237921 -0.006724 -1.486372 
+ Sales Growth (SG) 0.0000713 0.695329 0.000267 1.423681 + Sales Growth (SG) 0.0000825 1.049515 0.0000314* 1.694844 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.003967 0.425690 -0.007444 -0.407159 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.000454 0.093600 0.000712 0.473521 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) 0.000254 0.695779 0.000570 0.929265 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.000183 -0.543920 -0.000127 -1.565549 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.001910 0.643804 0.007172 1.450970 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.0000695 0.032241 -0.000720 -1.150586 
- OC x RPT 0.005776** 2.182495 0.011632** 2.477556 - OCF x RPT -0.012689 -0.839287 -0.002954 -0.643758 
- OC x Tenure -0.000110 -0.367365 0.000929* 1.662464 - OCF x Tenure 0.000952 0.554020 -0.000318 -0.614641 
- OC x Banks -0.000291 -0.402107 -0.000493 -0.360764 - OCF x Banks 0.005083 1.232901 0.000245 0.198074 
 N 379  379   N 379  379  
 Adjusted R-Squared (%)  
22.0588 
  
8.8653 
  Adjusted R-Squared (%) 
5.1188 
 
 
 
7.4272 
 
 F-Statistic 17.92157***  6.816098***   F-Statistic 4.225585***  5.796987***  
                                      * 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
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Table 6.6: Actual Regression Results (Main Results) : Normal OLS Regression Pooled Model (Non-Family Firms) 
Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q   MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
+/- Intercept 3.100880** 2.384321 +/- Intercept -0.201739 -0.074113 0.144871 0.323179 -0.104591 -0.548989 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 2.231071 1.640629 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 0.354976 0.547638 -0.162824 -0.768752 -0.057495 -0.612679 
+ Predicted Ownership 
Concentration (OCF)  -0.028700 -1.026797 
+ Ownership Concentration (OC) 
0.015463 1.584547 0.001665 0.490670 0.002345 1.611708 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) -0.349182*** -2.771052 
- Average Independent Directors 
Tenure (Tenure) 0.079759 1.163419 0.011197 0.598668 0.025091*** 3.132329 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged 
by the Firm (Banks) 0.555555 1.502203 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (Banks) -0.112630 -0.712071 -0.014214 -0.307514 -0.026752 -1.377378 
+ Ln (Firm Risk) 0.218367*** 4.703061 + Ln (Firm Risk) 0.228468*** 3.735366 0.046824* 1.807577 0.021009** 2.015505 
+/- Leverage (LEV) 0.298807 0.835810 +/- Leverage (LEV) 1.609717*** 3.140328 0.118710 0.680196 -0.019688 -0.274449 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.724917** -2.274113 +/- Firm Size (SIZE) 0.056663 0.435070 0.002390 0.130928 0.005760 0.719887 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000834 -1.497465 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.426762 -0.853299 -0.142149 -0.772503 -0.073997 -0.997818 
+ Ln (Age) 
0.053165 0.581570 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.001367 -1.261277 -0.000273 -1.104287 -0.0000114 -0.103425 
+ Sales Growth (SG) -0.000560 -0.985805 + Ln (Age) 0.200528 0.711398 -0.000346 -0.010505 -0.008092 -0.577816 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) -0.048826 -0.657835 
+ Sales Growth (SG) 
-0.001083 -1.564894 0.000390 0.770269 0.000540*** 3.417532 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.000207 -0.081608 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) -0.019730 -0.190083 -0.017320 -0.396816 0.016034 1.089810 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.006046 0.743380 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.001028 -0.411025 -0.001966 -1.323947 -0.000390 -0.649562 
+/- Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) -0.005029 -0.569562 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) -0.010273 -0.540498 0.003275 1.078946 0.000761 0.591598 
- OCF x RPT 
-0.052470* -1.695910 
+/- Gross Domestic Product  
(GDP) 0.002017 0.207367 -0.017593** -2.314069 0.000744 0.312012 
- OCF x Tenure 0.007589*** 2.859474 - OC x RPT -0.016655 -0.916391 0.002272 0.481165 0.001186 0.573095 
- OCF x Banks -0.013014 -1.637064 - OC x Tenure -0.001139 -0.868013 -0.000106 -0.292708 -0.000413*** -2.762952 
 N 151  - OC x Banks -0.002408 -0.775637 -0.000032 -0.031493 0.000355 0.828131 
 Adjusted R-Squared (%) 7.999   N 151  151  151  
 F-Statistic 3.311714***   Adjusted R-Squared (%) 4.4544  0.8235  5.8652  
     F-Statistic 2.170701***  1.208500  2.564587***  
                                      * 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
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Table 6.7: Actual Regression Results (Main Results) : Normal OLS Regression Fixed Effects Model (Non-Family Firms) 
Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q   MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
+/- Intercept 2.558357** 2.011223 +/- Intercept -0.817141 -0.302043 0.089645 0.200751 -0.082442 -0.442867 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 1.804638 1.365384 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 0.154293 0.244269 -0.163082 -0.769007 -0.062057 -0.671888 
+ Predicted Ownership 
Concentration (OCF)  -0.018641 -0.679537 
+ Ownership Concentration (OC) 
0.018167* 1.912439 0.001670 0.491496 0.002320 1.621396 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) -0.311805** -2.542704 
- Average Independent Directors 
Tenure (Tenure) 0.078337 1.173956 0.011225 0.599458 0.025464*** 3.232908 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged 
by the Firm (Banks) 0.650393* 1.785028 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (Banks) -0.054152 -0.346681 -0.014175 -0.306276 -0.026903 -1.409616 
+ Ln (Firm Risk) 0.215914*** 4.875897 + Ln (Firm Risk) 0.230107*** 3.900836 0.046839* 1.805948 0.020440** 1.996914 
+/- Leverage (LEV) 0.303445 0.874229 +/- Leverage (LEV) 1.583190*** 3.168225 0.118519 0.678284 -0.027891 -0.395502 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.736087** -2.432912 +/- Firm Size (SIZE) 0.064804 0.500500 0.002401 0.131348 0.006413 0.815086 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000746 -1.402200 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.413631 -0.859522 -0.142124 -0.771451 -0.069525 -0.954197 
+ Ln (Age) 
0.078256 0.854881 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.001182 -1.128797 -0.000273 -1.102325 -0.0000122 -0.113004 
+ Sales Growth (SG) -0.000573 -1.080574 + Ln (Age) 0.300760 1.054437 -0.000329 -0.009974 -0.008749 -0.636227 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) -0.029484 -0.426048 
+ Sales Growth (SG) 
-0.001060 -1.594937 0.000391 0.770615 0.000546*** 3.511185 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.000712 -0.287661 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.011535 0.117226 -0.017277 -0.395335 0.017929 1.239416 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.004933 0.613759 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.001441 -0.586739 -0.001966 -1.322263 -0.000390 -0.660245 
- OCF x RPT 
-0.043654 -1.451417 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) -0.013037 -0.696634 0.003274 1.077304 0.000844 0.667756 
- OCF x Tenure 0.006758*** 2.618717 - OC x RPT -0.012488 -0.706335 0.002277 0.481597 0.001323 0.649960 
- OCF x Banks -0.014855* -1.895960 - OC x Tenure -0.001152 -0.900616 -0.000106 -0.293815 -0.000417*** -2.839332 
 N 151  - OC x Banks -0.003148 -1.032677 -0.0000328 -0.032216 0.000351 0.835323 
 Adjusted R-Squared (%) 11.6274   N 151  151  151  
 F-Statistic 4.303926***   Adjusted R-Squared (%) 7.3821  0.5962  6.8764  
     F-Statistic 2.896144***  1.142681  2.756661***  
                                      * 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
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Table 6.8: Actual Regression Results (Main Results) : Normal OLS Regression Pooled Model (Family Firms And Non-Family Firms) 
 
Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
+/- Intercept 3.295714*** 7.213038 1.461046 1.607214 +/- Intercept -0.482789 -0.890130 0.005854 0.034798 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) -0.261851* -1.855436 -0.367914* -1.684581 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 0.604999 1.017361 0.169494 0.949196 
+ Ownership Concentration 
(OC)  -0.001794 -0.545947 0.011140** 2.064864 
+ Predicted Ownership 
Concentration (OCF) 0.022776* 1.670966 0.004387 1.023092 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) -0.023131 -1.360553 0.012795 0.434102 
- Average Independent Directors 
Tenure (Tenure) 0.068063 1.243006 -0.008904 -0.513908 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged 
by the Firm (Banks) 0.023375 0.617698 0.044614 0.692366 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (Banks) -0.184690 -1.323012 -0.106861** -2.440500 
+ Ln (Firm Risk) 0.145049*** 8.356504 0.162015*** 6.325004 + Ln (Firm Risk) 0.043691*** 3.307818 0.010996*** 2.839276 
+/- Leverage (LEV) 0.839324*** 9.934288 0.203629 1.583910 +/- Leverage (LEV) -0.073548 -1.055979 -0.075601*** -3.924135 
+/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.088450*** -4.150570 -0.005301 -0.122298 +/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.012875 -0.731565 -0.004763 -0.852987 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.404434*** -2.663490 -0.371000 -1.506337 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.190531** -2.006651 -0.060297** -2.074642 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000983*** -2.805956 -0.002143*** -3.225725 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000195 -1.001494 0.00000325 0.053782 
+ Ln (Age) 0.022056 0.605873 0.010650 0.108787 + Ln (Age) -0.008842 -0.521779 -0.007372 -1.399589 
+ Sales Growth (SG) 0.000025 0.205325 0.0000952 0.476462 + Sales Growth (SG) 0.000124 1.001892 0.0000616** 2.078346 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) -0.001003 -0.082079 -0.013630 -0.551515 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.001304 0.185055 0.002894 1.324262 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.000096 -0.181017 0.0000983 0.140562 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.000420 -1.063279 -0.0000445 -0.360930 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.001733 0.471200 0.001309 0.233062 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.001412 0.669260 0.000198 0.296649 
+/- Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) -0.003091 -1.045226 -0.004272 -1.139570 
+/- Gross Domestic Product  
(GDP) 0.000432 0.145700 0.001231 1.482685 
- OC x RPT 0.006608** 2.082602 0.009279* 1.856278 - OCF x RPT -0.015027 -1.096085 -0.004012 -0.974906 
- OC x Tenure 0.000455 1.334643 -0.000270 -0.463133 - OCF x Tenure -0.001312 -1.051498 0.000283 0.718649 
- OC x Banks -0.000601 -0.704877 -0.002076 -1.450143 - OCF x Banks 0.003874 1.213513 0.002334** 2.332857 
 Firm Type -0.260253*** -4.310242 -0.501872*** -3.441964  Firm Type 0.012786 0.475872 0.006682 0.784250 
 N 530  530   N 530  530  
 Adjusted R-Squared (%)  
10.6119 
  
4.2385 
  Adjusted R-Squared (%) 
3.6629 
  
5.546 
 
 
 F-Statistic 10.92846***  4.701634***   F-Statistic 4.179829***  5.910572***  
                                      * 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
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Table 6.9: Actual Regression Results (Main Results) : Normal OLS Regression Fixed Effects Model (Family Firms And Non-Family Firms) 
 
Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
+/- Intercept 3.174151*** 7.048353 1.069257 1.188690 +/- Intercept -0.483561 -0.892161 0.010605 0.063234 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) -0.278596** -2.026126 -0.441037** -2.072551 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 0.605793 1.018370 0.168905 0.947398 
+ Ownership Concentration 
(OC)  -0.000493 -0.152875 0.012718** 2.407940 
+ Predicted Ownership 
Concentration (OCF) 0.022757* 1.669044 0.004553 1.063683 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) -0.019223 -1.148165 0.018644 0.644037 
- Average Independent Directors 
Tenure (Tenure) 0.067876 1.239168 -0.008353 -0.482999 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged 
by the Firm (Banks) 0.032371 0.868057 0.055311 0.874687 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (Banks) -0.184726 -1.322852 -0.106268 -2.431422 
+ Ln (Firm Risk) 0.142268*** 8.418025 0.161657*** 6.485205 + Ln (Firm Risk) 0.043621*** 3.301168 0.010891 2.816400 
+/- Leverage (LEV) 0.829360*** 10.08514 0.175334 1.402214 +/- Leverage (LEV) -0.073392 -1.053379 -0.076633 -3.984099 
+/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.088060*** -4.173744 0.000988 0.022996 +/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.012876 -0.731402 -0.004736 -0.849781 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.359560** -2.421700 -0.274727 -1.142689 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.191057** -2.011330 -0.059054 -2.035246 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000890*** -2.601723 -0.001945*** -3.005134 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000195 -1.003751 0.00000342 0.056680 
+ Ln (Age) 0.038367 1.054850 0.087447 0.889467 + Ln (Age) -0.008918 -0.526066 -0.007433 -1.413891 
+ Sales Growth (SG) 0.0000313 0.268315 0.0000954 0.497634 + Sales Growth (SG) 0.000124 0.997682 0.0000616 2.080169 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) -0.00183 -0.153172 -0.015428 -0.642644 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.001310 0.185825 0.002932 1.344516 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.0000867 -0.167655 0.0000288 0.042256 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.000420 -1.063282 -0.0000428 -0.347458 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.001194 0.329456 0.000851 0.154206 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.001415 0.670529 0.000207 0.310870 
- OC x RPT 0.006824** 2.203240 0.010718** 2.198332 - OCF x RPT -0.015044 -1.096964 -0.003990 -0.971104 
- OC x Tenure 0.000392 1.166304 -0.000348 -0.607104 - OCF x Tenure -0.001308 -1.047769 0.000271 0.689248 
- OC x Banks -0.000787 -0.938313 -0.002332* -1.662405 - OCF x Banks 0.003875 1.213373 0.002319 2.322876 
 Firm Type -0.254476*** -4.230453 -0.492465*** -3.379930  Firm Type 0.012745 0.474181 0.006716 0.789746 
 N 530  530   N 530  530  
 Adjusted R-Squared (%)  
13.9344 
  
8.6674 
  Adjusted R-Squared (%) 
3.6086 
  
5.6987 
 
 F-Statistic 13.86331***  8.539710***   F-Statistic 
3.974338*** 
  
5.801235*** 
 
                                      * 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level 
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The following are the summary of the research results for key variables analysed in this 
research: 
Table 6.10: Summary of Research Results (Key Variables)(Coefficients)(Family 
Firms) 
Main Variables 
Tested  
Firm Value  
Tobin’s Q   Market-to-Book 
Value (MBV) 
 
Return On 
Equity (ROE) 
Return On 
Asset (ROA) 
Related Party 
Transactions 
That Are Likely 
to result in 
Expropriation 
Ratio (RPT)  
 
-0.198689* 
-0.202508* 
-0.422146** 
-0.469336** 
0.516853 
0.517745 
0.118215 
0.118155 
Average 
Independent 
directors’ tenure 
(Tenure) 
 
0.001169 
0.003535 
-0.04761* 
-0.042014 
-0.032256 
-0.031439 
0.016488 
0.016344 
No. of Domestic 
banks Engaged 
by the Firm 
(Banks)  
 
0.014093 
0.01597 
0.008565 
0.010079 
-0.224939 
-0.224343 
-0.013591 
-0.013738 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And RPT 
 
0.005713** 
0.005776** 
 
 
0.010767** 
0.011632** 
 
 
-0.012669 
-0.012689 
 
 
-0.002955 
-0.002954 
 
 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And Tenure 
 
-0.000089 
-0.00011 
0.000998* 
0.000929* 
0.000972 
0.000952 
-0.000322 
-0.000318 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And Banks 
 
-0.000238 
-0.000291 
-0.000406 
-0.000493 
0.005096 
0.005083 
0.000242 
0.000245 
*10% significance level     **5% significance level     ***1% significance level   
Italic figures represent coefficients of Fixed Effects Model. 
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Table 6.11: Summary of Research Results (Key Variables)(Non-Family Firms) 
Main Variables 
Tested  
Firm Value  
Tobin’s Q   Market-to-Book 
Value (MBV) 
 
Return On 
Equity (ROE) 
Return On 
Asset (ROA) 
Related Party 
Transactions 
That Are Likely 
to result in 
Expropriation 
Ratio (RPT)  
 
2.231071 
1.804638 
0.354976 
0.154293 
-0.162824 
-0.163082 
-0.057495 
-0.062057 
Average 
Independent 
directors’ tenure 
(Tenure) 
 
-0.349182*** 
-0.311805*** 
0.079759 
0.078337 
0.011197 
0.011225 
0.025091*** 
0.025464*** 
No. of Domestic 
banks Engaged 
by the Firm 
(Banks)  
 
 
0.555555 
0.650393* 
 
-0.11263 
-0.054152 
-0.014214 
-0.014175 
-0.026752 
-0.026903 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And RPT 
 
-0.05247* 
-0.043654 
-0.016655 
-0.012488 
0.002272 
0.002277 
0.001186 
0.001323 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And Tenure 
 
0.007589*** 
0.006758*** 
-0.001139 
-0.001152 
-0.000106 
-0.000106 
-0.000413*** 
-0.000417*** 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And Banks 
 
-0.013014 
-0.014855* 
-0.002408 
-0.003148 
-0.000032 
0.0000328 
0.000355 
0.000351 
*10% significance level     **5% significance level     ***1% significance level   
Italic figures represent coefficients of Fixed Effects Model. 
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Table 6.12: Summary of Research Results (Key Variables)(Family Firms And 
Non-Family Firms) 
Main Variables 
Tested  
Firm Value  
Tobin’s Q   Market-to-Book 
Value (MBV) 
 
Return On 
Equity (ROE) 
Return On 
Asset (ROA) 
Related Party 
Transactions 
That Are Likely 
to result in 
Expropriation 
Ratio (RPT)  
 
-0.261851* 
-0.278596** 
-0.367914* 
-0.441037** 
0.604999 
0.605793 
0.169494 
0.168905 
Average 
Independent 
directors’ tenure 
(Tenure) 
 
-0.023131 
-0.019223 
0.012795 
0.018644 
0.068063 
0.067876 
-0.008904 
-0.008353 
No. of Domestic 
banks Engaged 
by the Firm 
(Banks)  
 
0.23375 
0.032371 
0.044614 
0.055311 
-0.18469 
-0.184726 
-0.106861** 
-0.106268 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And RPT 
 
0.006608** 
0.006824** 
0.009279* 
0.010718** 
-0.015027 
-0.015044 
-0.004012 
-0.00399 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And Tenure 
 
0.000455 
0.000392 
-0.00027 
-0.000348 
-0.001312 
-0.001308 
0.000283 
0.000271 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And Banks 
 
-0.000601 
-0.000787 
-0.002076 
-0.002332* 
0.003874 
0.003875 
0.002334** 
0.002319 
Firm Type  
-0.260253*** 
-0.254476*** 
 
-0.501872*** 
-0.492465*** 
0.012786 
0.012745 
0.006682 
0.006716 
*10% significance level     **5% significance level     ***1% significance level   
Italic figures represent coefficients of Fixed Effects Model. 
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For family firms analysed in this research, RPTs which are likely to results in 
expropriation reduce firm value and it is statistically significant at 5% and 10% 
significance level. However, this reduction only affect market-based measures of firm 
value only i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV. In addition, controlling shareholders‘ ownership 
has a statistically significant positive moderating effect on this negative relationship at 
5% significance level. However, this significant positive moderating effect also only 
affect market-based measures of firm value only i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV. For non-
family firms, RPTs which are likely to results in expropriation does not have a 
significant relationship with firm value for both market-based and accounting-based 
performance measures. However, controlling shareholders‘ ownership have a significant 
negative moderating effect on the relationship between RPTs which are likely to results 
in expropriation and firm value at 10% significance level. However, this significant 
negative moderating effect is also restricted to market-based measures of firm value 
only i.e. Tobin‘s Q. For the pooled model (family and non-family firms) analysed in this 
research, RPTs which are likely to results in expropriation reduce firm value and it is 
statistically significant at 1% and 5% significance level. However, this reduction only 
affect market-based measures of firm value only i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV. In addition, 
controlling shareholders‘ ownership has a statistically significant positive moderating 
effect on this negative relationship at 1% and 5% significance level respectively. 
However, this significant positive moderating effect also only affect market-based 
measures of firm value only i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV. 
In the family firm model, ownership concentration has a positive relationship with firm 
value but it is restricted to accounting-based performance measures only (ROA). 
However, in non-family firms, ownership concentration has a positive relationship with 
firm value but it  is restricted to market-based performance measures only (MBV).  
Likewise, in the pooled model (family and non-family firms), ownership concentration 
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has a positive relationship with firm value for both market-based and accounting-based 
performance measures (i.e. MBV and ROE). 
For family firms analysed in this research, average independent directors‘ tenure 
reduces firm value and it is statistically significant at 10% significance level. However, 
this reduction only affect market-based measures of firm value only i.e MBV. 
Controlling shareholders‘ ownership also has a statistically significant positive 
moderating effect on this negative relationship at 10% significance level. However, this 
significant positive moderating effect only affect market-based measures of firm value 
only i.e. MBV. For non-family firms, there is inconclusive evidence on the relationship 
between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value as there is a significant 
negative relationship for market-based performance measures (Tobin‘s Q) at a 
significance level of 1% and a significant positive relationship for accounting-based 
performance measures (ROA) also at a significance level of 1%. There is also 
inconclusive evidence on the moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership 
on this relationship. For market-based performance measures (Tobin‘s Q), there is a 
significant positive moderating effect which is significant at 5% significance level 
whereas for accounting-based performance measures (ROA), there is a significant 
negative moderating effect which is significant at 5% significance level. For the pooled 
(family and non-family firms) model, there is no statistical significant relationship 
between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value as well as no significant 
moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on this relationship.  
For family firms analysed in this research, the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with do not have any statistical significant relationship with firm value. 
Controlling shareholders‘ ownership also do not have any statistical significant 
moderating effect on this relationship.  For non-family firms, there is a significant 
positive relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with 
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and firm value at 10% significance level. In addition, controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership have a significant negative moderating effect on this relationship at 10% 
significance level. However, both this significant positive relationship and significant 
negative moderating effect are restricted to market-based performance measures only 
(i.e. Tobin‘s Q). For the pooled model (family and non-family firms) results, there is a 
statistical significant negative relationship between the number of domestic banks that 
the firm engages with and firm value and this is statistically significant at 5% 
significance level. However, this reduction only affect accounting-based performance 
measures of firm value i.e ROA. For the pooled model (family and non-family firms), 
there is also inconclusive evidence on the moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership on the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with and firm value as there is a statistically significant positive moderating 
effect on accounting-based performance measures (i.e. ROA and significant at 5% 
significance level) and a statistically significant negative moderating effect on market-
based performance measures (i.e. MBV and significant at 10% significance level).  
In the pooled model (family and non-family firms) results, family firms has a lower firm 
value as compared with non-family firms and this is statistically significant at 1% 
significance level. In addition, in the pooled model (family and non-family firms), the 
joint hypotheses of H0 : βRPTs of family firms and βRPTs of non- family firms = 0 is rejected and has a 
significant negative relationship as derived from the regression results. Both these 
results prove that the negative relationship between RPT and firm value is stronger in 
family firms compared to non-family firms. However, this only affect market-based 
measures i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV. Likewise, in the pooled model (family and non-
family firms), the joint hypotheses of H0 : βOC x RPTs of family firms and βOC x RPTs of non- family 
firms = 0 is rejected and has a significant positive moderating effect as derived from the 
regression results. Both these results prove that the significant positive moderating 
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effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on this relationship is stronger in family 
firms compared to non-family firms due to the overall lower firm value of family firms 
(i.e. market-based measures of Tobin‘s Q and MBV) which renders a stronger corporate 
reputational effects in family firms. On the other hand, the rejection of the joint 
hypotheses of H0 : βOC x RPTs of family firms and βOC x RPTs of non- family firms = 0 also shows that it 
cannot be proven whether the significant negative moderating effect of non-family 
firms‘ controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between RPT which are 
likely to result in expropriation and firm value is stronger in non-family compared to 
family firms because the sign of the β is positive, not negative. 
Although there is a statistical significant negative relationship between average 
independent directors‘ tenure and firm value (i.e. MBV) in family firms and overall, 
family firms has a lower firm value (i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV) as compared with non-
family firms and this is statistically significant at 1% significance level; these results 
cannot prove that the negative relationship between average independent directors‘ 
tenure and firm value is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms because 
the joint hypotheses in the pooled model (family and non-family firms) i.e. H0 : βtenure of 
family firms and βtenure of non- family firms = 0 is not rejected as derived from the regression 
results. Although, controlling shareholders‘ ownership also has a statistically significant 
positive moderating effect on the negative relationship between average independent 
directors‘ tenure and firm value (i.e. MBV) in family firms and overall family firms has 
a lower firm value (i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV) as compared with non-family firms and 
this is statistically significant at 1% significance level; these results cannot prove that 
the positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the 
relationship between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value is stronger in 
family firms compared to non-family firms because the joint hypotheses in the pooled 
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model (family and non-family firms) i.e. H0 : βoc x tenure of family firms and β oc x tenure of non-family 
firms = 0 is not rejected as derived from the regression results. 
Even though there is a statistically significant positive relationship between the number 
of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value (i.e. market-based 
performance measure Tobin‘s Q) in non-family firms; this result cannot prove that this 
positive relationship is stronger in non-family firms compared to family firms because 
overall family firms family has a lower firm value as compared with non-family firms 
for market-based performance measures and this is statistically significant at 1% 
significance level.  
Despite the fact that non-family firms‘ controlling shareholders‘ ownership has a 
statistically significant negative moderating effect on the relationship between the 
number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value (i.e. market-based 
measure Tobin‘s Q), this result cannot prove that the significant negative moderating 
effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between the number of 
domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value (i.e. Tobin‘s Q) is stronger in 
non-family firms compared to family firms because because the joint hypotheses in the 
pooled model (family and non-family firms) i.e. H0 : βoc x banks of family firms and β oc x banks of 
non-family firms = 0 is not rejected as derived from the regression results for market-based 
performance measures (Tobin‘s Q). 
For family firms, non-family firms and the pooled model (family and non-family firms), 
firm risk is significantly positively related to firm value for both market-based 
performance measures and accounting-based performance measures at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. For family firms and the pooled model (family and non-
family firms), leverage has a significant positive relationship with market-based 
performance measures (Tobin‘s Q) at 1% significance level but a significant negative 
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relationship with accounting-based performance measures (ROE and ROA) at 1% 
significance level. However, for non-family firms, leverage has a significant positive 
relationship with market-based performance measures (MBV) at 1% significance level. 
In addition, for family firms, firm size has a significant negative relationship with 
market-based performance measures (Tobin‘s Q) at 1% significance level but a 
significant positive relationship with accounting-based performance measures (ROE 
and ROA) at 1%  and 10% significance level respectively.  For non-family firms, there 
is no significant relationship between firm size and firm value for both market-based 
and accounting-based performance measures. In the pooled model (family and non-
family firms), firm size has a significant negative relationship with firm value for 
market-based performance measures only (Tobin‘s Q) at 1% significance level. 
Furthermore, for family firms and the pooled model (family and non-family firms), 
independent directors‘ ratio has a significant negative relationship with market-based 
performance measures (Tobin‘s Q and MBV) at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively and accounting-based performance measures (ROE and ROA) at 5% and 
10% significance level respectively. However, for non-family firms, independent 
directors‘ ratio has a significant negative relationship with market-based performance 
measures (Tobin‘s Q) at 5% significance level. 
On the other hand, for family firms and the pooled model (family and non-family 
firms), non-affiliated blockholders have a siginificant negative relationship with firm 
value but only on market-based performance measures only (Tobin‘s Q and MBV) at 
1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.  However, for non-family firms, there 
is no significant relationship between non-affiliated blockholders and firm value for 
both market-based and accounting-based performance measures. 
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In family firms firms, non-family firms and the pooled model (family and non-family 
firms), firm age has no significant relationship with firm value for both market-based 
performance measures and accounting-based performance measures.  
Likewise, for family firms, non-family firms and the pooled model (family and non-
family firms), sales growth has a significant positive relationship with accounting-based 
performance measures (ROA) (significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively) but not market-based performance measures.  
Moreover, for both family firms, non-family firms and the pooled model (family and 
non-family firms), R&D expenditures, capital expenditures and marketing & advertising 
expenditures have no significant relationship with firm value for both market-based 
performance measures and accounting-based performance measures.  
For family firms, GDP has a significant positive relationship with only accounting-
based performance measures (i.e. ROE and ROA) at 1% and 5% significance level 
respectively. For non-family firms, GDP has a significant negative relationship with 
only accounting-based performance measures (i.e. ROE) at 5% significance level. For 
the pooled model (family and non-family firms), GDP has no significant relationship 
with firm value for both market-based and accounting-based performance measures. 
6.5 ROBUSTNESS   TEST RESULTS  
The following are the robustness test results : 
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Table 6.13: Actual Regression Results (Main Results) : Normal OLS Regression Pooled Model (Family Firms)(Without Biased Industries) 
Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
+/- Intercept 2.157508*** 7.131756 1.945428*** 4.044555 +/- Intercept -0.692059 -1.123637 -0.389896* -1.842765 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) -0.193345* -1.770699 -0.669589*** -3.925931 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 0.534871 0.887381 0.132284 0.651368 
+ Ownership Concentration 
(OC)  0.0000844 0.031628 0.000524 0.123300 
+ Predicted Ownership 
Concentration (OCF) 0.012947 0.834122 0.008429 1.584654 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) 0.003896 0.332643 0.008252 0.440201 
- Average Independent Directors 
Tenure (Tenure) 0.052924 0.771464 0.009961 0.434426 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged 
by the Firm (Banks) 0.027722 1.077686 0.012700 0.307384 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (Banks) -0.189101 -1.163092 -0.004254 -0.080106 
+ Ln (Firm Risk) 0.138962*** 10.43838 0.232661*** 11.56912 + Ln (Firm Risk) 0.035845*** 3.988312 0.010483*** 3.531986 
+/- Leverage (LEV) 0.842825*** 13.84242 -0.073565 -0.804679 +/- Leverage (LEV) -0.088834** -2.442564 -0.053129*** -4.164259 
+/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.054980*** -3.855169 -0.024306 -1.070528 +/- Firm Size (SIZE) 0.016391 1.516394 0.006132* 1.755679 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.064726 -0.566519 -0.186983 -1.036772 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.041207 -0.581747 -0.024683 -1.042252 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000639* -1.818537 -0.001226** -2.197124 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.00000301 -0.014428 0.0000744 1.074276 
+ Ln (Age) -0.002944 -0.125444 -0.042680 -1.123877 + Ln (Age) -0.012594 -1.060119 -0.007221* -1.649897 
+ Sales Growth (SG) 0.000059 0.624358 0.000153 1.121389 + Sales Growth (SG) 0.0000622 0.940144 0.0000338* 1.854752 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.003570 0.484472 0.003279 0.274986 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.000161 0.037631 0.000572 0.395150 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) 0.000159 0.477877 0.000358 0.703165 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.0000983 -0.324519 -0.0000962 -1.197563 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.000974 0.344478 0.006011 1.370002 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) -0.001032 -0.488564 -0.001119* -1.698710 
+/- Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) -0.003074 -1.483666 -0.008593*** -2.819077 
+/- Gross Domestic Product  
(GDP) 0.005440*** 2.689366 0.001318** 2.224062 
- OC x RPT 0.005240** 2.149765 0.015583*** 4.093351 - OCF x RPT -0.012728 -0.886908 -0.003288 -0.681081 
- OC x Tenure -0.000168 -0.686995 -0.000287 -0.729551 - OCF x Tenure -0.001187 -0.728024 -0.000169 -0.309872 
- OC x Banks -0.000574 -0.967062 -0.000666 -0.698301 - OCF x Banks 0.004306 1.120558 0.0000281 0.022375 
 N 366  366   N 366  366  
 Adjusted R-Squared (%)  
22.1874 
  
11.7085 
  Adjusted R-Squared (%) 
4.9594 
  
7.9436 
 
 F-Statistic 18.37767***  9.081955***   F-Statistic 4.180174***  6.258943***  
                                      * 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
233 
 
Table 6.14: Actual Regression Results (Main Results) : Normal OLS Regression Fixed Effects Model (Family Firms)(Without Biased 
Industries) 
Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
+/- Intercept 2.146964*** 7.169529 1.904325*** 4.070099 +/- Intercept -0.675941 -1.097481 -0.385437* -1.821258 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) -0.192718* -1.786637 -0.658401*** -3.991607 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 0.534608 0.886637 0.132378 0.651565 
+ Ownership Concentration 
(OC)  0.000555 0.209588 0.001575 0.381595 
+ Predicted Ownership 
Concentration (OCF) 0.013016 0.838208 0.008415 1.581393 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) 0.006089 0.522608 0.013275 0.724894 
- Average Independent Directors 
Tenure (Tenure) 0.053097 0.773676 0.009928 0.432799 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged 
by the Firm (Banks) 0.029613 1.158643 0.015354 0.381174 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (Banks) -0.188701 -1.160223 -0.004347 -0.081817 
+ Ln (Firm Risk) 0.135068*** 10.27088 0.215362*** 11.08971 + Ln (Firm Risk) 0.035784*** 3.980020 0.010494*** 3.533842 
+/- Leverage (LEV) 0.842490*** 14.04888 -0.084899 -0.967997 +/- Leverage (LEV) -0.088358** -2.428384 -0.053248*** -4.170576 
+/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.055784*** -3.934443 -0.025171 -1.134479 +/- Firm Size (SIZE) 0.016345 1.511567 0.006144* 1.758284 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.031515 -0.277998 -0.094390 -0.537869 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.042900 -0.605154 -0.024314 -1.025153 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000596* -1.709918 -0.001089** -2.013119 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.00000637 -0.030562 0.0000751 1.082985 
+ Ln (Age) -0.000577 -0.024681 -0.038393 -1.037009 + Ln (Age) -0.012767 -1.074039 -0.007176 -1.637946 
+ Sales Growth (SG) 0.000064 0.698103 0.000144 1.122938 + Sales Growth (SG) 0.0000614 0.927394 0.0000339* 1.859281 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.003116 0.427399 0.002383 0.206725 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.000196 0.045873 0.000566 0.390934 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) 0.000168 0.510746 0.000370 0.747914 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.000101 -0.331855 -0.0000958 -1.192996 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.000782 0.278638 0.005440 1.262256 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) -0.001018 -0.481845 -0.001121* -1.701932 
- OC x RPT 0.005227** 2.170032 0.015312*** 4.156382 - OCF x RPT -0.012723 -0.886249 -0.003290 -0.681192 
- OC x Tenure -0.000194 -0.795902 -0.000340 -0.884398 - OCF x Tenure -0.001192 -0.730663 -0.000168 -0.307998 
- OC x Banks -0.000621 -1.053431 -0.000763 -0.820816 - OCF x Banks 0.004297 1.117870 0.0000301 0.023975 
 N 366  366   N 366  366  
 Adjusted R-Squared (%)  
24.4952 
  
14.9475 
  Adjusted R-Squared (%) 
4.9238 
  
7.8684 
 
 F-Statistic 19.73090***  11.14690***   F-Statistic 3.990046***  5.930921***  
                                      * 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
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Table 6.15: Actual Regression Results (Main Results) : Normal OLS Regression Pooled Model (Non-Family Firms)(Without Biased 
Industries) 
Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q   MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
+/- Intercept 3.404858*** 3.415677 +/- Intercept 1.572024 1.026971 -0.331505 -0.863109 -0.165750 -0.914228 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 1.819565 1.601227 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 0.366883 0.727820 -0.126330 -0.699294 -0.058315 -0.651407 
+ Predicted Ownership 
Concentration (OCF)  -0.038300* -1.811696 
+ Ownership Concentration (OC) 
0.014329* 1.792493 0.002560 0.880112 0.002214 1.584924 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) -0.355047*** -3.536711 
- Average Independent Directors 
Tenure (Tenure) 0.003459 0.066995 0.014211 0.892849 0.024756*** 3.240032 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged 
by the Firm (Banks) 0.378809 1.396708 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (Banks) 0.080438 0.703963 0.001979 0.050213 -0.025887 -1.396599 
+ Ln (Firm Risk) 0.195907*** 4.722977 + Ln (Firm Risk) 0.208071*** 4.069872 0.011104 0.486716 0.013283 1.314976 
+/- Leverage (LEV) -0.131805 -0.448695 +/- Leverage (LEV) 0.473489 1.169708 -0.180469 -1.152598 -0.069769 -1.001199 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.455181* -1.715354 +/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.016964 -0.236118 0.019136 1.225000 0.008146 1.067148 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000676 -1.555673 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.656019 -1.611210 -0.036213 -0.229683 -0.047802 -0.674830 
+ Ln (Age) 
-0.009343 -0.140205 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000688 -0.835949 -0.000187 -0.903338 0.00000568 0.054603 
+ Sales Growth (SG) -0.000495 -0.980081 + Ln (Age) -0.041653 -0.326434 -0.016200 -0.585244 -0.013406 -1.010916 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) -0.030942 -0.530877 
+ Sales Growth (SG) 
-0.000299 -0.486960 0.000607 1.306143 0.000540*** 3.517986 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) 0.000597 0.258292 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.023663 0.280236 0.015209 0.407170 0.014482 1.035297 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.002044 0.339511 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.000467 -0.214622 -0.000466 -0.343032 -0.000173 -0.292129 
+/- Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) -0.000258 -0.029936 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) -0.001274 -0.115286 0.001735 0.676172 0.000417 0.342487 
- OCF x RPT 
-0.041438 -1.629255 
+/- Gross Domestic Product  
(GDP) -0.006585 -0.903042 -0.017056** -2.192225 0.001218 0.499393 
- OCF x Tenure 0.007638*** 3.586542 - OC x RPT -0.010321 -0.800357 0.002042 0.510267 0.001421 0.721976 
- OCF x Banks -0.008232 -1.419086 - OC x Tenure 0.000366 0.384122 -0.000165 -0.535662 -0.000411*** -2.894032 
 N 148  - OC x Banks -0.002976 -1.248500 -0.0000328 -0.037667 0.000428 1.044239 
 Adjusted R-Squared (%) 8.6206   N 148  148  148  
 F-Statistic 3.458360***   Adjusted R-Squared (%) 3.5082  0.3979  5.3562  
     F-Statistic 1.894793**  1.098317  2.392816***  
                                      * 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
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Table 6.16: Actual Regression Results (Main Results) : Normal OLS Regression Fixed Effects Model (Non-Family Firms)(Without Biased 
Industries) 
Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q   MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
+/- Intercept 3.041131*** 3.144794 +/- Intercept 1.289281 0.850751 -0.385030 -1.006543 -0.138163 -0.782475 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 1.436663 1.310637 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 0.209144 0.424107 -0.126500 -0.699362 -0.063254 -0.720085 
+ Predicted Ownership 
Concentration (OCF)  -0.030209 -1.464234 
+ Ownership Concentration (OC) 
0.016268** 2.087667 0.002563 0.880064 0.002172 1.585771 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) -0.328330*** -3.366779 
- Average Independent Directors 
Tenure (Tenure) 0.005357 0.106327 0.014229 0.892877 0.025077*** 3.347849 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged 
by the Firm (Banks) 0.461942* 1.739589 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (Banks) 0.114866 1.018858 0.002005 0.050789 -0.026168 -1.440812 
+ Ln (Firm Risk) 0.192157*** 4.882229 + Ln (Firm Risk) 0.206136*** 4.156592 0.011116 0.486637 0.012839 1.297978 
+/- Leverage (LEV) -0.074113 -0.261438 +/- Leverage (LEV) 0.516675 1.306165 -0.180578 -1.151889 -0.076339 -1.117460 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.461556* -1.843803 +/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.014219 -0.199063 0.019140 1.223785 0.008709 1.164035 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000596 -1.442026 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.645712 -1.640273 -0.036193 -0.229276 -0.043560 -0.627539 
+ Ln (Age) 
0.004204 0.063491 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000558 -0.697886 -0.000187 -0.901780 0.0000044 0.043112 
+ Sales Growth (SG) -0.000538 -1.155918 + Ln (Age) -0.008322 -0.065109 -0.016190 -0.584191 -0.014158 -1.090782 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) -0.020060 -0.370897 
+ Sales Growth (SG) 
-0.000325 -0.548401 0.000608 1.305567 0.000546*** 3.615392 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.0000312 -0.013966 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.041939 0.519647 0.015233 0.407294 0.016327 1.189217 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.000948 0.159902 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.001000 -0.469065 -0.000466 -0.342457 -0.000180 -0.310500 
- OCF x RPT 
-0.033614 -1.369579 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) -0.002930 -0.268042 0.001734 0.675041 0.000495 0.414391 
- OCF x Tenure 0.007072*** 3.420104 - OC x RPT -0.007102 -0.562889 0.002045 0.510436 0.001566 0.811570 
- OCF x Banks -0.009887* -1.739857 - OC x Tenure 0.000327 0.350499 -0.000165 -0.536068 -0.000414*** -2.972885 
 N 148  - OC x Banks -0.003494 -1.492955 -0.0000333 -0.038198 0.000425 1.059257 
 Adjusted R-Squared (%) 13.3251   N 148  148  148  
 F-Statistic 4.783628***   Adjusted R-Squared (%) 7.2298  0.165  6.4873  
     F-Statistic 2.817067***  1.038525  2.617487***  
                                      * 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
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Table 6.17: Actual Regression Results (Main Results) : Normal OLS Regression Pooled Model (Family Firms And Non-Family 
Firms)(Without Biased Industries) 
 
Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
+/- Intercept 2.981192*** 8.224688 2.039946*** 3.401048 +/- Intercept -0.560941 -1.115752 0.051390 0.311744 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) -0.272620** -2.169029 -0.438100** -2.398006 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 0.260757 0.469002 0.119303 0.675470 
+ Ownership Concentration 
(OC)  -0.002287 -0.835027 0.008403** 2.011801 
+ Predicted Ownership 
Concentration (OCF) 0.020130 1.527616 0.002988 0.682216 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) -0.026071* -1.897441 0.005135 0.234904 
- Average Independent Directors 
Tenure (Tenure) 0.114812** 2.253356 -0.007298 -0.430248 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged 
by the Firm (Banks) 0.038542 1.244933 0.057301 1.190798 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (Banks) -0.208927 -1.630701 -0.116432*** -2.740045 
+ Ln (Firm Risk) 0.146020*** 9.392773 0.223555*** 10.45269 + Ln (Firm Risk) 0.041524*** 3.423485 0.010813*** 2.868543 
+/- Leverage (LEV) 0.739587*** 9.861672 0.018166 0.174745 +/- Leverage (LEV) -0.143832** -2.285031 -0.086759*** -4.661365 
+/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.075301*** -4.541860 -0.027932 -0.997832 +/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.003268 -0.183316 -0.004344 -0.730666 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.231213* -1.785873 -0.379817* -1.925146 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.151644* -1.732223 -0.039212 -1.382118 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000734*** -2.617118 -0.001125** -2.335617 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000119 -0.675960 0.0000227 0.392042 
+ Ln (Age) -0.010600 -0.388934 -0.058710 -1.188929 + Ln (Age) -0.009360 -0.610388 -0.009284* -1.838205 
+ Sales Growth (SG) 0.0000486 0.456640 0.000177 1.101361 + Sales Growth (SG) 0.000134 1.248368 0.0000667** 2.344730 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.001158 0.118630 0.006676 0.383762 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.000857 0.135961 0.002493 1.203185 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.0000638 -0.131500 0.000501 0.818736 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.000407 -1.093010 -0.000015 -0.124658 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.000142 0.044802 0.001956 0.429312 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.000267 0.133022 -0.000131 -0.196236 
+/- Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) -0.002724 -0.918713 -0.008542*** -2.840079 
+/- Gross Domestic Product  
(GDP) -0.000464 -0.162026 0.001398* 1.649392 
- OC x RPT 0.006514** 2.329149 0.010316** 2.510404 - OCF x RPT -0.006655 -0.518572 -0.002826 -0.693086 
- OC x Tenure 0.000509* 1.840547 0.00000374 0.008652 - OCF x Tenure -0.002508** -2.157480 0.000242 0.625878 
- OC x Banks -0.000733 -1.042630 -0.001788 -1.645324 - OCF x Banks 0.004489 1.530468 0.002573*** 2.646703 
 Firm Type -0.198277*** -4.437326 -0.279587*** -3.468047  Firm Type 0.022994 0.939048 0.008744 1.066745 
 N 514  514   N 514  514  
 Adjusted R-Squared (%)  
11.9446 
  
9.0853 
  Adjusted R-Squared (%) 
3.0058 
  
5.5321 
 
 F-Statistic 12.00181***  9.104979***   F-Statistic 3.513374***  5.749614***  
                                      * 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
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Table 6.18: Actual Regression Results (Main Results) : Normal OLS Regression Fixed Effects Model (Family Firms And Non-Family 
Firms)(Without Biased Industries) 
Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable Expected 
Signs 
Independent Variables And 
Intercept 
Dependent Variable 
Tobin’s Q MBV ROE ROA 
Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats Coeff. t-stats 
+/- Intercept 2.903995*** 8.164830 1.949360*** 3.302149 +/- Intercept -0.563796 -1.122211 0.057485 0.349842 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) -0.281612** -2.297469 -0.466114*** -2.622057 
- Related Party Transactions 
That Are Likely to result in 
Expropriation Ratio (RPT) 0.260813 0.468949 0.118957 0.674740 
+ Ownership Concentration 
(OC)  -0.001207 -0.448913 0.009321** 2.281885 
+ Predicted Ownership 
Concentration (OCF) 0.020122 1.526513 0.003141 0.718719 
- Average Independent 
Directors Tenure (Tenure) -0.022390* -1.654990 0.009568 0.445645 
- Average Independent Directors 
Tenure (Tenure) 0.114732** 2.251013 -0.006782 -0.400691 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged 
by the Firm (Banks) 0.046470 1.523250 0.063803 1.350747 
- No. of Local Banks Engaged by 
the Firm (Banks) -0.208946 -1.630316 -0.115868*** -2.732503 
+ Ln (Firm Risk) 0.141202*** 9.324425 0.212159*** 10.22668 + Ln (Firm Risk) 0.041494*** 3.419657 0.010726*** 2.850451 
+/- Leverage (LEV) 0.737013*** 10.10117 0.003144 0.031232 +/- Leverage (LEV) -0.143746** -2.282858 -0.087755*** -4.723160 
+/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.074521*** -4.554833 -0.027986 -1.011227 +/- Firm Size (SIZE) -0.003273 -0.183584 -0.004317 -0.727633 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.197358 -1.559233 -0.306801 -1.595780 
+/- Independent Directors Ratio 
(IDR) -0.151872* -1.734117 -0.037856 -1.336869 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000680** -2.478526 -0.001015** -2.159969 
+ Non-Affiliated Blockholders 
(NAB) -0.000119 -0.677024 0.0000227 0.393026 
+ Ln (Age) -0.002739 -0.101072 -0.044178 -0.901963 + Ln (Age) -0.009392 -0.612245 -0.009363* -1.858028 
+ Sales Growth (SG) 0.0000511 0.501694 0.000164 1.071766 + Sales Growth (SG) 0.000134 1.246344 0.0000666** 2.344668 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.000485 0.050826 0.005380 0.317721 
+ R&D Expenditure-to-Sales 
(RDS) 0.000860 0.136384 0.002528 1.222799 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.0000537 -0.113596 0.000442 0.741115 
+ Capital Expenditure-to-Sales 
(CS) -0.000407 -1.093033 -0.0000135 -0.112186 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) -0.000437 -0.140583 0.001290 0.288647 
+/- Marketing & Advertising 
Expenditure-to-Sales (MS) 0.000270 0.134018 -0.000123 -0.183790 
- OC x RPT 0.006601** 2.416893 0.010844*** 2.709921 - OCF x RPT -0.006656 -0.518466 -0.002808 -0.690059 
- OC x Tenure 0.000456* 1.673050 -0.0000295 -0.069607 - OCF x Tenure -0.002506** -2.155206 0.000231 0.597919 
- OC x Banks -0.000898 -1.297621 -0.001942* -1.822713 - OCF x Banks 0.004490 1.530115 0.002559*** 2.638153 
 Firm Type -0.194178*** -4.381075 -0.280973*** -3.510659  Firm Type 0.022975 0.937952 0.008770 1.072319 
 N  
514 
  
514 
  N 
514 
  
514 
 
 Adjusted R-Squared (%)  
15.3558 
  
12.7604 
  Adjusted R-Squared (%) 
2.9442 
  
5.7039 
 
 F-Statistic 14.97810***  12.26994***   F-Statistic 3.337329***  5.660675***  
                                      * 10% sig.level   **  5% sig.level  *** 1% sig.level  
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The following are the summary of the research results of the robustness test for the key 
variables analysed in this research: 
Table 6.19: Summary of Research Results (Key Variables)(Coefficients) 
(Family Firms)(Without Biased Industries) 
Main Variables 
Tested  
Firm Value  
Tobin’s Q   Market-to-Book 
Value (MBV) 
Return On 
Equity (ROE) 
Return On 
Asset 
(ROA) 
Related Party 
Transactions 
That Are Likely 
to result in 
Expropriation 
Ratio (RPT)  
 
-0.193345* 
-0.192718* 
-0.669589*** 
-0.658401*** 
0.534871 
0.534608 
0.132284 
0.132378 
Average 
Independent 
directors’ tenure 
(Tenure) 
 
 
0.003896 
0.006089 
 
0.008252 
0.013275 
0.052924 
0.053097 
0.009961 
0.009928 
No. of Domestic 
banks Engaged 
by the Firm 
(Banks)  
0.027722 
0.029613 
0.0127 
0.015354 
-0.189101 
-0.188701 
-0.004254 
-0.004347 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And RPT 
 
0.00524** 
0.005227** 
0.015583*** 
0.015312*** 
-0.012728 
-0.012723 
-0.003288 
-0.00329 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And Tenure 
 
-0.000168 
-0.000194 
-0.000287 
-0.00034 
-0.001187 
-0.001192 
-0.000169 
-0.000168 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And Banks 
 
-0.000574 
-0.000621 
 
 
-0.000666 
-0.000763 
 
 
0.004306 
0.004297 
 
 
 
0.0000281 
0.0000301 
 
 
*10% significance level     **5% significance level     ***1% significance level   
Italic figures represent coefficients of Fixed Effects Model. 
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Table 6.20: Summary of Research Results (Key Variables)(Coefficients) 
(Non-Family Firms) (Without Biased Industries) 
Main Variables 
Tested  
Firm Value  
Tobin’s Q   Market-to-Book 
Value (MBV) 
Return On 
Equity (ROE) 
Return On 
Asset (ROA) 
Related Party 
Transactions 
That Are Likely 
to result in 
Expropriation 
Ratio (RPT)  
 
 
1.819565 
1.436663 
 
0.366883 
0.209144 
-0.12633 
-0.1265 
-0.058315 
-0.063254 
Average 
Independent 
directors’ tenure 
(Tenure) 
 
-0.355047*** 
-0.32833*** 
0.003459 
0.005357 
0.014211 
0.014229 
0.024756*** 
0.025077*** 
No. of Domestic 
banks Engaged 
by the Firm 
(Banks)  
0.378809 
0.461942* 
0.080438 
0.114866 
0.001979 
0.002005 
-0.025887 
-0.026168 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And RPT 
 
-0.041438 
-0.033614 
-0.010321 
-0.007102 
0.002042 
0.002045 
0.001421 
0.001566 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And Tenure 
 
0.007638*** 
0.007072*** 
0.000366 
0.000327 
-0.000165 
-0.000165 
-0.000411*** 
-0.000414*** 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And Banks 
 
 
 
-0.008232 
-0.009887* 
 
 
-0.002976 
-0.003494 
 
 
-0.0000328 
-0.0000333 
 
 
0.000428 
0.000425 
 
 
*10% significance level     **5% significance level     ***1% significance level   
Italic figures represent coefficients of Fixed Effects Model. 
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Table 6.21: Summary of Research Results (Key Variables)  
(Family Firms And Non-Family Firms)(Without Biased Industries) 
Main Variables 
Tested  
Firm Value  
Tobin’s Q   Market-to-Book 
Value (MBV) 
Return On 
Equity (ROE) 
Return On 
Asset (ROA) 
 
Related Party 
Transactions 
That Are Likely 
to result in 
Expropriation 
Ratio (RPT) 
  
-0.27262** 
-0.281612** 
-0.4381** 
-0.466114*** 
0.260757 
0.260813 
0.119303 
0.118957 
Average 
Independent 
directors’ tenure 
(Tenure) 
 
-0.026071* 
-0.02239* 
0.005135 
0.009568 
0.114812** 
0.114732** 
-0.007298 
-0.006782 
No. of Domestic 
banks Engaged 
by the Firm 
(Banks)  
0.038542 
0.04647 
0.057301 
0.063803 
-0.208927 
-0.208946 
-0.116432*** 
-0.115868*** 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And RPT 
0.006514** 
0.006601** 
0.010316** 
0.010844*** 
-0.006655 
-0.006656 
-0.002826 
-0.002808 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And Tenure 
 
0.000509* 
0.000456* 
0.00000374 
-0.0000295 
-0.002508** 
-0.002506** 
0.000242 
0.000231 
Interaction 
Between 
Ownership 
Concentration 
And Banks 
 
-0.000733 
-0.000898 
-0.001788 
-0.001942* 
0.004489 
0.00449 
0.002573*** 
0.002559*** 
Firm Type 
 
 
-0.198277*** 
-0.194178*** 
-0.279587*** 
-0.280973*** 
0.022994 
0.022975 
0.008744 
0.00877 
*10% significance level     **5% significance level     ***1% significance level   
Italic figures represent coefficients of Fixed Effects Model. 
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For family firms analysed in this research, RPTs which are likely to result in 
expropriation reduce firm value and it is statistically significant at 1% and 10% 
significance level. However, this reduction only affect market-based measures of firm 
value only i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV. In addition, controlling shareholders‘ ownership 
has a statistically significant positive moderating effect on this negative relationship at 
1% and 5% significance level respectively. However, this significant positive 
moderating effect also only affect market-based measures of firm value only i.e. Tobin‘s 
Q and MBV. For non-family firms, there is no significant relationship between RPTs 
which are likely to result in expropriation and firm value for both accounting-based and 
market-based performance measures. However, in non-family firms in exclusive 
industries or biased industries, there is a significant negative moderating effect of 
controlling shareholders‘ ownership on this relationship for market-based performance 
measures (Tobin‘s Q). This conclusion is derived by comparing the pre-robustness and 
robustness test results for non-family firms. For the pooled model (family and non-
family firms), RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation reduce firm value and it 
is statistically significant at 1% and 5% significance level. However, this reduction only 
affect market-based measures of firm value only i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV. In addition, 
controlling shareholders‘ ownership has a statistically significant positive moderating 
effect on this negative relationship at 1% and 5% significance level. However, this 
significant positive moderating effect also only affect market-based measures of firm 
value only i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV.  
In the family firm model, ownership concentration does not have significant 
relationship with firm value for both accounting-based and market-based performance 
measures. However, in non-family firms, there are contradictory results on the 
relationship between ownership concentration and market-based performance measures. 
Ownership concentration has a significant negative relationship with firm value for 
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Tobin‘s Q where as ownership concentration has a significant positive relationship with 
MBV.  Likewise, in the pooled model (family and non-family firms), ownership 
concentration has a positive relationship with firm value for market-based performance 
measures only (i.e. MBV). 
For family firms analysed in this research, average independent directors‘ tenure has no 
significant relationship with firm value. Controlling shareholders‘ ownership also has 
no siginificant moderating effect on this relationship. For non-family firms, there is 
inconclusive evidence on the relationship between average independent directors‘ 
tenure and firm value as there is a significant negative relationship for market-based 
performance measures (Tobin‘s Q) at a significance level of 1% and a significant 
positive relationship for accounting-based performance measures (ROA) also at a 
significance level of 1%. There is also inconclusive evidence on the moderating effect 
of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on this relationship. For market-based 
performance measures (Tobin‘s Q), there is a significant positive moderating effect 
which is significant at 5% significance level whereas for accounting-based performance 
measures (ROA), there is a significant negative moderating effect which is significant at 
5% significance level. For the pooled (family and non-family firms) model, there is 
inconclusive evidence with regards to the relationship between average independent 
directors‘ tenure and firm value. Average independent directors‘ tenure reduces firm 
value for market-based performance measures (i.e. Tobin‘s Q) and this is statistically 
significant at 10% significance level whereas it increases firm value for accounting-
based performance measures (i.e. ROE) and this is statistically significant at 5% 
significance level. Similarly, for the pooled (family and non-family firms) model, there 
is inconclusive evidence with regards to the moderating effect of controlling 
shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between average independent directors‘ 
tenure and firm value. Controlling shareholders‘ ownership have a significant positive 
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moderating effect on this relationship for market-based performance measures (i.e. 
Tobin‘s Q) and this is statistically significant at 10% significance level whereas 
controlling shareholders‘ ownership have a significant negative moderating effect on 
this relationship for accounting-based performance measures (i.e. ROE) and this is 
statistically significant at 5% significance level.  
For family firms analysed in this research, the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engaged with do not have any statistical significant relationship with firm value. 
Controlling shareholders‘ ownership also do not have any statistical significant 
moderating effect on this relationship. For non-family firms, there is a significant 
positive relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with 
and firm value at 10% significance level. In addition, controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership have a significant negative moderating effect on this relationship at 10% 
significance level. However, both this significant positive relationship and significant 
positive negative effect is restricted to market-based performance measures only (i.e. 
Tobin‘s Q). For the pooled model (family and non-family firms), there is a statistical 
significant negative relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with and firm value and this is statistically significant at 1% significance level. 
However, this reduction only affect accounting-based performance measures of firm 
value i.e ROA. For the pooled model (family and non-family firms), there is also 
inconclusive evidence on the moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership 
on the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with 
and firm value as there is a statistically significant positive moderating effect on 
accounting-based performance measures (i.e. ROA and significant at 1% significance 
level) and a statistically significant negative moderating effect on market-based 
performance measures (i.e. MBV and significant at 10% significance level).  
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In the pooled model (family and non-family firms), family firms has a lower firm value 
as compared with non-family firms and this is statistically significant at 1% significance 
level. In addition, in the pooled model (family and non-family firms), the joint 
hypotheses of H0 : βRPTs of family firms and βRPTs of non- family firms = 0 is rejected and has a 
significant negative relationship as derived from the regression results. Both these 
results prove that the negative relationship between RPT and firm value is stronger in 
family firms compared to non-family firms. However, this only affect market-based 
measures i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV. Likewise, in the pooled model (family and non-
family firms), the joint hypotheses of H0 : βOC X RPTs of family firms and βOC X RPTs of non- family 
firms = 0 is rejected and has a significant positive moderating effect as derived from the 
regression results. Both these results prove that the positive moderating effect of 
controlling shareholders‘ ownership on this relationship is stronger in family firms 
compared to non-family firms due to the overall lower firm value of family firms (i.e. 
market-based measures of Tobin‘s Q and MBV) which renders a stronger corporate 
reputational effects in family firms.  
Even though in non-family firms, average independent directors‘ tenure reduces firm 
value for market-based performance measures (i.e. Tobin‘s Q) and this is statistically 
significant at 1% significance level; it cannot be proven that this negative relationship is 
stronger in non-family firms compared to family firms because overall, in the pooled 
model (family and non-family firms), family firms has a lower firm value than non-
family firms and this is statistically significant at 1% significance level. Similarly, 
although in non-family firms, average independent directors‘ tenure increases firm 
value for accounting-based performance measures (i.e. ROE) and this is statistically 
significant at 1% significance level; it cannot be proven that this positive relationship is 
stronger in non-family firms compared to family firms because overall, in the pooled 
model (family and non-family firms), there is no significant difference between the firm 
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value of family firms and non-family firms. Likewise, although in non-family firms, 
controlling shareholders‘ ownership have a significant positive moderating effect on the 
relationship between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value for market-
based performance measures (i.e. Tobin‘s Q) and this is statistically significant at 1% 
significance level; it cannot be proven that this moderating effect is stronger in non-
family firms compared to family firms because overall, in the pooled model (family and 
non-family firms), family firms has a lower firm value than non-family firms and this is 
statistically significant at 1% significance level. A higher firm value for non-family 
firms renders a weaker positive moderating effect. Similarly, although in non-family 
firms, controlling shareholders‘ ownership have a significant negative moderating effect 
on the relationship between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value for 
accounting-based performance measures (i.e. ROA) and this is statistically significant at 
1% significance level, it cannot be proven that this negative moderating effect is 
stronger in non-family firms compared to family firms because the joint hypotheses in 
the pooled model (family and non-family firms) i.e. H0 : βocf x tenure of family firms and β ocf x 
tenure of non-family firms = 0 is not rejected as derived from the regression results for market-
based performance measures (ROA). 
 Even though there is a statistically significant positive relationship between the number 
of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value (i.e. market-based 
performance measure Tobin‘s Q) in non-family firms; this result cannot prove that this 
positive relationship is stronger in non-family firms compared to family firms because 
the joint hypotheses in the pooled model (family and non-family firms) i.e. H0 : βbanks of 
family firms and β banks of non-family firms = 0 is not rejected as derived from the regression results 
for market-based performance measures (Tobin‘s Q). 
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Despite the fact that non-family firms‘ controlling shareholders‘ ownership has a 
statistically significant negative moderating effect on the relationship between the 
number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value (i.e. market-based 
measure Tobin‘s Q), this result cannot prove that the negative moderating effect of 
controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between the number of 
domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value (Tobin‘s Q) is stronger in 
non-family firms compared to family firms because the joint hypotheses in the pooled 
model (family and non-family firms) i.e. H0 : βoc x banks of family firms and β oc x banks of non-family 
firms = 0 is not rejected as derived from the regression results for market-based 
performance measures (Tobin‘s Q). 
For family firms, non-family firms and the pooled model (family and non-family firms), 
firm risk is significantly positively related to firm value for both market-based 
performance measures and accounting-based performance measures at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. For both family firms and the pooled model (family and 
non-family firms), leverage has a significant positive relationship with market-based 
performance measures (Tobin‘s Q) at 1% significance level but a significant negative 
relationship with accounting-based performance measures (ROE and ROA) at 1% and 
5% significance level. However, for non-family firms, leverage does not have a 
significant relationship with both market-based and accounting-based performance 
measures. 
In addition, for family firms, firm size has a significant negative relationship with 
market-based performance measures (Tobin‘s Q) at 1% significance level but a 
significant positive relationship with accounting-based performance measures (ROA) at 
10% significance level. In non-family firms, there is no significant relationship between 
firm size and firm value for both market-based and accounting-based performance 
measures. For the pooled model (family and non-family firms), firm size has a 
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significant negative relationship with market-based performance measure only (Tobin‘s 
Q) at 1% significance level. Furthermore, in family firms, independent directors‘ ratio 
has no significant relationship with firm value for both market-based and accounting-
based performance measures. However, for non-family firms, independent directors‘ 
ratio has a significant negative relationship with market-based performance measures 
(Tobin‘s Q) at 10% significance level. In the pooled model (family and non-family 
firms), independent directors‘ ratio has a significant negative relationship with market-
based performance measures (Tobin‘s Q and MBV) and accounting-based performance 
measures (ROE) both at 10% significance level respectively. 
On the other hand, for both family firms and the pooled model (family and non-family 
firms), non-affiliated blockholders have a siginificant negative relationship with firm 
value but only on market-based performance measures only (Tobin‘s Q and MBV) at 
1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively.  However, for non-family firms, there 
is no significant relationship between non-affiliated blockholders and firm value for 
both market-based and accounting-based performance measures. 
In family firms and the pooled model (family and non-family firms), firm age has a 
significant negative relationship with firm value for accounting-based performance 
measures (i.e. ROA) only at 10% significance level but not market-based performance 
measures. However, in non-family firms, firm age has no significant relationship with 
firm value for both market-based performance measures and accounting-based 
performance measures. Likewise, for family firms, non-family firms and the pooled 
model (family and non-family firms), sales growth has a significant positive 
relationship with accounting-based performance measures (ROA) (significant at 1%, 
5% and 10% significance level respectively) but not market-based performance 
measures.  
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Moreover, in family firms, marketing & advertising expenditures have a significant 
negative relationship with accounting-based performance measures (i.e. ROA) at 10% 
significance level but not market-based performance measures. However, for non-
family firms and the pooled model (family and non-family firms); marketing & 
advertising expenditures have no significant relationship with firm value for both 
market-based performance measures and accounting-based performance measures. In 
family firms, non-family firms and the pooled model (family and non-family firms); 
R&D expenditures and capital expenditures and have no significant relationship with 
firm value for both market-based performance measures and accounting-based 
performance measures.  
For family firms, GDP has a significant negative relationship with market-based 
performance measures (i.e. MBV) at 1% significance level but a significant positive 
relationship with accounting-based performance measures (i.e. ROE and ROA) at 1% 
and 5% significance level respectively. For non-family firms, GDP has a significant 
negative relationship with accounting-based performance measures (i.e. ROE) at 5% 
significance level. In the pooled model (family and non-family firms), GDP has a 
significant negative relationship with market-based performance measures (i.e. MBV) at 
1% significance level but a significant positive relationship with accounting-based 
performance measures (i.e. ROA) at 10%  significance level.  
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6.6 HYPOTHESES TESTED 
The following is a description of the hypotheses being tested as well as the conclusions 
that are made: 
H1a:  There is a negative relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) 
which are likely to result in expropriation and a firm value in Malaysian firms. 
 The research results show that there is a statistically significant negative 
relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation and firm 
value (market-based measures i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV) for family firms only. It 
is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively and this result 
is robust against firms in non-exclusive industries (without biased industries).  
Therefore, H1a is supported. 
H1b:  If there is a negative relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) 
which are likely to result in expropriation and firm value in Malaysian firms, 
this negative relationship is likely to be stronger in family firms compared to 
non-family firms. 
 The research results shows that in family firms, there is a significant negative 
relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation and firm 
value only in market-based performance measures i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV. 
Likewise, in the pooled model (family and non-family firms) results, the joint 
hypotheses of H0 : βrpt for family firms and H0 : βrpt for non-family firms  = 0 is rejected (for 
market-based measures i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV) and there is a significant 
negative relationship. Furthermore, the pooled model (family and non-family 
firms) results shows that family firms has a lower firm value (market-based 
measures i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV) compared to non-family firms and this is 
statistically significant at 1% significance level. These results are robust against 
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firms in non-exclusive industries (without biased industries).  All these prove 
that the negative relationship between RPT and firm value is stronger in family 
firms compared to non-family firms. Hence, H1b is supported. 
H2a:  There is a negative relationship between independent directors’ tenure and firm 
value in Malaysian firms. 
 The research results show that in family firms within exclusive (biased) 
industries, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between 
average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value in market-based 
performance measures i.e. MBV. This is significant at 10% significance level. 
This conclusion is made by comparing the pre-robustness test results of family 
firms and the robustness test results of family firms. Therefore, H2a is supported. 
H2b:  If there is a negative relationship between independent directors’ tenure and 
firm value in Malaysian firms, this negative relationship is likely to be stronger 
in family firms compared to non-family firms. 
 It cannot be proven whether the significant negative relationship between 
average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value in family firms within 
exclusive (biased) industries is stronger in family firms compared to non-family 
firms for market-based performance measure i.e. MBV. The reason is that in the 
pooled model (family and non-family firms) results (with biased industries), the 
joint hypotheses of H0 : βtenure for family firms and H0 : βtenure for non-family firms  = 0 is not 
rejected for market-based performance measures (i.e. MBV). Therefore, no 
conclusion can be made as to whether the negative relationship between average 
independent directors‘ tenure and firm value is stronger in family firms or non-
family firms. Hence, H2b is not supported. 
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H3a:  There is a negative relationship between the quantity of domestic banks that the 
firm engages with and firm value in Malaysian firms. 
 The research results shows that in non-family firms, there is a statistically 
significant positive relationship between the quantity of domestic banks that the 
firm engages with and firm value for market-based performance measures 
(Tobin‘s Q). This is robust against non-family firms without exclusive or biased 
industries. This is significant at 10% significance level.  Therefore, H3a is not 
supported. 
H3b: If there is a negative relationship between the quantity of domestic banks that 
the firm engages with and firm value in Malaysian firms, this negative 
relationship is likely to be stronger in family firms compared to non-family 
firms. 
 Since H3a is not supported, thus, H3b is not supported. 
H4a:  There is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership on 
the relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) which are likely to 
result in expropriation and firm value in Malaysian firms. 
 The research results show that for family firms, there is a statistically significant 
positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership concentration 
on the relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation and 
firm value for market based performance measures i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV. 
The results are also robust against family firms without exclusive or biased 
industries. These results are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% significance level 
respectively.  Therefore, H4a is supported. 
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H4b :  If there is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership on 
the relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) which are likely to 
result in expropriation and firm value in Malaysian firms, this positive 
moderating effect is likely to be stronger in family firms compared to non-family 
firms. 
 The research results show that there is a statistically significant positive 
moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership concentration on the 
relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation and firm 
value for market based performance measures i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV in family 
firms. In addition, in the pooled model (family and non-family firms), the joint 
hypotheses of H0 : βoc x RPTs for family firms and H0 : βoc x RPTs for non-family firms  = 0 is 
rejected for market-based performance measures (i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV). 
Likewise, in the pooled model (family and non-family firms), overall, the firm 
value (i.e. market based measures of Tobin‘s Q and MBV) is lower in family 
firms compared to non-family firms and this is statistically significant at 1% 
significance level. Both these results are robust against family firms without 
biased or exclusive industries. Basically, these results show that the significant 
positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the 
relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation and firm 
value is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. Lower overall 
firm value (market-based performance measures i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV) in 
family firms renders a stronger corporate reputational effects in these firms. 
Therefore, H4b is supported. 
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H5a:  There is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership on 
the relationship between independent directors’ tenure and firm value in 
Malaysian firms. 
 The research results shows that there is a statistically significant positive 
moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship 
between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value for market-based 
performance measures (i.e. MBV) within family firms in exclusive or biased 
industries. This is statistically significant at 10% significance level. This 
conclusion is made after comparing the pre-robustness and robustness test 
results for family firms. Therefore, H5a is supported. 
H5b:  If there is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership on 
the relationship between independent directors’ tenure and firm value in 
Malaysian firms, this positive moderating effect is likely to be stronger in family 
firms compared to non-family firms. 
 Even though the research results shows that there is a statistically significant 
positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the 
relationship between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value for 
market-based performance measures (i.e. MBV) within family firms in exclusive 
or biased industries; it cannot be proven that this significant positive moderating 
effect is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms because in the 
pooled model (family and non-family firms)(with biased industries), the joint 
hypotheses of H0 : βoc x tenure for family firms and H0 : βoc x tenure for non-family firms  = 0 is 
not rejected for market-based performance measures (i.e. MBV). Therefore, no 
conclusion can be made as to whether the significant positive moderating effect 
of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between average 
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independent directors‘ tenure and firm value is stronger in family firms or non-
family firms. Hence, H5b is not supported. 
H6a:  There is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership on 
the relationship between the quantity of domestic banks that the firm engages 
with and firm value in Malaysian firms. 
 The research results shows that in non-family firms, controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership has a negative moderating effect on the relationship between the 
number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value for market-
based performance measures (Tobin‘s Q).  This result is robust against non-
family firms without exclusive or biased industries and is significant at 10% 
significance level respectively. Therefore, H6a is not supported. 
H6b:  If there is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders’ ownership on 
the relationship between the quantity of domestic banks that the firm engages 
with and firm value in Malaysian firms, this positive moderating effect is likely 
to be stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. 
 Since H6a is not supported, H6b is also not supported. 
6.7 SUMMARY OF HYPOTHESES 
Table 6.22 summarise the hypotheses being tested in this research as discussed in the 
previous section. The summary discuss whether the hypothesis is supported or not; after 
controlling for industry effects in the robustness tests:
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Table 6.22: Summary Of Hypotheses Tested 
Hypothesis 
 
Description 
 
Is Hypothesis 
Supported? 
H1a 
 
There is a negative relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) which are likely to result in expropriation and firm 
value in Malaysian firms. 
Yes  
H1b 
 
If there is a negative relationship between related party transactions (RPTs) which are likely to result in expropriation and 
firm value in Malaysian firms, this negative relationship is likely to be stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. 
Yes  
H2a There is a negative relationship between independent directors‘ tenure and firm value in Malaysian firms. Yes  
H2b 
 
If there is a negative relationship between independent directors‘ tenure and firm value in Malaysian firms, this negative 
relationship is likely to be stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. 
No 
H3a 
 
There is a negative relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value in 
Malaysian firms. 
No 
H3b If there is a negative relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value in 
Malaysian firms, this negative relationship is likely to be stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. 
No 
H4a 
 
There is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between related party 
transactions (RPTs) which are likely to result in expropriation and firm value in Malaysian firms. 
Yes  
 
H4b 
 
If there is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between related party 
transactions (RPTs) which are likely to result in expropriation and firm value in Malaysian firms, this positive moderating 
effect is likely to be stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. 
Yes  
H5a 
 
There is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between independent 
directors‘ tenure and firm value in Malaysian firms. 
Yes  
H5b If there is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between independent 
directors‘ tenure and firm value in Malaysian firms, this positive moderating effect is likely to be stronger in family firms 
compared to non-family firms. 
No 
H6a 
 
There is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between the number of 
domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value in Malaysian firms. 
No 
H6b If there is a positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between the number of 
domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value in Malaysian firms, this positive moderating effect is likely to be 
stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. 
No 
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6.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter discuss the overall research results  including the robustness tests results 
and how they are related to the hypotheses being tested. The descriptive statistics are 
also discussed. The next chapter will discuss the overview of the findings, implications 
of these findings, research significance and limitations in this research as well as 
suggestions for future research. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
7.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides conclusions drawn from the research findings and discussions 
presented in the previous chapter. This rest of the chapter is organised as follows. 
Section 5.2 discusses the overview of the findings based upon the research objectives. 
Section 5.3 discusses the implications of findings. Section 5.4 discusses the theoretical 
contributions and policy implications. Section 5.5 discusses the research limitations. 
Section 5.6 discusses the suggestions for future research and Section 5.7 concludes. 
7.2 DISCUSSION: OVERVIEW OF THE FINDINGS 
The following are explanations of the findings based on the research objectives of this 
study.  
7.2.1 Research Objective 1: To Examine Whether There Is A Negative 
Relationship Between Related Party Transactions (RPTs) Which Are Likely To 
Result In Expropriation, Independent Directors’ Tenure And The Number Of 
Domestic Banks That The Firm Engages With, And firm value In Malaysian 
Firms. 
This study focused on minority shareholder expropriation in Malaysian public-listed 
firms. The first research objective is to examine whether there is a significant negative 
relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation, independent 
directors‘ tenure and the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with, and firm 
value in Malaysian firms.   
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Based on the regression results, it is found that RPTs which are likely to result in 
expropriation significantly reduces firm value (market-based measures i.e. Tobin‘s Q 
and MBV) in Malaysian family firms only. In non-family firms, there is no significant 
relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation and firm value for 
both market-based and accounting-based performance measures. This result is 
consistent with the study by Munir and Gul (2011) whereby they found that related 
party transactions reduce firm value (i.e. market-based measures) in Malaysian family 
firms but not in non-family firms. 
For Malaysian family firms in exclusive industries, there is a statistically significant 
negative relationship between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value in 
market-based performance measures (i.e. MBV). However, in family firms in non-
exclusive industries or without biased industries, it is found that average independent 
directors‘ tenure does not have any statistical significant relationship with firm value for 
both market-based performance and accounting-based performance measures. In non-
family firms, there is inconclusive evidence on the relationship between  average 
independent directors‘ tenure and firm value as there is a significant negative 
relationship for market-based performance measures (i.e. Tobin‘s Q) but a significant 
positive relationship for accounting-based performance measures (i.e. ROA). All these 
results are inconsistent with the findings by Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) and Liu 
and Sun (2010) who found that longer tenure of independent directors is beneficial to 
the interests of minority shareholders.  
The research results also shows that there is no significant relationship between the 
number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value for both market-
based and accounting-based performance measures in Malaysian family firms. 
However,  there is a significant positive relationship between the number of domestic 
banks that the firm engages with and firm value for market-based performance measures 
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(Tobin‘s Q) in Malaysian non-family firms. These results are inconsistent with the 
findings by Fok et.al. (2004) who found that there is a significant negative relationship 
between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value among 
public-listed firms in Taiwan. 
7.2.2 Research Objective 2: To Examine Whether, If There Is A Negative 
Relationship Between Related Party Transactions (RPTs) Which Are Likely To 
Result In Expropriation, Independent Directors’ Tenure And The Number Of 
Domestic Banks That The Firm Engages With, And firm value In Malaysian 
Firms; This Negative Relationship Is Stronger In Family Firms Compared To 
Non-Family Firms. 
The second research objective is to examine whether, if there is a significant negative 
relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation, independent 
directors‘ tenure and the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with, and firm 
value in Malaysian firms; this negative relationship is stronger in family firms 
compared to non-family firms.  
The regression results show that the significant negative relationship between RPTs 
which are likely to result in expropriation against firm value (market-based measures 
i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV) is more prominent in Malaysian family firms compared to 
non-family firms. This finding is similar to the findings by Munir and Gul (2011) who 
found that the significant negative relationship between total RPTs and firm value 
(market-based measures) is stronger in Malaysian family firms compared to non-family 
firms.  
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On the other hand, based upon the research results, it cannot be proven that the 
significant negative relationship between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm 
value (i.e. market-based performance measures of Tobin‘s Q and MBV and accounting 
–based performance measure of ROE) is stronger in family firms or non-family firms.  
7.2.3 Research Objective 3: To Examine Whether There Is A Positive 
Moderating Effect Of Controlling Shareholders’ Ownership On The Relationship 
Between Related Party Transactions (RPTs) Which Are Likely To Result In 
Expropriation, Independent Directors’ Tenure And The Number Of Domestic 
Banks That The Firm Engages With, And firm value In Malaysian Firms. 
The third research objective is to examine whether there is a significant positive 
moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between 
RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation, independent directors‘ tenure and the 
number of domestic banks that the firm engages with, and firm value in Malaysian 
firms.  
The regression results show that there is a significant positive moderating effect of 
controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between RPTs which are likely 
to result in expropriation and firm value (market-based measures i.e. Tobin‘s Q and 
MBV) in Malaysian family firms only. In Malaysian non-family firms, there is a 
significant negative moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the 
relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation and firm value for 
market-based performance measure only (Tobin‘s Q).  In addition, there is also a 
significant positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the 
relationship between independent directors‘ tenure and firm value (on market-based 
performance measures i.e. MBV) in Malaysian family firms within exclusive industries 
or biased industries only. In Malaysian family firms within non-exclusive industries or 
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without biased industries,  there is no significant moderating effect of controlling 
shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between average independent directors‘ 
tenure and firm value for both market-based and accounting-based performance 
measures. On the other hand, in Malaysian non-family firms, there is inconclusive 
evidence on the moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the 
relationship between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value. For market-
based performance measures (Tobin‘s Q), there is a significant positive moderating 
effect whereas for accounting-based performance measures (ROA), there is a significant 
negative moderating effect. 
Furthermore, there is no significant moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership on the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with and firm value for both market-based performance and accounting-based 
performance measures in Malaysian family firms. However, for Malaysian non-family 
firms, there is  a significant negative moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership on this relationship on market-based performance measure (Tobin‘s Q). 
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7.2.4 Research Objective 4: To Examine Whether, If There Is A Positive 
Moderating Effect Of Controlling Shareholders’ Ownership On The Relationship 
Between Related Party Transactions (RPTs) Which Are Likely To Result In 
Expropriation, Independent Directors’ Tenure And The Number Of Domestic 
Banks That The Firm Engages With, And firm value In Malaysian Firms; This 
Positive Moderating Effect Is Stronger In Family Firms Compared To Non-Family 
Firms. 
The fourth research objective is to examine whether, if there is a significant positive 
moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between 
RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation, independent directors‘ tenure and the 
number of domestic banks that the firm engages with, and firm value in Malaysian 
firms; this positive moderating effect is stronger in family firms compared to non-
family firms. 
The research results shows that the significant positive moderating effect of controlling 
shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in 
expropriation and firm value (market-based measures i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV)  is 
stronger in Malaysian family firms compared to non-family firms.  However, it cannot 
be proven whether the positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership 
on the relationship between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value 
(market-based measure i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV) is stronger in family firms compared 
to non-family firms. 
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7.3 IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
This study examines the effects of RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation, 
independent directors‘ tenure and the quantity of domestic banks that the firm engages 
with in Malaysian firms and their impact upon firm value and whether these firm value 
effects are moderated by the controlling shareholder‘s ownership concentration. A 
comparison is also made on whether the resulting negative relationship (if any) and the 
resulting positive moderating effect (if any) is stronger in family firms compared to 
non-family firms. This comparison is made as the extant literature only provides limited 
empirical evidence as to whether expropriation is more prevalent in family firms or non-
family firms in the context of the Malaysian institutional setting. 
Basically, the findings in this research expand the findings by Chrisman, Chua, Chang 
and Kellermanns (2007) and Schulze et.al. (2001) that agency problems, specifically, 
Agency Problem Type II (Principal-principal conflict) is present not only within family 
firms but also in non-family firms. For family firms, this is evidenced by the significant 
negative relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation and firm 
value as well between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value in family 
firms. For non-family firms, this is evidenced by the significant negative moderating 
effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between RPTs which 
are likely to result in expropriation and firm value as well as the significant negative 
moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between 
the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value in non-family 
firms.  
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However, the findings also reveal that minority shareholder expropriation through RPTs 
is more prominent in Malaysian family firms compared to non-family firms. This 
possibly indirectly suggests that Agency Problem Type II (Principal-principal conflict) 
is more severe in family firms compared to non-family firms within the Malaysian 
context. Hence, attention on minority shareholder expropriation problems particularly 
via RPTs in Malaysia ought to focus more on family firms rather than non-family firms.  
Additionally, the positive relationship between ownership concentration and firm value 
in Malaysian family firms as well as in the pooled model (family and non-family firms) 
supports the argument by Heugens et.al. (2009) that increased controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership increases firm value within Asian emerging markets. 
Likewise, there is a significant negative relationship between independent directors‘ 
tenure and firm value within Malaysian family firms in exclusive industries only. This 
significant negative relationship possibly indirectly suggests that Malaysian family 
firms in exclusive industries may encounter less market competition and as a result, 
their independent directors are less concerned in evaluating the performance of their 
CEOs (Young, Stedham and Beekun, 2000). This provide opportunities for family 
controlling shareholders to increase their influences on the independent directors as they 
serve longer on the board, through their CEOs who are basically hired by them; and 
ultimately increase their level of expropriation. This reduces firm value. However, from 
the research results, it cannot be proven whether expropriation due to the long tenure of 
independent directors is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms within 
the context of the Malaysian institutional setting. Hence, attention on minority 
shareholder expropriation problems particularly due to long tenure of independent 
directors in Malaysia should focus on family firms as well as non-family firms. 
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Furthermore, the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with increases firm 
value in Malaysian non-family firms. On the other hand, there is no significant minority 
shareholder expropriation through the domestic banking channel in family firms. The 
reason for the result differences could possibly be due to the credit crunch experienced 
by emerging markets such as Malaysia during the global financial crisis which reduced 
the level of domestic bank lending (Cetorelli and Golberg, 2010; Claessens et.al., 2010; 
Tong and Wei, 2011). The findings in this study further suggests that this reduction of 
domestic bank lending could possibly be targeted more at family firms compared to 
non-family firms. This could occur as family firms may possibly be perceived by 
domestic banks as possessing higher credit risks compared to non-family firms for loan 
transactions. Non-family firms are perceived to have lower credit risks compared to 
family firms possibly because non-family firms such as state-owned firms are very 
likely to be bailed out by the government in the event of financial distress (Dewenter 
and Malatesta, 2001).  
In addition, non-family firms such as foreign-owned firms in Malaysia are mostly 
multinationals which possess larger assets in their balance sheets (Grauwe and 
Camerman, 2002) to serve as loan collaterals compared to local family firms and thus, 
they are perceived to have lower credit risks (Ma, Ma and Tian, 2012) compared to 
family firms. As a result of the different credit risk perception on Malaysian family and 
non-family firms, domestic bank lending is severely reduced during the credit crunch 
towards family firms. Consequently, family controlling shareholders have less 
opportunities to expropriate the domestic bank loans that their firms undertake which 
result in the insignificant minority shareholder expropriation through the domestic 
banking channel in family firms.  
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On the other hand, with little reduction of domestic bank loans to Malaysian non-family 
firms, these firms are able to use these loans productively to add value to the firm as 
what the results suggested. This shows that generally, controlling shareholders in non-
family firms do not expropriate the domestic loans that their firms undertake but 
instead, use it productively to add value to the firm. However, large controlling 
shareholders in non-family firms such as state-owned firms or government-linked 
companies (GLCs), expropriate the loans that their firms obtained from domestic banks 
as the results show that in non-family firms, there is a significant negative moderating 
effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between the number of 
domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value.  
Likewise, the results also show that in non-family firms in exclusive industries or biased 
industries, there is a significant negative moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership on the relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation 
and firm value which possibly suggests that in large non-family firms such as state-
owned firms or government-linked companies (GLCs), controlling shareholders 
expropriate minority shareholders through the usage of RPTs. It also suggests that in 
these large non-family firms; similar to the explanation earlier, due to lower market 
competition, independent directors in these firms may be less commited to evaluate the 
performance of their CEOs, hence, providing opportunities for controlling shareholders 
to expropriate minority shareholders through RPTs. All these findings are consistent 
with the findings of Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004) and Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006) who found that firms with higher state ownership have lower financial reporting 
practices which imply that they are likely to be involved in minority shareholder 
expropriation. 
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In addition, the significant positive moderating effects of controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership on the relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation 
and firm value in family firms as well as the significant positive moderating effects of 
controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between average independent 
directors‘ tenure and firm value in family firms in exclusive industries only; suggests 
the influence of family firm reputational effects in the post-Transmile period in 
encouraging large family controlling shareholders to reduce their expropriation of 
minority shareholders through RPTs and as well as to reduce their expropriation due to 
long tenure of independent directors (for family firms in exclusive industries only).  
Furthermore, the significant positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership on the relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation 
and firm value is stronger in family firms compared to non-family firms. This suggests 
that the corporate reputational effects due to the Transmile fiasco is stronger in family 
firms compared to non-family firms. Since corporate reputational effects is stronger in 
family firms compared to non-family firms, it also follows that indirectly, Agency 
Problem Type II (Principal-principal conflict) can be considered to be more severe in 
family firms compared to non-family firms. 
In addition, there are numerous anomalies in the research findings which constitute part 
of the limitations of this study. First, in Malaysian family firms, the statistically 
significant negative relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in 
expropriation and firm value as well as the significant positive moderating effect of 
controlling shareholders‘ ownership on this relationship are restricted to market-based 
performance measures i.e. Tobin‘s Q and MBV and not accounting-based performance 
measures. However, the negative significant moderating effect of controlling 
shareholders‘ ownership on this relationship in non-family firms is also only restricted 
to market-based performance measure (i.e. Tobin‘s Q). 
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Second, in the family firm in exclusive industries or in biased industries, ownership 
concentration has a positive relationship with firm value but it is restricted to 
accounting-based performance measures only (ROA). However, in non-family firms in 
exclusive industries or in biased industries, ownership concentration has a positive 
relationship with firm value but it is restricted to market-based performance measures 
only (MBV).  On the other hand, in non-family firms in non-exlusive industries or 
without biased industries, there are contradictory results on the relationship between 
ownership concentration and market-based performance measures. Ownership 
concentration has a significant negative relationship with firm value for Tobin‘s Q 
where as ownership concentration has a significant positive relationship with MBV.  
Likewise, in the pooled model (family and non-family firms) in non-exclusive 
industries or without biased industries, ownership concentration has a positive 
relationship with firm value for market-based performance measures only (i.e. MBV). 
Third, in Malaysian family firms within exclusive or biased industries, the significant 
negative relationship between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value as 
well as the positive moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on this 
relationship are also restricted to market-based performance measures i.e. MBV.  
Fourth, in Malaysian non-family firms and in the pooled model (family and non-family 
firms), there is inconclusive evidence i.e. contradictory results whereby there is a 
significant negative relationship between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm 
value for market-based performance measures (i.e. Tobin‘s Q) but a significant positive 
relationship between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value for 
accounting-based performance measures (i.e. ROA and ROE).  
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Fifth, in Malaysian non-family firms, the significant positive relationship between the 
number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value is restricted for 
market-based performance measures (i.e. Tobin‘s Q) whereas in the pooled model 
(family and non-family firms), the significant negative relationship between the number 
of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value is restricted for accounting-
based performance measures (i.e. ROA). 
Sixth, in Malaysian non-family firms, the moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership on the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with and firm value is restricted to market-based performance measures only 
(Tobin‘s Q).  
Seventh, in the pooled model (family and non-family firms), there are contradictory 
results for the moderating effects of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the 
relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm 
value.  For the negative moderating effect is on market-based performance measure 
(MBV) whereas the positive moderating effect is on accounting-based performance 
measure (ROA).  
Eigth, in Malaysian family firms and the pooled model (family and non-family firms) 
there are contradictory results in the relationship between leverage and firm value 
whereby leverage has a significant positive relationship with market-based performance 
measures (Tobin‘s Q) but a significant negative relationship with accounting-based 
performance measures (ROE and ROA).  However, for non-family firms, leverage 
increases firm value and this is restricted to market-based performance measures only 
(MBV). 
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Nineth, in Malaysian family firms and in the pooled model (family and non-family 
firms), there are contradictory results in the relationship between firm size and firm 
value whereby there is a significant negative relationship with market-based 
performance measures (Tobin‘s Q) but a significant positive relationship with 
accounting-based performance measures (ROA).   
Tenth, in Malaysian family firms and in the pooled model (family and non-family 
firms), non-affiliated blockholders have a siginificant negative relationship with firm 
value but it is restricted to market-based performance measures only (Tobin‘s Q and 
MBV).  
Eleventh, in Malaysian family firms and in the pooled model (family and non-family 
firms) in non-exclusive industries or without biased industries, firm age has a significant 
negative relationship with firm value but this is restricted to accounting-based 
performance measures (i.e. ROA) only.  
Twelveth, in Malaysian family firms, non-family firms and in the pooled model (family 
and non-family firms), sales growth has a significant positive relationship with firm 
value but this is restricted to accounting-based performance measures (ROA) only.  
Thirteenth, in Malaysian family firms in non-exclusive industries or without biased 
industries, marketing & advertising expenditures have a significant negative 
relationship with firm value but this is restricted to accounting-based performance 
measures (ROA) only.  
Fourteenth, in Malaysian family firms in exclusive industries or with biased industries, 
GDP has a significant positive relationship with firm value but this is restricted to only 
accounting-based performance measures (i.e. ROE and ROA). However, in Malaysian 
family firms in non-exclusive industries or without biased industries; there are 
contradictory results in the relationship between GDP and firm value whereby there is a 
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significant negative relationship with market-based performance measures (MBV) but a 
significant positive relationship with accounting-based performance measures (ROE 
and ROA). Moreover, in non-family firms, the significant negative relationship between 
GDP and firm value is restricted to accounting-based performance measures only 
(ROE). Likewise, for the pooled model (family and non-family firms), there are 
contradictory results in the relationship between GDP and firm value whereby GDP has 
a significant negative relationship with market-based performance measures (MBV) but 
a significant positive relationship with accounting-based performance measures (ROA). 
From the research findings‘ anomalies, the restrictions of the research results to certain 
type of performance measures i.e. market-based or accounting-based performance 
measures as well as the contradictory research results between accounting-based and 
market-based performance measures possibly suggests that the market-based and 
accounting-based performance measures have different susceptibility to management 
manipulation
23
. Generally, market-based performance measures are less susceptible to 
management manipulation compared to accounting-based performance measures 
(McGuire, Schneeweis and Branch, 1990) possibly because market-based performance 
measures reflect shareholder valuation of the firm as well as both current firm 
performance and future growth potential (Woo, Willard and Daellenbach, 1992).  
In contrast, accounting-based performance measures are more susceptible to 
management manipulation (Chakravarthy, 1986; Lubatkin and Shrieves, 1986; 
Purkayastha, 2013) because these performance measures are more oriented towards 
historical information (Chakravarthy, 1986; Purkayastha, 2013). Generally, accounting-
based performance measures encounter problems related to accounting manipulation, 
                                                          
23
 Likewise, the contradictory research results in the market-based performance measures in non-family firms in 
non-exclusive or without biased industries on the relationship between ownership concentration and market-based 
performance measures suggests that the differences could be due to the specification of ownership concentration. 
This is because for Tobin’s Q, predicted ownership concentration which is a function of firm risk and firm size is used 
whereas for MBV, ownership concentration is used. 
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asset undervaluation, distortion due to depreciation policies, inventory valuation and 
treatment of certain revenue and expenditure items, differences in methods of 
consolidating accounts and differences due to lack of standardisation in international 
accounting conventions (Chakravarthy, 1986).  
As a consequence of these problems, it can be observed in this study that there is a 
higher sensitivity of market-based performance measures towards Agency Problem 
Type II (principal-principal conflict) as evidenced by the significant negative 
relationship between RPTs which are like to result in expropriation and market-based 
performance measure (Tobin‘s Q and MBV), the significant negative relationship 
between average independent directors‘ tenure and market-based performance measure 
(MBV), the significant negative moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership on the relationship between RPTs which are like to result in expropriation 
and market-based performance measure (Tobin‘s Q and MBV) and the significant 
negative moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship 
between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and market-based 
performance measure (Tobin‘s Q). The higher sensitivity of market-based performance 
measures towards Agency Problem Type II (principal-principal conflict) is consistent 
with the finding by Mollah, Farooque and Karim (2012) who find that shareholders in 
emerging markets use their discretion where necessary to discount the market valuations 
of firms if they have a negative perception of firms‘ performances and they are less 
attracted to accounting-based performance measures which are prone to accounting 
manipulations.  
Likewise, as a result of the problems in accounting-based performance measures, it can 
also be observed in this study that there are numerous contradictory significant results 
between accounting-based and market-based performance measures. The contradictory 
research results in this study will not be taken into consideration as part of the 
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significant findings in this research because the type of research that is conducted in this 
study is conclusive research. To confirm the hypotheses that are tested in this research 
requires either conclusive evidence in both accounting-based and market-based 
performance measures or conclusive evidence which is restricted to only market-based 
or accounting-based performance measure (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009; 
Singh, 2007). Therefore, only conclusive evidences whether they are robust against all 
the performance measures utilised in this study or only restricted to one particular 
performance measure in this study are accepted as significant findings for this type of 
research. 
Overall, after considering the limitations of this research; the basic implication of the 
findings of this study is that this research indicates that minority shareholder 
expropriation does exist within Malaysian family and non-family firms. On the other 
hand, reputational effects in the aftermath of the Transmile case help to reduce minority 
shareholder expropriation in family firms by encouraging family controlling 
shareholders to reduce their expropriation through RPTs and as well as encouraging 
them to exert less influence upon independent directors as the latter‘s tenure increases, 
thus, reducing their level of expropriation.  
Lastly, the research results in this study can possibly dispute the argument by Peng and 
Jiang (2010) that reputational effects is a poor substitute for institutional deficiencies 
such as low minority shareholder rights protection particularly in emerging markets 
such as Malaysia because the research results show that these effects are able to reduce 
minority shareholder expropriation. 
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7.4 RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 
7.4.1 Theoretical Contributions  
There are several theoretical contributions of this research. 
First, the comparisons conducted in this study with the objectives of assessing whether 
expropriation as well as the moderating effects of controlling shareholders‘ ownership 
on expropriation, are more prevalent in Malaysian family firms or non-family firms are 
necessary because according to agency theory, principal-principal conflict (i.e. minority 
shareholder expropriation) may be more prevalent in family firms compared to non-
family firms (Fama and Jensen, 1983b; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Furthermore, the 
likelihood of this conflict occurring is highest during periods of financial crisis (Jiang 
and Peng, 2011; Johnson et.al., 2000a; Mitton, 2002; Young et.al., 2008).  However, 
corporate reputational effects may also help mitigate this conflict (Gomes, 2000; 
Claessens and Fan, 2002; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Khanna and Yafeh, 2007).  
To conduct the comparisons in this research, the periods of analysis chosen is between 
2007 and 2009.  During this period, two major events affect Malaysia, namely, the 
Transmile fiasco in 2007 which induced corporate reputational effects particularly in 
family firms (Song, 2010), as well as the global financial crisis which started in 2008.  
The comparisons conducted in this study provide a new perspective to agency theory as 
the extant literature have not empirically examined the interplay between agency theory 
(with respect to principal-principal conflict), corporate reputational effects and financial 
crisis within a single analysis i.e. the effects of minority shareholder expropriation on 
firm value during a period where corporate reputational effects as well as financial crisis 
exist and they may influence this relationship.  
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Since periods of financial crisis aggravates minority shareholder expropriation whereas 
corporate reputational effects help mitigate this problem, the existence of these 
opposing forces simultaneously may generate a particular outcome on the relationship 
between minority shareholder expropriation and firm value.  Hence, this provides a new 
perspective to agency theory (with respect to principal-principal conflict) as previous 
studies have only discussed or examined the interplay between agency theory (with 
respect to principal-principal conflict) and corporate reputational effects (i.e. the impact 
of corporate reputational effects on minority shareholder expropriation) (Gomes, 2000; 
Khanna and Palepu, 2000 and Khanna and Yafeh, 2007) as well as between agency 
theory (with respect to principal-principal conflict) and financial crisis (i.e. the extent of 
minority shareholder expropriation during periods of financial crisis) (Jiang and Peng, 
2011; Johnson et.al., 2000a; Mitton, 2002; Young et.al., 2008). As such, this study 
provides a new perspective to agency theory (with respect to principal-principal 
conflict)  by showing that corporate reputational effects help mitigate minority 
shareholder expropriation during periods of financial crisis through the positive 
moderating effects of controlling shareholders‘ ownership. In addition to that, the 
finding that expropriation through RPTs is more prevalent in emerging market firms 
such as Malaysian family firms also supports the contingency approach towards RPTs 
as proposed by Pizzo (2011) as discussed in Chapter 3. Consistent with this theory, 
expropriation through RPTs is more prevalent in firms located in emerging markets 
where the level of investor protection is lower as this encourages expropriation. 
Secondly, by examining the relationship between independent directors‘ tenures and 
firm value; this research contributes to the corporate governance literature as it 
empirically examines certain assumptions of agency theory (with respect to principal-
principal conflict). Based upon agency theory (with respect to principal-principal 
conflict), independent directors who are basically outside directors without family or 
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business ties to the firm are presumed to be able to impartially provide checks and 
balances to board decision-making as well as to evaluate top management.  It is also 
assumed that they are less likely to be influenced by the controlling shareholder through 
the CEO
24
 (Fama and Jensen, 1983b).  However, whether these assumptions still hold in 
emerging markets is yet to be investigated.  In this research, the significant negative 
relationship between independent directors‘ tenure and firm value in family firms (in 
exclusive industries only) shows that the assumptions of agency theory (with respect to 
principal-principal conflict) with regards to the effectiveness and ―true independence‘ of 
independent directors; do not hold within family firms in exclusive industries in 
emerging markets such as Malaysia. This provides a new perspective to agency theory 
(with respect to principal-principal conflict), hence, making a theoretical contribution.  
This result also proves that the managerial hegemony theory as discussed in Chapter 2 
is applicable in the Malaysian context within family firms in exclusive industries. This 
is because it is proven that the management of family firms in exclusive industries do 
exert their influence upon the independent directors as the latter‘s tenure increases as 
shown by the significant negative relationship between average independent directors‘ 
tenure and firm value in these firms. 
Thirdly, by examining the moderating effects of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on 
the relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation, independent 
directors‘ tenure as well as the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with, 
and firm value; this research extends the existing theory of ownership structure by 
providing robust empirical evidence on how controlling shareholders‘ ownership 
influences expropriation within firms. The findings that there is a significant positive 
moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between 
RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation and firm value as well as between 
                                                          
24
  The CEO is usually someone hired by the controlling shareholder and he is supportive of the latter (Peng and Jiang, 2010). 
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average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value in Malaysian family firms shows 
that controlling shareholders‘ ownership can indeed mitigate expropriation via RPTs as 
well as reduce expropriation due to long tenure of independent directors in family firms. 
On the other hand, the findings that there is a significant negative moderating effect of 
controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between RPTs which are likely 
to result in expropriation and firm value as well as between the number of domestic 
banks that the firm engages with and firm value in Malaysian non-family firms suggest 
that large controlling shareholders in non-family firms are likely to be involved in 
minority shareholder expropriation. All these findings contribute to the theory of 
ownership structure. 
Aside from theoretical contributions, there are also policy implications of this research. 
7.4.2 Policy Implications 
There are several policy implications of this research.  
Firstly, the significant negative relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in 
expropriation (in family firms) and average independent directors‘ tenure (in family 
firms in exclusive industries only) against firm value as well as the significant negative 
moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between 
RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation and firm value and between the number 
of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value in Malaysian non-family 
firms; indicate to the Securities Commission (SC) that minority shareholder 
expropriation do exist within Malaysian public-listed family and non-family firms.  As 
such, the SC should re-evaluate Part 8, Para. 8.1-8.3 of the Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) 2012 so that in the future, it can improve the codes of 
corporate governance.  Currently, through these provisions, MCCG 2012 does not 
include protection of minority shareholder rights.  Protection of minority shareholders‘ 
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rights would be able to strengthen the relationship between the firm and shareholders as 
it encourages minority shareholders to be more proactive in the firm‘s decision-making 
(La Porta et.al., 1997, 1998; Qian and Zhao, 2011).  This is consistent with the 
objectives of Part 8, MCCG 2012.  Protection of minority shareholders‘ rights is also 
important as it is part of the objectives of the Malaysian Capital Market Master Plan 
(CMP) issued in 2001 (Shim, 2006).  Hence, if the SC issues codes of corporate 
governance in the future, it should include protection of minority shareholder rights as 
part of its objectives in improving corporate governance.  
Secondly, the significant negative relationship between independent directors‘ tenure 
and firm value as found in family firms in exclusive industries only, suggests that the 
recommendation in MCCG 2012
25
 which limits the independent directors‘ tenure to a 
maximum of nine years is applicable and should be continued. This recommendation 
should particularly target family firms in exclusive industries only as shown by the 
research results. The reason is because the research results show that long tenure of the 
independent directors reduces firm value in this type of family firms. 
Thirdly, the Central Bank should evaluate the bank-directed lending policy which is still 
prevalent in Malaysia (Ang, 2009; Ang and Sen, 2011) particularly to politically-
connected (Boubakri, Cosset and Saffar, 2009) large non-family firms which have easy 
access to bank-directed lending (Ang, 2009; Ang and Sen, 2011), as the results show 
that there is a significant negative moderating effect of controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership on the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with and firm value in non-family firms.  Bank-directed lending policies 
provide opportunities for controlling shareholders to expropriate the loans they obtain 
from the domestic banks, as debt provide incentives for expropriation in emerging 
markets (Faccio et.al., 2001c). 
                                                          
25
  Part 3, Para.3.3. 
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7.5 LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
There are two limitations of this research.  
First, the credit crunch which occurs during the global financial crisis in emerging 
markets such as Malaysia (Cetorelli and Golberg, 2010; Claessens et.al., 2010; Tong 
and Wei, 2011) might be the reason for the existence of insignificant results in family 
firms in the relationship between the number of domestic banks that the firm engages 
with and firm value as well as the moderating effects of controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership on this relationship. As explained earlier in this chapter, the credit crunch 
could have resulted in the reduction of domestic bank-lending to family firms. Hence, 
this reduced the level of domestic loan expropriation by family controlling shareholders 
during the period of study. Therefore, it is difficult to obtain significant results in the 
analysis of minority shareholder expropriation through the domestic banking channel in 
family firms during this period. Similarly,  due to the credit crunch, it is also difficult to 
achieve significant results in the analysis of the moderating effect of controlling 
shareholders‘ ownership on this relationship as there is not much expropriation which 
they can reduce through the domestic banking channel as their ownership increase as a 
result of corporate reputational effects of the Transmile case. Basically, the credit 
crunch have inhibited the achievement of significant results in the relationship between 
the number of domestic banks that the firm engages with and firm value in Malaysian 
family firms as well as in the moderating effects of controlling shareholders‘ ownership 
on this relationship, which, otherwise, could possibly have been achieved. 
Second, the significant research results related to the hypotheses as found in this study 
are mainly restricted to market-based measures only. This shows that the market-based 
performance measures are more sensitive to Agency Problem Type II (principal-
principal conflict). This occurs possibly because accounting-based performance 
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measures in this study may be subject to management manipulation (Chakravarthy, 
1986; Lubatkin and Shrieves, 1986; Purkayastha, 2013). Hence, a true and unbiased 
comprehensive research results encompassing both market-based and accounting-based 
performance measures could not be entirely achieved in this study. Therefore, the 
significant results obtained in this study ought to be viewed within the context of the 
limitations of the research results whereby the accounting-based performance measures 
may be subject to management manipulation which resulted in contradictory research 
findings as well as results which are restricted to only one type of performance measure.  
Third, there is an element of survivorship bias in this research as firms in the sample are 
obtained with the condition that the company have survived the entire period of 
analysis.  In addition, firms which are listed after 31
st
 December, 2007 or delisted from 
the Main Market are excluded from the sample.  Hence, this survivorship bias inhibits a 
more complete sample from being utilised in this research. If there is no such inhibition, 
a better and clearer research results could have been achieved with a larger sample size. 
7.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are four suggestions for future research. 
First, future research could analyse the relationship between the number of domestic 
banks that the firm engages with and firm value in Malaysian family firms during a 
period without credit crunch. This will provide a clearer picture as to whether minority 
shareholder expropriation through the domestic banking channel does occur among 
Malaysian family firms. Similarly, a comparison of minority shareholder expropriation 
through the domestic banking channel between family and non-family firms during 
periods without credit crunch could also provide a clearer picture as to whether 
expropriation through the domestic banking channel (if any) is stronger in family firms 
or non-family firms. 
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Second, future research could analyse why long tenure of independent directors reduces 
firm value only in Malaysian family firms in exclusive industries and not in Malaysian 
family firms in non-exclusive industries as well as why controlling shareholders with 
high equity stakes in large non-family firms in exclusive industries or biased industries 
negatively moderates the firm value effects of RPTs. As explained earlier, this may 
possibly be due to lower market competition encountered by these firms in exclusive 
industries which result in less job commitment of their independent directors, and 
ultimately result in minority shareholder expropriation through RPTs as well as due to 
the long tenure of these directors. However, there is still limited direct empirical 
evidence on these issues. Future research could provide more empirical evidence on 
these issues in an in-depth manner. 
Third, future studies on minority shareholder expropriation which analyse firm value 
effects should utilise performance measures which are less subject to management 
manipulation such as market-based performance measures (McGuire et.al., 1990). This 
will reduce the distortions in the research results which could yield a more unbiased 
research findings. 
Lastly, future research can compare whether minority shareholder expropriation is 
higher during the period 2007-2009 (whereby the global financial crisis and the 
Transmile corporate reputational effects prevail) or during the pre-2007 period within 
the context of the Malaysian institutional setting. This future study is interesting as the 
extant literature only provide limited empirical evidence on this issue. Future research 
can also examine minority shareholder expropriation using monthly or annual buy and 
hold stock returns as part of the market-based performance measures at it is a better 
measure of firm value (which is more aligned to shareholder objectives). 
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7.7 CONCLUSION  
Basically this chapter discuss the conclusions drawn from the research results from the 
previous chapter. It also discuss the implications of the findings, research significance, 
limitations as well as suggestions for future research.  
With consideration of the limitations of this study, generally, the findings in this 
research shows that Agency Problem Type II (principal-principal conflict) exist within 
Malaysian family and non-family firms. However, minority shareholder expropriation 
through RPTs is found to be more prominent in family firms compared to non-family 
firms. In addition, the reduction in firm value due to long tenure of independent 
directors within family firms in exclusive industries shows that in this type of firms, 
longer tenure of independent directors is detrimental to the interests of minority 
shareholders as family controlling shareholders could exert more influence on these 
directors as their tenure increase, thus, reducing their true independence and increasing 
minority shareholder  expropriation.  
On the other hand, the positive moderating effect of family controlling shareholders‘ 
ownership on the relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in expropriation 
and firm value as well as between average independent directors‘ tenure and firm value 
suggests that family firm reputational effects is able to reduce minority shareholder 
expropriation in Malaysian family firms, particularly in the aftermath of the Transmile 
fiasco. Vice versa, the negative moderating effects of non-family controlling 
shareholders‘ ownership on the relationship between RPTs which are likely to result in 
expropriation and firm value and between the number of domestic banks that the firm 
engages with and firm value in Malaysian non-family firms; suggests that controlling 
shareholders with high equity stakes in large non-family firms might be involved in 
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minority shareholder expropriation through RPTs as well as through the domestic 
banking channel.  
Hence, all these brings into dispute the argument by Peng and Jiang (2010) that 
reputational effects is a poor substitute for institutional deficiencies in emerging markets 
such as Malaysia. 
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9.0 APPENDICES 
9.1  APPENDIX A 
9.1.1    List Of Public-listed Companies Utilised In This Research 
No. Family Firms 
1.  A-Rank Bhd 
2.  Abric Bhd 
3.  Adventa Bhd 
4.  AHB Bhd 
5.  Ahmad Zaki Resources Bhd 
6.  AIC Corporation Bhd 
7.  Air Asia Bhd 
8.  Amalgamated Industrial Steel Bhd 
9.  Analabs Resources Bhd 
10.  Ann Joo Resources Bhd 
11.  APB Resources Bhd 
12.  APM Automotive Bhd 
13.  APP Industries Bhd 
14.  Asas Dunia Bhd 
15.  Asia File Corporation Bhd 
16.  Asia Pacific Land Bhd 
17.  Atis Corporation Bhd 
18.  Atlan Bhd 
19.  Atur Maju Resources Bhd 
20.  AutoAir bhd 
21.  AV Ventures Bhd 
22.  AandM Realty Bhd 
23.  Baneng Holding Bhd 
24.  Baswell Resources Bhd 
25.  Batu Kawan Bhd 
26.  BCB Bhd 
27.  Berjaya Land Bhd 
28.  Berjaya Sports Toto Bhd 
29.  Bintai Kinden Bhd 
30.  BLD Plantation Bhd 
31.  Bolton Bhd 
32.  Bonia Bhd 
33.  BoxPak Bhd 
34.  BP Plastic Bhd 
35.  Brem Holdings Bhd 
36.  Bright Packaging Bhd 
37.  BSL Corporation Bhd 
38.  BTM Resources Bhd 
39.  Cab Cakaran Bhd 
40.  Canone Bhd 
41.  CPBIP Bhd 
42.  CCK Consolidated Bhd 
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No. Family Firms 
43.  Century Bond Bhd 
44.  Century Logistic Bhd 
45.  Cepat Wawasan Bhd 
46.  Changhuat Corporation Bhd 
47.  Cheetah Corporation Bhd 
48.  Choo Bee Metal Bhd 
49.  Chuan Huat Resources Bhd 
50.  Classic Scenic Bhd 
51.  CNAsia Bhd 
52.  Coastal Contract Bhd 
53.  Cocoa Land Bhd 
54.  Comintel Bhd 
55.  Compugates Bhd 
56.  Country Heights Bhd 
57.  Crescendo Corporation Bhd 
58.  Crest Builder Bhd 
59.  CYL Corporation Bhd 
60.  CI Holding Bhd 
61.  Dataprep Bhd 
62.  Degem Bhd 
63.  Deleum Bhd 
64.  Delloyd Ventures Bhd 
65.  Dialog Group Bhd 
66.  DKLS Bhd 
67.  Dijaya Corporation Bhd 
68.  Dolomite Corporation Bhd 
69.  Dominant Enterprise Bhd 
70.  DPS Bhd 
71.  Dreamgate Bhd 
72.  DXN Bhd 
73.  DBE Resources Bhd 
74.  Eden Bhd 
75.  Ekovest Bhd 
76.  Emas Kiara Bhd 
77.  Encorp Bhd 
78.  Eng Kah Bhd 
79.  Eng Tex Bhd 
80.  Eonmetall Group Bhd 
81.  EP Manufacturing Bhd 
82.  Esthetic International Group Bhd 
83.  Eupe Bhd 
84.  Eurospan Bhd 
85.  Euro Holdings Bhd 
86.  FACB Industries Bhd 
87.  Farlim Group Bhd 
88.  Farms Best Bhd 
89.  Favelle Favco Bhd 
90.  Federal Furniture Bhd 
91.  Fiamma Bhd 
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No. Family Firms 
92.  Fima Corporation Bhd 
93.  Fitters Bhd 
94.  Formis Resources Bhd 
95.  FurniWeb Bhd 
96.  FSBM Bhd 
97.  Freight Management Holding Bhd 
98.  Gadang Bhd 
99.  Gefung Bhd 
100.  General Corporation Bhd 
101.  Genting Bhd 
102.  Ge-Shen Corporation Bhd 
103.  George Kent Bhd 
104.  Glenealy Plantations Bhd 
105.  Globetronics Bhd 
106.  Golden Frontier Bhd 
107.  Glomac Bhd 
108.  Goldis Bhd 
109.  Golsta Bhd 
110.  Goodway Bhd 
111.  Gopeng Bhd 
112.  GR&D Central Enterprise Bhd 
113.  GR&D Hoover Bhd 
114.  Green Packet Bhd 
115.  Guan Chong Bhd 
116.  Gunung Capital Bhd 
117.  Guoco Land Bhd 
118.  Hai-O Enterprise Bhd 
119.  Haisan Bhd 
120.  Harbour-Link Bhd 
121.  Harnlen Bhd 
122.  Hevea Bhd 
123.  Hexza Corporation Bhd 
124.  Hiap Tek Bhd 
125.  HIL Industries Bhd 
126.  Hing Yiap Knitting Bhd 
127.  Hirotako Bhd 
128.  Hong Leong Industries Bhd 
129.  Hovid Bhd 
130.  HPI Industries Bhd 
131.  Hock Sin Leong Bhd 
132.  Hock Seng Lee Bhd 
133.  Huat Lai Bhd 
134.  Hua Yang Bhd 
135.  Hume Industries Bhd 
136.  Hunza Properties Bhd 
137.  Hup Seng Bhd 
138.  Hwa Tai Corporation Bhd 
139.  Hytex Bhd 
140.  Ibraco Bhd 
326 
 
No. Family Firms 
141.  I-Bhd 
142.  IGB Bhd 
143.  Imaspro Bhd 
144.  Ingress Bhd 
145.  Integrated Rubber Corporation Bhd 
146.  Integra Bhd 
147.  IOI Corporation Bhd 
148.  Ipmuda Bhd 
149.  Ireka Corporation Bhd 
150.  Jadi Corporation Bhd 
151.  Jasa Kita Bhd 
152.  Jaycorp Bhd 
153.  Jaya Tiasa Bhd 
154.  JMR Corporation Bhd 
155.  Johan Holdings Bhd 
156.  Johore Tin Bhd 
157.  Kamdar Bhd 
158.  Karabunai Corporation Bhd 
159.  Kawan Corporation Bhd 
160.  KBB Resources Bhd 
161.  Kein Hing International Bhd 
162.  Kencana Petroleum Bhd 
163.  Ken Holdings Bhd 
164.  Khee San Bhd 
165.  Khind Bhd 
166.  Kian Joo Bhd 
167.  Kia Lim Bhd 
168.  Kim Hin Bhd 
169.  Kim Loong Bhd 
170.  Kinsteel Bhd 
171.  KKB Engineering Bhd 
172.  KNM Bhd 
173.  Knusford Bhd 
174.  Kobay Bhd 
175.  Komark Bhd 
176.  Konsortium Logistik Bhd 
177.  Kossan Bhd 
178.  Kotra Industries Bhd 
179.  KPS Consortium Bhd 
180.  Kretam Holdings Bhd 
181.  Kriss Asset Bhd 
182.  KSL Bhd 
183.  KL Kepong Bhd 
184.  Kumpulan Europlus Bhd 
185.  Kumpulan Fima Bhd 
186.  Kumpulan HandL High Tech Bhd 
187.  Kumpulan Powernet Bhd 
188.  Kwantas Corporation Bhd 
189.  KYM Holdings Bhd 
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No. Family Firms 
190.  Latexx Bhd 
191.  Lay Hong Bhd 
192.  LB Aluminium Bhd 
193.  LBI Capital Bhd 
194.  LBS Bina Group Bhd 
195.  Len Cheong Bhd 
196.  Lebar Daun Bhd 
197.  Lee Swee Kiat Bhd 
198.  Leweko Corporation Bhd 
199.  Lien Hoe Corporation Bhd 
200.  LiiHen Bhd 
201.  Lingui Bhd 
202.  Lion Corporation Bhd 
203.  Lion Diversified Bhd 
204.  Lion Forest Bhd 
205.  Lion Industries Bhd 
206.  Lipo Corporation Bhd 
207.  London Biscuit Bhd 
208.  Leader Steel Bhd 
209.  LTKM Bhd 
210.  Luster Industries Bhd 
211.  Lysaght Bhd 
212.  Malaysian AE Model Bhd 
213.  Magni Bhd 
214.  Mahajaya Bhd 
215.  Mah Sing Bhd 
216.  Malton Bhd 
217.  Mamee Bhd 
218.  Malaysian Bulk Carriers Bhd 
219.  Malaysia Pacific Industries Bhd 
220.  Mechmar Bhd 
221.  Melati Ehsan Holdings Bhd 
222.  Melewar Industrial Group Bhd 
223.  Metal Reclamation Bhd 
224.  Metro Kajang Bhd 
225.  Metronic Bhd 
226.  Mega First Corporation Bhd 
227.  MHC Plantation Bhd 
228.  MHouse Bhd 
229.  Mieco Bhd 
230.  Minetech Bhd 
231.  Mintye Bhd 
232.  Mitrajaya Bhd 
233.  MK Land Bhd 
234.  MTD ACPI Engineering Bhd 
235.  MTD Capital Bhd 
236.  Muda Bhd 
237.  Mudajaya Bhd 
238.  Muhibah Bhd 
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No. Family Firms 
239.  MUH Bhd 
240.  Multivest Bhd 
241.  Mycron Bhd 
242.  Narra Industries Bhd 
243.  New Hoong Fatt Bhd 
244.  NPC Bhd 
245.  NTPM Bhd 
246.  NV Multi Corporation Bhd 
247.  NWP Bhd 
248.  Nylex Bhd 
249.  Ogawa Bhd 
250.  OFI Industries Bhd 
251.  OKA Bhd 
252.  Oriental Bhd 
253.  Padini Bhd 
254.  Pahanco Bhd 
255.  Pantech Bhd 
256.  Paos Holding Bhd 
257.  Paramount Bhd 
258.  Parkson Bhd 
259.  Patimas Bhd 
260.  PCCS Bhd 
261.  Pelangi Publishing Group Bhd 
262.  Pensonic Bhd 
263.  Pentamaster Bhd 
264.  Permaju Bhd 
265.  Petaling Tin Bhd 
266.  Picorp Bhd 
267.  Pintaras Bhd 
268.  PJ Bumi Bhd 
269.  PJ Development Bhd 
270.  PLB Engineering Bhd 
271.  Poh Kong Bhd 
272.  Poly Glass Fibre Bhd 
273.  PPHB Bhd 
274.  Prestar Bhd 
275.  Prinsiptek Bhd 
276.  Pulai Spring Bhd 
277.  Puncak Niaga Bhd 
278.  PW Consolidated Bhd 
279.  Priceworth Wood Products Bhd 
280.  QL Resources Bhd 
281.  Quality Concrete Holdings Bhd 
282.  Ranhill Holdings Bhd 
283.  Rapid Bhd 
284.  Rock Chemical Industries Bhd 
285.  Resin Tech Bhd 
286.  Reliance Pacific Bhd 
287.  Rimbunan Sawit Bhd 
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No. Family Firms 
288.  Riverview Bhd 
289.  Sapura Crest Bhd 
290.  Sapura Industrial Bhd 
291.  Sapura Resources Bhd 
292.  Satang Holdings Bhd 
293.  SBC Corporation Bhd 
294.  Scientex Bhd 
295.  Scomi Engineering Bhd 
296.  Scomi Marine Bhd 
297.  Selangor Dredging Bhd 
298.  Seacera Bhd 
299.  See Hup Bhd 
300.  Sernkou Bhd 
301.  Shangri-La Bhd 
302.  SHL Consolidated Bhd 
303.  Sitt Tat Bhd 
304.  Seni Jaya Bhd 
305.  Sino-Huaan Bhd 
306.  SKB Shutters Bhd 
307.  SKP Bhd 
308.  SLP Resources Bhd 
309.  SMIS Corporation Bhd 
310.  Sarawak Oil Palm Bhd 
311.  Selangor Properties Bhd 
312.  Southern Acid Bhd 
313.  Southern Steel Bhd 
314.  Spritzer Bhd 
315.  Stamford College Bhd 
316.  Stone Corporation Bhd 
317.  Subur Bhd 
318.  Success Bhd 
319.  Sui Wah Bhd 
320.  Sumatec Bhd 
321.  Sunway City Bhd 
322.  Sunway Holdings Bhd 
323.  Supermax Bhd 
324.  Swee Joo Bhd 
325.  Sarawak Plantations Bhd 
326.  SYF Bhd 
327.  Taan Bhd 
328.  TAFI Industries Bhd 
329.  Takaso Corporation Bhd 
330.  Talam Corporation Bhd 
331.  Taliworks Corporation Bhd 
332.  Tamadam Bhd 
333.  Tanco Bhd 
334.  Tasek Bhd 
335.  Teck Guan Perdana Bhd 
336.  Tek Seng Bhd 
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No. Family Firms 
337.  Tanjung Offshore Bhd 
338.  Thong Guan Bhd 
339.  Tiong Nam Logistics Bhd 
340.  Transocean Bhd 
341.  Tomei Corporation Bhd 
342.  Top Glove Corporation Bhd 
343.  TPC Bhd 
344.  TRC Bhd 
345.  Triumphal Bhd 
346.  TSR Capital Bhd 
347.  TheStore Corporation Bhd 
348.  Tradewinds Bhd 
349.  Tradewinds Corporation Bhd 
350.  UMS-Neiken Bhd 
351.  UnimechBhd 
352.  Unisem Bhd 
353.  United Bintang Bhd 
354.  United Kotak Bhd 
355.  United U-Li Corporation Bhd 
356.  UPA Press Bhd 
357.  Voir Industries Bhd 
358.  VS Industry Bhd 
359.  Wah Seong Bhd 
360.  Wang Zheng Bhd 
361.  Warisan Bhd 
362.  Watta Holdings Bhd 
363.  Wawasan TKH Holdings Bhd 
364.  Weida Bhd 
365.  Wong Engineering Bhd 
366.  Woodlandor Holdings Bhd 
367.  WTK Holdings Bhd 
368.  WWE Holdings Bhd 
369.  Xian Leng Holdings Bhd 
370.  Yee Lee Corporation Bhd 
371.  Yinson Bhd 
372.  YLI Holdings Bhd 
373.  YNH Property Bhd 
374.  Yong Tai Bhd 
375.  YTL Cement Bhd 
376.  YTL Land and Development Bhd 
377.  YTL Power Corporation Bhd 
378.  Zecon Bhd 
379.  Zhulian Bhd 
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No. State-Owned Firms 
1.  Acoustech Bhd 
2.  ARK Resources Bhd 
3.  Astral Asia Bhd 
4.  Bina Darulaman Bhd 
5.  Bintulu Port Bhd 
6.  Boustead Heavy Industries Bhd 
7.  Chemical  Company Of Malaysia Bhd 
8.  CCM Duopharma Bhd 
9.  Central Industrial Corporation Bhd 
10.  Damansara Realty Bhd 
11.  Eastern Pacific Industries Corporation Bhd 
12.  Faber Group Bhd 
13.  Formosa Pronsonic Bhd 
14.  Golden Pharos Bhd 
15.  KFC Holdings Bhd 
16.  KLCC Property Bhd 
17.  KPJ Healthcare Bhd 
18.  Kulim (M) Bhd 
19.  Kumpulan Hartatanah Selangor Bhd 
20.  Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Bhd 
21.  Kurnia Setia Bhd 
22.  Maju Perak Bhd 
23.  Malaysia Airline System Bhd 
24.  Mentiga Bhd 
25.  MISC Bhd 
26.  Malaysia  Airport Holdings Bhd 
27.  Malaysian Resources Corporation Bhd 
28.  NCB Bhd 
29.  News Straits Times Press (M) Bhd 
30.  Pasdec Bhd 
31.  Perbadanan Bekalan Air Pulau Pinang Bhd 
32.  Pembinaan Limbongan Setia Bhd 
33.  Perak Corporation Bhd 
34.  Petronas Dagangan Bhd 
35.  Petronas Gas Bhd 
36.  Pharma Niaga Bhd 
37.  PLUS Expressway Bhd 
38.  Pos Malaysia Bhd 
39.  Proton Holdings Bhd 
40.  QSR BR&D Bhd 
41.  Silverbird Bhd 
42.  Sindora Bhd 
43.  SPK Bhd 
44.  Suria Capital Bhd 
45.  TDM Bhd 
46.  Tebrau Bhd 
47.  Telekom Bhd 
48.  Tenaga Nasional Bhd 
49.  TH Plant Bhd 
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No. State-Owned Firms 
50.  Time DotCom Bhd 
51.  Time Engineering Bhd 
52.  Tracoma Bhd 
53.  UAC Bhd 
54.  UMW Holdings Bhd 
55.  Utusan Melayu Bhd 
56.  Ya Horng Electronics Bhd 
 
 
No. Foreign-Owned Firms 
1.  AEON Corporation Bhd 
2.  Ajinomoto Bhd 
3.  Amway Bhd 
4.  Apex Healthcare Bhd 
5.  Apollo Food Holdings Bhd 
6.  British American Tobacco (M) Bhd 
7.  Carlsberg (M) Bhd 
8.  Chin Teck Plantations Bhd 
9.  Cycle and Carriage Bhd 
10.  Cymao Bhd 
11.  Daiman Development Bhd 
12.  Digi.Com Bhd 
13.  DNP Holdings Bhd 
14.  Dutch Lady Bhd 
15.  Eksons Bhd 
16.  Esso (M) Bhd 
17.  Evergreen Fireboard Bhd 
18.  Fraser and Neave Bhd 
19.  Guiness Anchor (M) Bhd 
20.  Harrison Holdings Bhd 
21.  Industronics Bhd 
22.  IQ Group Bhd 
23.  JT International Bhd 
24.  Keck Seng Bhd 
25.  Kenmark Industrial Corporation Bhd 
26.  KESM Industries Bhd 
27.  Kluang Rubber Company Bhd 
28.  Kuchai Development Bhd 
29.  LaFarge Cement (M) Bhd 
30.  Latitude Bhd 
31.  LCTH Bhd 
32.  Maxtral Bhd 
33.  Metech Group Bhd 
34.  Metrod Bhd 
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No. Foreign-Owned Firms 
35.  Malaysian Packaging Bhd 
36.  Malaysian Smelting Corporation Bhd 
37.  Negeri Sembilan Oil Palms Bhd 
38.  Nestle (M) Bhd 
39.  Nikko Electronics (M) Bhd 
40.  OCI Bhd 
41.  Panasonic (M) Bhd 
42.  Perstima Bhd 
43.  PIE Industrial Bhd 
44.  PNE PCB Bhd 
45.  Sungai Bagan Corporation Bhd 
46.  Shell (M) Bhd 
47.  Sunchirin Bhd 
48.  Superlon (M) Bhd 
49.  Tai Kwong Yokohama (M) Bhd 
50.  Tawin Bhd 
51.  Texchem (M) Bhd 
52.  Tien Wah Press (M) Bhd 
53.  Titan Chemicals (M) Bhd 
54.  Tong Her (M) Bhd 
55.  Uchi Tech Bhd 
56.  Wellcall Holdings Bhd 
57.  Yeo Heap Seng (M) Bhd 
58.  Yi Lai Bhd 
59.  YSP South East Asia Bhd 
 
No. Corporate-Owned Firms 
1.  Alam Maritime Resources Bhd 
2.  Aliran Insan Resources Bhd 
3.  Amtek Bhd 
4.  Concrete Engineering Bhd 
5.  DKSH Bhd 
6.  Ekowood Bhd 
7.  Emivest Bhd 
8.  Fututech Bhd 
9.  Heitech Padu Bhd 
10.  IRM Group Bhd 
11.  Konsortium Transnasional Bhd 
12.  KUB Bhd 
13.  MBM Resources Bhd 
14.  Minho Bhd 
15.  Mulpha Land Bhd 
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No. Corporate-Owned Firms 
16.  Plenitude Bhd 
17.  Star Publications (M) Bhd 
18.  Unico-Desa Plantations Bhd 
19.  Zelan Bhd 
 
No. Firms With Mixed Ultimate Ownership For Different Years (Others) 
1.  Padiberas Nasional Bhd 
2.  Ramunia Bhd 
3.  SMPC Corporation Bhd 
4.  KeyAsic (M) Bhd 
5.  Loh and Loh Corporation Bhd 
6.  MUI Properties Bhd 
7.  Mulpha International Bhd 
8.  Putrajaya Perdana Bhd 
9.  UBG Bhd 
10.  Global Carriers Bhd 
11.  GSB Group Bhd 
12.  Petra Energy Bhd 
13.  SEG Bhd 
14.  Ekran Bhd 
15.  Evermaster Group Bhd 
16.  LCL Corporation Bhd 
17.  Java (M) Bhd 
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Conference Proceeding 
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